It has always impressed me that so much of the American fire service subscribes to a one-size-fits-everything philosophy in their firefighting tactics. Some departments do better, but the practice is all too common, in my opinion.

Here are two examples that occurred in less than one week with one fire department. It's not that individual organization that I hold up as being unrealistic, because it is so common, so easy and almost traditional to do this very thing. This is just the best example that I could find.

A village fire department, which covers its own community as well as a rural district, got a call for a house fire early one Sunday evening. It was within the village so they had a run of only a mile. The fire was in a small 1½- story frame dwelling. The first floor was well involved on arrival. Everything went splendidly. The fire as out quickly, ventilation was done and the building was laddered. Two 1 ¾-inch lines wrapped it up. I doubt that the second line was used. All in all, a credit to the fire department.

On Thursday of that week the same organization got an alert for a dwelling fire in the rural district. This was a ranch-style house with no garage. It was involved to the extent of the Sunday evening fire but with no second floor. It was on one level and so was the fire -- and there was plenty of it.

By comparing the two alarms, we can become aware that a switch of tactics was called for. The second fire was more than five miles from the station but over good roads. Look at these considerations: You can get a good deal more manpower with a volunteer department on Sunday evening than you can on Thursday afternoon. Also, a run of over five miles opposed to one mile allows enough time for combustion to expand itself four fold. Result: A lot more fire.

It was my good fortune to arrive at the incident prior to the fire apparatus by some minutes. That gave me the privilege of conducting my own size-up. The first-arriving pumper was the same one that made the initial attack Sunday night. It was standard for rural work. It had 1,000 gallons of water on board. The pump had sufficient flow to work at any major fire.

I was anxious to see how the attack would proceed. Flame were showing from at least four windows and doors. In the rear, flames were coming out of a door, lapping over the eave and extending over the roof.

Off came the old 1 ¾-inch lines, just as I feared.

Two tankers were coming in at that time to extend the water supply. As the lines began working, it seemed to take some time for the fire to realize it was being fought. It yielded slowly, but gained some additional footage before the water caught up with it.

There was no chance for interior firefighting for some time; until control was completely established.

How did their strategy compare with mine? Manpower was sufficient by arrival to make a reasonable attack upon arrival of the apparatus. I would have put all hands on a 2 ½-inch line to give it good maneuverability. I would have put that line in the biggest opening and fed it for about a minute. Shut it down, and with that manpower move on to the next opening and hit it again. This would be repeated until as all openings had been worked that showed flames.

Knowing how much this size hose line can do in these full-fire incidents in one-level dwellings gives me so much confidence.

What was wrong with the application of two 1 ¾-inch lines as opposed to one 2½-inch line? After all, the fire was eventually put down.

The application of the greater flow in one place has a greater effect on heavy fire than an equal flow from two sources. Even if the gallonage totals add up to the same flow rate, the whole flow of that 2 ¼-inch line is the best fire killer.

With one 2 ¼-inch hoseline, the fire would have been extinguished a good deal faster than with the dual lines. That’s important, because the longer it takes to achieve conclusion, the longer your people are exposed to danger. All fireground commanders should follow this practice to the letter for the sake of us all.

The duties of a chief officer are broad and varied. But on the fireground, the most important tool he has is his head. He or she has to think, speak, see and project a vision during an ongoing, progressive incident.

Thinking must start at the moment the alarm is given. The day, the hour and the time it will take to transport command to the scene all come to bear on early decision making. Decisions made in transit, combined with what is observed on scene should guide chief officers in what actions must be taken to address the challenge. It is not always two 1 ¾-inch lines. There is no one-size-fits-all in firefighting.