There are different levels of training that must be undertaken to prepare the emergency service work force. There is initial training, skills training, refresher training and professional-development training that occur in most full-service response organizations.

The recruitment and indoctrination of firefighters is well-developed and well-documented in most large fire service organizations. Fully trained individuals then start a process of on-the-job training under close supervision. Minor violations are corrected immediately, and feedback is provided continually by the company officer or senior members. When managed properly, this results in a rapid learning of the standards and procedures supported by the organizations.

Recruit training is the process of introducing and imparting the basic levels of training to allow a recruit to understand basic commands, instructions and tasks so that they may perform these tasks under supervision. I call this level task awareness and execution. It provides the student with the answer to the question, “What should I do?”

The next level of training is for the company officer. It consists of the information necessary to move a fully skilled firefighter to the realm of manager at the first level of command. These new tasks involve commanding; leading; and instructing the fire company to execute a series of tasks, evolutions, and activities to complete fireground or company objectives. This level of training is the supervision/coordination level.

The first line supervisor focuses on the coordination of team effort and the allocation and coordination of resources. This training provides the learner the answer to the questions, “What should we do? How should we do it? Why does it need to be done?”

Developing competency at the lieutenant or captain level places multiple demands on the student learner. There is much less contact with a supervisor in most organizations. Feedback often is limited to events that result in overtly outstanding or catastrophic performance. This lack of immediate feedback and corrective criticism or positive reinforcement frequently results in the company officer becoming more self-critical and peer-focused for feedback and support. This is not always the best arrangement, but it is reality in most organizations in which the division managers have limited contact with their personnel.

Making the switch from “what do we do?” to “how and when should we do it and with what resources?” is a major leap for most practitioners. The more experience a company officer has in making these decisions and getting good results, the better the confidence level of the officer and the better the performance from the company.

At the chief officer level, all the rules change. Contact with the supervisor is even more limited. The mentoring opportunities because of administrative and executive priorities all but force any professional development to be an individual responsibility.

In developing chief officers, we take an experienced company officer and assign them not only to coordinate teams and activities, but to administer programs, lead entire divisions, and assume responsibility for the management of change both up and down the organization. We also require the chief-level officer to command major working emergencies and be responsible for the safety and survival of the entire team, exposed civilians, and involved and threatened property. This level is the organizational leadership and change-agent level.

The training for this level must prepare the learner to answer all subordinates' questions of the task, as well as: By what process shall I manage change and lead others? What level of quality is required/expected? At what risk? At what benefit? When? (strategic timing) What type of evaluation/feedback method shall I employ?

The chief officer's job requires more focus on process than on activities. It's not enough to know what needs to be done; he or she need to know how the decisions will be developed, communicated, executed and evaluated.

Training of chief officers must include the decision-making process, not just what decisions are to be made. The American fire service has focused on teaching both company and chief officers what decisions need to be made under certain conditions. Our mnemonics from Layman (RECEO), Sprenger and Bruegman (REVIS), and the National Fire Academy (WALLACE-WAS-HOT) have focused on what activities need to be accomplished in what priority. This approach has stressed to the student learner when to make tactical decisions on the fireground.

What I have found to be lacking in the literature and the approach to training senior-level personnel is a focus on how leaders and managers make quality decisions. How do limited information and high stakes affect the quality and timing of your decisions? Under what conditions should decisions be made autocratically? What circumstances require/demand a participating process for decision-making? When does and experienced command officer choose to make an immediate decision with limited information rather than use a consultative, collaborative process with other team members included?

The danger of teaching what to do without the reason why creates a generation of leaders and managers who mimic what they have seen rather than make quality decisions using a variety of approaches and tools based on the environment they find themselves in at any given moment.

In many company-officer training academies, the attention is on policies, procedures and standards. There is too much emphasis on forms, activities and tasks. We spend hours teaching what to call in and what to say on which frequency. There is very little, however, on how to get input, weigh options, evaluate decisions and solicit feedback. Recognizing personal stress indicators, what options and tools exist to gather and verify information, and how to execute and evaluate each decision are topics foreign to most chief officer — level programs.

The fire service often is compare to the military for their commonalities: a rigid structure, unity of command, division of labor, uniformity, positional authority, and discipline and order. However, the fire service is deficient in a uniform foundation from department to department and, in some organizations, even from shift to shift. In the military services there is a foundation of common history; shared values; stated mission; individual responsibilities; and rules of order, behavior and conduct. This foundation is called “doctrine.” Even in a military training exercise, there are unchanging immovable facts, which are referred to as the “ground truth.”

The fire service, for all intents and purposes, is lacking this rigid, immovable foundation on which to build decision-making models that will operate consistently. In many nationalized fire services, there is much more uniformity, standardization and commonality in which models can be developed or modified, with excellent results.

In the Executive Fire Officer program, the concept of developing a standard mission, vision, and value statement for each fire department is one attempt at creating a solid foundation from which to create organizational change. There are many powerful processes in developing as near a doctrine as the paramilitary services can achieve. This is a solid process that has yielded positive results in many departments.

One goal in every fire department should be to create a plan to develop the fire service leaders of the future. Within these future leaders and managers, the ability to make solid, valid, quality decisions in changing environments with predictable results should be a fundamental skill set. Your personal professional development plan must include formal training in the art and science of decision-making. The management of organizational change and the safety and survival of your forces on the fireground depend on these skills.

It's perfectly acceptable to allow the rookie academy and the initial on-the-job training to teach task- and performance-level evolutions. At company-officer training, we must expose the aspiring officer to the basics of how to make decisions. Most certainly, at the chief officer level our curricula and incident critiques should incorporate an assessment and discussion of the strengths and weaknesses in the decision-making process. Post-incident evaluations should evaluate the speed of decisions, the creation and communication of a common operational picture, the evaluation and feedback method(s) chosen by the commander, and the quality and outcome of all strategic and tactical decisions that were made.

If you are without a foundation to conduct this training, embark on the journey of developing the foundation in your organization using the tools of mission, vision and values statements as powerful surrogates for doctrine. For those organizations that have already established a strong organizational foundation, start building on these concepts by formalizing the chief officer development process to include discussion of the military decision-making models.

If your post-incident evaluations are non-existent or not very productive, revise the SOP on how to conduct them, and be sure to add in the step of evaluation and discussion of the quality of all decisions made by the command staff. Include a discussion and evaluation of the process of communicating, executing, and evaluating the direction and challenges of the strategic and tactical plans. In short, start building into the regular organizational activities an appreciation and commitment to improve the decision-making abilities and the decision-making processes for emergency and non-emergency activities.

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John Linstrom is a senior manager in the Homeland Security Services division of EG&G Technical Services, assigned to the Southern California office. He's an adjunct faculty member for Texas A&M University and the National Fire Academy. Linstrom currently serves as a battalion chief/paramedic in Apple Valley, Calif. He also serves as commander of the DHS/FEMA DMORT team for Region IX and has been involved in the national US&R program since 1996.