Aviation is not inherently dangerous. But some of the things done with aircraft — such as firefighting — present a greater risk than other airborne activities. In 2001 and 2002 there were 28 accidents involving aircraft engaged in aerial firefighting to one degree or another. This places a burden on managers whose responsibility it is to ensure appropriate controls are in place to reduce the risk of a mishap.

With information obtained from the National Transportation Safety Board, we will examine those accidents, as well as actions taken by the departments of Interior and Agriculture to mitigate the sources of high-risk aircraft operations, which includes the continued grounding of many air tankers and lead planes.

FACTS AND FIGURES

In 2001 there were 16 fire aviation accidents involving 18 aircraft. In 2002, the number of accidents dropped to 12, each involving a single aircraft. Five accidents resulted in fatal injuries and 11 caused some degree of personal injury. There were no injuries in 12 accidents. Every accident resulted in substantial damage or destruction of the aircraft. During this period, the U.S. Forest Service saw its accident rate reach a level higher than any year since 1978.

Two-thirds of the accident aircraft were owned by commercial operators under contract to federal or state agencies, rather than owned by the government. In fact, only four of the aircraft were government-owned. Additionally, almost half of the aircraft involved were helicopters, 13 to be exact, while nine were multi-engine airplanes and eight were single-engine airplanes.

A review of the missions being performed at the time of the accidents reveals that dropping fire suppressants and retardants proved to be the most frequent and deadliest activity. Of the 30 accidents, 15 total and all but one of the fatal accidents were during these missions. The only other fatal accident involved a helicopter completing an in-flight maintenance test flight prior to a fire suppression mission.

Aerial detection and reconnaissance were the next most-frequently cited activities, accounting for eight accident aircraft. Smokejumper and helitack operations each accounted for two accidents. Overall, tactical missions — those directly related to fire suppression — proved to be the most hazardous, accounting for two thirds of the total.

In most cases, the NTSB determines the probable cause of the accident after a lengthy investigation. For those accidents still in the preliminary stages of the investigation, known facts provide guidance as to what factors contributed to the mishap. Unfortunately, as with most general aviation accidents, pilot error played a role in many accidents. In fact, the Forest Service cites that 86% of accidents with its contract personnel were caused bu human error. Some examples include: running out of fuel while in flight, striking trees while dropping retardant, failing to see and avoid other mission aircraft and colliding mid-air, and losing control of the aircraft after touching down on a runway. Bucket entanglements and improper emergency procedures were cited in others.

These problems, of course, aren't confined to operations in the United States. In early May, the bucket on a Russian helicopter returning from a fire suppression mission became entangled in the tail rotor. The helicopter crashed, killing all 12 people on board.

Of course, pilot errors are not the only factors in accidents. Mechanical problems were cited in eight accidents, including two aircraft that suffered catastrophic structural failure while in flight. Weather was a factor in two accidents and several remain under investigation.

THEORY AND PRACTICE

The philosophy of the USFS is that all accidents can be prevented. While it may not be possible to prevent all accidents, the risk of accidents can be managed and reduced.

Pilots who are well-qualified, properly trained, rested and performing their mission in accordance with well-crafted standard operating procedures are less likely to be involved in a mishap. The same general theory applies to the aircraft itself. Simply stated, aircraft that are properly maintained and flown within design limitations are less likely to suffer the type of mechanical problems that can contribute to an accident.

In one accident a pilot, new to fire suppression and on his second retardant delivery flight, crashed on take-off in an overloaded airplane. According to the NTSB report, the pilot had been given a “few hours” of dual instruction and his employer “briefly” discussed procedures for mixing retardant. The improperly mixed load weighed 1,200 pounds more than a proper mixture would have. When combined with other factors affecting aircraft performance, the airplane simply did not have sufficient power to sustain flight.

