Here are some highlights of lessons learned and best practices from after-incident reports submitted to the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center between August and December.

USE OF MARK 3 PUMPS CLARIFIED

Crews and lines overhead should be made aware that the Great Basin Cache at NIFC states all Mark-3 pumps can use the same gas/oil mixtures. The pumps built before the early 1970s originally were specified to use a 16-to-1 gas-to-oil mixture while all pumps made since then require a 24-to-1 ratio. The Cache at NIFC related that pumps manufactured before the early 1970s can be run on the 24-to-1 ratio.

On a Type-3 incident during the 2002 fire season, both generations of pumps were used. This resulted in confusion among crew members over which was the proper gas-to-oil mixture to use. Using the wrong gas-to-oil mixture ratios can impede operations and potentially damage a pump. According to the Cache, all Mark-3 pumps should now have the 24-to-1 ratio boldly stenciled on the pump.

As a point of information, premixed gas-to-oil mixture supplied to Alaskan incidents is mixed to a 40-to-1 ratio. The Alaska Cache has found this mix to be very effective based on 10 years of use and it simplifies logistics for all two-cycle machinery, such as chain saws and pumps, to use the same ratio. For more specifics on operating Mark-3 pumps, visit www.wildfire-equipment.com/Mark-3.html.

POPULATION PROTECTION PLANS FOUND EFFECTIVE

A population urban-interface plan developed by Missoula County, Mont., is now in use by 56 counties in Montana. The “Population Protection Plan” is a document that can be implemented by incident management teams and affected local communities during urban interface wildfires.

The plan consists of four primary elements: fire suppression, evacuation process, access management and structural protection.

The fire suppression component keeps primary resources focused on suppression and is combined with the use of independent advance reconnaissance parties to locate defensible spaces. A portion of the suppression resources are held in staging and then dispatched to these newly identified defensible interface positions.

The evacuation process portion of the plan includes the emergency implementation procedure guidelines and non-compliance response guidelines, and is combined with pre-planned evacuation routes that identify roadblocks and other traffic control points. Resource locations for those being dislocated, such as evacuation centers, are included as part of this portion of the plan.

In the access management component, access criteria are developed, and then bulletin boards, public service announcements and other signage are used to explain access restrictions. Restricted access also may include the use of pilot cars and limits on general access hours to the affected areas.

The structural protection plan considers the use of both traditional and progressive tactics such as engine task forces, large volume sprinkler systems, house wraps, foam and gel applications, and night operations to suppress ember blizzards that can potentially ignite wildland urban-interface structures.

For a copy of the plan format and additional information visit www.wildfirelessons.net/Library.htm#WUI.

SAFETY OBJECTIVE BECOMES PARAMOUNT

On a 2002 Type-3 incident, the first and paramount objective of the initial attack incident commander upon arrival became safely removing the already — on-scene local personnel who were suppressing the fire without proper wildfire training and personal protective equipment. When the wildland fire — trained resources arrived, 30 Marines from a local base and the local volunteer fire department were already on scene. Neither the Marines nor the local fire department were properly trained or equipped to handle this type of incident. Later the incident commander contacted the local Marine Corps commander and arranged for wildland fire and ICS training as well as technical support in securing PPE for the Marines. The county emergency services office also was contacted to arrange for training and proper wildland fire PPE for the local volunteer fire department. As a result, a situation that at one time presented a serious safety liability became a means of establishing additional initial attack resources in this locale at minimal cost.

BRIEFING OPERATIONAL RESOURCES AT CHECK-IN

Crews and other operational resources checking in after the regularly scheduled shift briefings can miss critical information prior to assignment to the fireline. To solve this communication lapse, one incident management team has altered its check-in procedures for operational resources. As part of this team's check-in procedure, new resources are automatically routed through key personnel in a manner similar to the one currently established for the demobilization process. This check-in routing entails line personnel receiving an incident action plan from the plans section, gear and radios from logistics, and an operations briefing from either the staging-area manager or a safety officer. This revised procedure was found to be so effective in preventing check-in lapses that this IMT decided to use it for the remainder of its 2002 season assignments.

INCIDENT MEDICAL TEAMS DEPLOYED

Incident management teams from the Pacific Northwest use incident medical teams that are ordered when one of their teams is first mobilized for an in-region or national assignment. Paramedics and EMTS make up this five-member team working for the medical unit leader. The medical team's primary focus is on preventive medicine rather than treatment after the fact. For example, they work with crews to help prevent dehydration rather than have to treat numerous heat illness cases. Feedback from firefighters and other incident personnel indicates that this type of consistent medical team staffing has led to high-quality care on these incidents.

The Learning Curve

The Learning Curve is the newsletter of the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center, an interagency program supported by the Federal Fire and Aviation Leadership Council. The center works in cooperation with the Federal Fire and Aviation Safety Team, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group's Safety and Health Working Team and Training Working Team, and the National Association of State Foresters. The full text of this newsletter can be found at www.wildfirelessons.net.