Some years ago I was asked to present at a conference on high-rise firefighting. I've never even worked in a community that had a building taller than six stories, so my task was to find something to contribute. I embarked on a research project to study all the firefighter fatalities in North America occurring during operations at high-rise fires. What I found was as surprising as it was troubling.

Nearly all of the fatalities occurred because firefighters violated three basic principles:

Team operations

If one member of the team has a problem or an issue, the entire team should exit the building. Teams arrive together, work together and leave together regardless of the assignment. This buddy system can't be overstated.

Air management

Is it wise to decide when to leave a hazardous, unpredictable environment based on a low-air alarm? The American fire service should take a cue from our brothers across the pond and order crews out of an environment immediately dangerous to life or health based on meticulous monitoring of fire attack teams' time in the building, the amount of air in their cylinders and calculation of the exact second that they need to be ordered out of the building — long before a low-air alarm ever sounds.

Ventilation

The science doesn't change. If any member of the team creates uncoordinated openings, these openings frequently result in a sudden hazardous event and lead to fireground deaths.

Other recurring problems on the list included forgetting the radio on the truck; not wearing full PPE; disregarding orders; not calling for help or direction when lost, trapped or in trouble; and the old standby: freelancing outside of the command and accountability system.

Maintaining competence should be a personal and organizational priority. There are many “use it or lose it” skills in fire suppression that really do matter. They may not always seem like the most critical skills, but when the time comes to execute, you don't want the lights but no one at home.

I recall a traffic accident where an occupied Pontiac sports car became airborne and ended up precariously balanced on a utility pole guy-wire with all four tires off the ground. An engine and truck were on scene, and I was the responding chief. I asked the truck officer what his plan was, and he responded that his crew was going to secure the axles to anchors on all four directions and use an A-frame ladder to access and remove the driver. The occupant was still behind the wheel and the “Keystone Firemen” still were running around the car with no progress 20 minutes later. What was the problem? No one could tie an appropriate knot for the occasion. As a chief officer responsible for their training, I wasn't feeling good about life at that particular moment.

I also remember working a full cardiac arrest with the senior paramedic in the department. He intubated and ventilated the patient and gave her an amp of sodium bicarbonate. The patient's heart rate and rhythm converted and she started breathing on her own. My partner then pulled an epinephrine preload out of the drug box and inserted it in the IV tubing port. I literally grabbed his wrist to stop him from administering the drug. “What are you doing?” I asked. He said, “You always give epi after bicarb, don't you?” You don't if the patient doesn't need it.

These are examples of talented, experienced practitioners who have lost their edge. This usually results from a combination of burnout, lack of proper training, and familiar assignments that don't challenge or require practitioners to be on their game. Members who say they can do this job in their sleep are certainly at risk. In many environments, members do the same routine tasks on every fire or every call; when the time comes to pull an old play out of the playbook, they can't execute and the operation suffers.

Also, frequently the personnel assigned to “drive a desk” simply aren't as current or as proficient as they once were. Every chief officer worth his or her salt wants to get out of the office and respond to a working fire, but it's not about you. If you can't improve the operation, find something productive to do to support the person running the fire.

In my experience, many good firefighters are fully engaged for the first four or five years in a new position but can be difficult to motivate after that time. In many cases, the time that firefighters once focused on training, familiarization and mental scenarios is replaced by the hobby, or business or investment interest of the month. When the bell rings, they find themselves in battle with no skills, tools or alternative options. When you limit your options, you reduce yourself to a small set of tasks that you are proficient in. Abraham Maslow said when your only tool is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.

Think back to auto extrication training in the 1980s. Firefighters were fully trained on high-lift jacks; mastic cutters; porta-powers; come-alongs; and a plethora of widgets and gadgets to rip, snort and tear. Now what do 90% of responders grab for a simple door pop? The hydraulic rescue tool. And the 1I-inch line is the only one they can remember how to pull because they haven't drilled on working lines, heavy streams or tactics, or carried hoselines aloft in years.

Some changes to the profession have occurred for the right reasons and at the right time; some have occurred for the wrong reasons or at the wrong time. Some changes have occurred that no one has bothered to analyze why or what influence they've had on the fire service profession. When it comes to training, there have been some changes that deserve a second look.

In the 1980s, performance standards were touted as an innovation and a best practice being used by many departments throughout the country. The concept was simple: Develop basic fire company tactical evolutions and require on-duty companies to execute these basic evolutions within a predetermined time frame. Some companies may remember “Black Tuesdays” or Fridays when they would have to go to the training tower and perform their evolution for the week, month or quarter. Company officers had immediate feedback on what was expected, what evolutions were standardized and how firefighters were expected to accomplish them. Command officers had an immediate assessment of the performance of their crews, and they had a real-time validated process to determine how long a specific tactical operation would take on the fireground.

Many departments that had the spotlight on them for their development and use of performance standards have since dropped the program. I remember a quote from a Total Quality Management seminar: “If you don't measure it, you don't manage it.” The fire service has been wary of anything that measures or documents performance, even if it was beneficial.

The departments that have successfully maintained these basic competency evaluations have done so by focusing on improvement and not on punishment. Those programs with punitive tones or attitudes surrounding the performance standards seem to have fewer results and more problems being managed and sustained. This same issue arose in the early days of the Wellness and Fitness Initiative. When the focus was on punishing those members who were unfit and below fitness standards, the programs were less successful. Those who use the program as a tool to improve performance and move toward the desired behaviors incrementally have seen significant results and benefits.

Another innovative practice that seems to have gone by the wayside is drill. A drill is different than training. Training is the process of instituting new processes, procedures and techniques. Drills reinforce basic skills to make them second nature. In many organizational cultures, it is difficult to institute drills; they're viewed as a waste of time and criticized for being below the level of experienced practitioners.

I heard an NFL player on television a few month's ago state that his coach expected that every time a ball was dropped, even if it was on the practice field or out of a ball bag, that certain defensive positions were expected to run and retrieve it at all costs.

This is one example of a drill technique instituted and reinforced to make a basic skill reflexive, which influences and leads to a positive outcome. Focusing on the basics with drills, drills and more drills until every position on every company can execute by the numbers under all conditions and variables should be reinstated in all departments for a limited number of tactical evolutions. Hose lays, blitz attacks, ladder evolutions, tactical or operational retreat, and mayday drills all fall in this category.

Avoiding skill atrophy means creating a training program that regularly drills on the basics. Chiefs need to measure and hold their personnel and officers accountable for competency on the basics. If you don't have a drill manual, think about developing one. Have an officers meeting where you agree on the 10 most essential and critical evolutions for engines and then another 10 for trucks and rescues. They should be those basics that must be done correctly the first time or people are in danger. Take these evolutions and begin to focus some time and effort to ensure basic competency throughout your organization.

If you have to drill, then drill. If you need to evaluate using performance standards, then do it. When personnel are competent, put that in their performance evaluation. When they aren't competent at the basics, assign remedial training and evolutions, or take appropriate action to discipline or transfer those who can't cut it. The stakes are too high to function with less than 100% of your responding companies fully trained, experienced and competent on all evolutions that your organization considers to be essential fireground skills.

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John Linstrom is executive director of The Linco Group, an emergency services consultancy. He's an adjunct faculty member for Texas A&M University and the National Fire Academy. Linstrom currently serves as a reserve battalion chief in Apple Valley, Calif. He also serves as commander of the DHS/FEMA DMORT for Region IX and has been involved in the national USAR program since 1996.