Col. David Hackworth was one of the most decorated soldiers of the Vietnam War. He earned more than 90 service decorations, both personal and organizational. After he retired he co-wrote About Face: the Odyssey of an American Warrior. In the book, he touts a theory that every fire officer needs to understand. He admonished all those who are going to take others into combat that "practice doesn't make perfect — it makes it permanent," because "sweat in training saves blood on the battlefield."

What Hackworth was saying is that repetition does not equal perfection, especially when done improperly or inappropriately. Nowhere is this truer than in training firefighters for combat.

If you are like me, you probably become very frustrated when reading frequent stories about firefighters who are killed or badly injured at an incident. Most frustrating are the stories of firefighters dying in training exercises. Practice did not make it perfect for these individuals, and the only things made permanent were the deaths or long-term recoveries that never should been occurred. I particularly am dismayed when the death of a firefighter is called "an unfortunate accident." There is nothing accidental about going to the scene of a fire. We go on purpose and everything we do there also should be on purpose.

Over the last few decades, training has followed a convoluted path that might not be making the fireground safer. Much of what we call "training" in the firehouse is more about media-delivery systems than fireground competency.

What brought this problem to my attention was a conversation I had with a young firefighter after a recruit academy graduation. This particular individual is on the verge of becoming a fire captain. I have known him since he was in Boy Scouts and have had numerous conversations with him about preparing for his career.

In this particular conversation, he lamented that his fire department's training program has turned into nothing more than watching videos and complying with state and federal standards regarding EMS training. He told me that one of the reasons he taught at the fire academy was to participate in the live burns that they don't hold for the in-service crews.

Think about his complaint and ask yourself: Does that kind of training make for a safe firefighter on the fireground?

In my opinion, it doesn't. What makes firefighters safe on the fireground is the hands-on, face-to-face competency with the physical aspects of combat firefighting. It really boils down to being able to wear breathing apparatus, climb ladders, and use powerful tools to tear apart vehicles or force entry into buildings. None of those skill sets come from lying in a recliner and watching a video.

Unfortunately, many fire departments lack the facilities to conduct that kind of approach. Moreover, many departments lack training officers who can make sure that these competencies are being assessed frequently. Lastly, many organizations are so burned out from trying to comply with bureaucratic standards that they fail to realize physical-combat inadequacies.

If I just described your fire department, I apologize. But before you dismiss the hands-on notion as being impossible, I would like you to think about another question. How much of your training program involves actual drilling as opposed to exchanging information? How much of your drilling is aimed at improving firefighters' ability to perform their jobs exactly in the same fashion, every time? In short, has your redundancy resulted in competency?

Hackworth wrote that it is useless to practice with wooden guns. A real gun has recoil. It has consequences. A real gun can hurt you if you don't know what you are doing. The same might be said for active firefighting. It is very critical that we train firefighters using techniques that are as close to fireground conditions as possible.

I have some concerns about some of the simulations that are being touted as being "live fire," because they are artificial in their nature. Now before anybody gets too upset, I am not suggesting that these training props are not useful. But I have concerns about giving trainees the idea that a fire can go out with the turn of a valve or the wrong impression of what a flashover looks like, because these are created by liquefied petroleum gas.

We have a challenge before us. We have to do something to improve combat firefighters' skill sets. One thing that needs to happen is a thorough examination of individuals' training profiles after a line-of-duty death. Admittedly, some departments may not want those records examined too closely. But Hackworth would have told you that such losses are predictable.

In his later years, Hackworth was interviewed about his philosophy of life. The interviewer asked Hackworth what leadership technique he used in combat to ensure that his soldiers would not die needlessly. His reply was quick and to the point.

"I talked to my soldiers," he said. "I was there. I would never give an order that I wouldn't do myself. And I loved my soldiers. I never wasted them. They knew that, and we formed a very perfect team. I was very hard on them, meaning I was like a father that took his children and laid a very disciplined trip on them."