Texas City, Texas, was a booming port town of 18,000 that offered good jobs in refineries and chemical plants, which had occasional fires and explosions. To the residents, this became entertainment. Children would skip school and join a gathering crowd to watch a tank fire burn.

On the cool morning of April 16, 1947, the S.S. Grandcamp caught fire while berthed at the pier. It drew a huge crowd as usual, but the fire created added interest because of the unusual peach and reddish-orange smoke. Entertainment turned to disaster when the Grandcamp, loaded with ammonium nitrate, exploded. In the end some 600 people were killed, thousands of homes were destroyed, windows were shattered four miles away and the explosion was heard 150 miles away. Neighboring refineries were destroyed in the fires that burned for days.

“We weren't prepared for disaster; we lacked communications and there was no one to take control,” says Ken LeMet, retired president of the Texas City Railway. This tragedy did have an upside. Disaster preparedness was improved, mutual aid was established and other ports evaluated their safety procedures.

National infrastructure

As one of the driving forces of the American economy, industrial plants are part of the nation's critical infrastructure. Nearly every jurisdiction has an industrial site of some size, and virtually every industrial sector has had a disaster.

Fire departments and other emergency response groups typically define a disaster as an event that greatly exceeds their response capability. The public, however, may perceive a disaster in quite different terms. A major warehouse fire, even a total loss, that doesn't result in fatalities or injuries might not be perceived as a disaster to an unaffected observer. However, if the fire occurred in an area with limited employment opportunities, the people who lost their jobs most certainly would believe that it was a disaster.

Mutual aid and cooperation between industry and municipal agencies varies greatly around the country. On one end of the spectrum, the best prepared have a close, cooperative and active partnership; on the other end, there's a lot of work to be accomplished. Obviously, the more on-site visits, pre-planning and joint mutual-aid training between industrial and municipal fire departments, the better prepared we will be to protect our communities.

Industrial events are quite often caused by human failure. In some cases it's the failure of industrial plant personnel to follow policies and procedures, and sometimes it's a failure on the part of municipal fire departments to fully understand the potential hazards associated with the industrial sites in their response area.

None of the following events are intended to criticize the personnel involved. Rather, they're intended to show a variety of mishaps that could have been prevented or minimized with effective internal audits, and proper pre-planning, training, and recognition of the special hazards and challenges of industrial facilities.

Crude oil errors

A rural fire department that had a number of remote crude oil storage tanks throughout its response area responded to a report of a tank fire. Because the crude tank was only about 40 feet in diameter, the fire department extinguished the blaze with foam using handlines at a rate less than 300gpm.

However, there was not an accurate report of how long the tank had been burning prior to the fire department's arrival. When the fire was nearly extinguished, a portion of the crude was violently ejected from the tank. Firefighters were able to run out of the path of burning crude, but several received second-degree radiant heat burns to their backs and shoulders.

The firefighters said that they thought their application of foam caused the crude to erupt, but that wasn't the case. All crude oil contains water. The water can be found in two places: stratified in thin layers and at the bottom of the tank. As crude oil burns, a layer of heavy solids called a heat wave begins to form. As the fire continues to burn off the “light ends” of the fuel, the hot, solid layer gets thicker and heavier and begins to migrate toward the bottom of the tank. If the heat wave contacts a water layer, a small steam explosion causes a “slopover.” The size of a slopover depends on the size of the water layer. With a 17,000-to-one expansion ration, even ¼/¡ž inch of water can produce a large volume of steam.

The firefighters' failure to recognize the potential hazard of burning crude oil could have been fatal. If the crude tank had burned long enough for the heat wave to reach the water at the bottom of the tank, a boilover would have ejected the entire contents of the tank in seconds. The resulting fireball could reach 10 times the diameter of the tank, and the flow of hot gases and burning fuel can travel at nearly 20mph. You can't outrun that.

Importance of codes

A small, easy-to-extinguish fire in an automotive fluid blending and packaging facility grew into a huge fire that destroyed the entire building. The facility was located in an area not subject to a mandatory fire code.

The fire started in a small, outdoor work area between two warehouses. The fire was reported shortly after it started, and the arriving chief officer was on scene in about seven minutes. The small fire had already grown into a liquid pool fire that engulfed two semi-trailers loaded with empty drums. Flames also had surrounded a 6,000-gallon trailer tank containing synthetic motor oil, heating the oil and igniting vapors that vented from the tank. The chief reported hearing thumps and small explosions as the fire spread to additional containers. There was no on-site water source; the closest source was more than a mile away.

The 6,000-gallon tank wagon, constructed of aluminum, failed from the intense heat and spilled its contents. Flames surrounded several 2,000-gallon tanks, which also spilled their contents into the fire. Pipelines from nearby storage tanks ruptured, adding more fuel to the fire. Burning fuel flowed toward a tank farm containing additional combustible liquids. The dike wall was cracked and broken, allowing burning liquid to collect around the storage tanks. Heat caused some tanks to burst while others collapsed and broke. Burning liquid continued to spread to the plants other warehouses. Fire consumed the entire facility and the 1.2 million gallons of fuel on site.

The facility wasn't designed to contain contaminated runoff that would have resulted from fighting the fire with water. There was no choice but to let the plant burn and focus on protecting nearby residences. The fire had burned down to a manageable size the following day. Area residents couldn't return to their homes for three days.

The chief was familiar with the plant and knew early on that there was insufficient water to bring a large fire under control. The fire department had visited the site two years prior to tour the facility and observe fire hazards. They observed unprotected metal construction; minimal water supply; and a lack of firewalls, fire protection systems, fire detection systems and alarms.

At the time of the visit, there were no mandatory fire codes for unincorporated areas in the county. The county having jurisdiction had the authority to adopt fire codes three years prior to the fire but did not. Ten months after the fire, an investigative board recommended the adoption of mandatory codes for unincorporated areas. Shortly thereafter, the county adopted the International Fire Code.

Industrial plants pose unique challenges and hazards. Facility drills and a common incident command system are critical components of effective management of an incident. Industrial facilities require strategy and tactics that are not typically part of a municipal fire training program. Mutual aid and good pre-planning are an integral part in protecting the nation's critical infrastructure.

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Scott Dornan is an assistant chief with ConocoPhillips Fire Department in Kuparuk, Alaska, and is the chair of the International Association of Fire Chiefs' Industrial Fire & Safety Section.