In another incident, an improperly installed fuel control unit — error on the part of maintenance personnel — led to an in-flight loss of engine power in one engine of a twin-engine helicopter. The pilot failed to follow proper emergency procedures for single-engine operations and a mishap resulted. In still another, after making 40 to 50 water drops on a fire, the pilot found that he had flown into trees without realizing it, indicating possible pilot fatigue, damaging the rotor blades and ingesting pine needles into the engine.

In response to the increase in accidents, the USFS and the Bureau of Land Management commissioned a Blue Ribbon Fact Finding Panel on Aviation. The panel released its report in December 2002 and noted several deficiencies in the current system. Among other things, these include lack of active oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration with regard to the inspection and maintenance of aircraft, inconsistent cooperation and collaboration between federal and state agencies responsible for wildland aerial firefighting, and a failure to identify training requirements for air crews of contract aircraft.

In general, aircraft that are owned or operated by government agencies, including contractors operating under an exclusive-use agreement, are by definition “public aircraft” and exempt from regulation by the FAA. Each government agency, whether federal, state or local, is responsible for regulating its own aircraft operations, including such things as airworthiness, maintenance, pilot qualifications and training. This places a tremendous burden on the contracting government agency as it must draft comprehensive regulations and assure compliance, within the constraints of limited budgets.

On the other hand, contractors, by their nature, are concerned with profitability. Given the penalties that are assessed when aircraft are unavailable for service, contractors are encouraged to keep their aircraft operating. This isn't to suggest that a contractor would knowingly operate an unsafe aircraft, however.

To deal with this issue, the Blue Ribbon Panel encouraged revisions to the contracting process to allow longer contract times to promote long-term planning and facilitate purchase of replacement aircraft. Further, they encouraged greater oversight by the FAA with regard to airworthiness.

The panel also observed that the Forest Service has, in the past, failed to set crew training requirements in its contracts and has not provided for safety officers to manage training. Overall, the panel found that insufficient funding has led to an atmosphere that accepts unnecessary risk in airborne firefighting. The panel offered several options to improve the level of safety, including greater use of military aircraft, outsourcing management of the entire federal firefighting mission to a private contractor and consolidating all federal resources under a single agency.

CAUSE AND EFFECT

While the panel's recommendations still are being evaluated, there has been immediate action. Eleven C-130A and PB4Y four-engine air tankers have been permanently grounded. An additional 33 tankers are undergoing extensive inspection and repair using a program designed by the Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories. By March, two large air tankers, both P-3 Orions, had been returned to service with other P-3s expected to follow. Further, half of the federal lead plane fleet is being retired, and replacements are being sought.

The immediate impact of fewer firefighting aircraft may be a reduction in the availability of aerial retardant/suppressant delivery. Wildland firefighting tactics, in particular the need for increased safety measures for ground personnel, will have to be adjusted to address the possible reduction in air support.

Beyond the specific recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel, several important lessons can be learned from analyzing accidents. Lessons that apply to any aviation operation, in particular emergency service aviation.

Managers and supervisors play a key role in safety and accident prevention. They define the mission to be performed and draft comprehensive operational policies and procedures designed to give guidance on how to safely meet that mission. They also use aircraft designed to perform the firefighting mission and ensure that the planes are properly maintained.

Management ensures that only qualified personnel are selected to fill every position and that they are given proper initial and recurrent training. Perhaps most important, to verify that this training is consistent and effective, there must be a system of accountability in place to ensure that everyone, even management, complies with policy. Without accountability, everything else is essentially meaningless.

In the end, aerial firefighting, like firefighting on the ground, is a hazardous activity conducted in a hostile environment. However, properly managed, the risk of a mishap can be reduced and the mission accomplished safely.

Chief Donald L. Shinnamon Sr. serves as the director of public safety for the City of Holly Hill, Fla. He is the chair of the Florida Fire Chiefs Association Aviation Committee and the Government Services Committee of Helicopter Association International and is a member of the NFPA Aviation Section. A pilot rated in both airplanes and helicopters, he studied aircraft accident investigation at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University