The challenge to find adequate, appropriate facilities for structural live-fire training is widely recognized. This challenge also involves a dilemma over the use of acquired structures, specifically hurdles in acquiring, making safe and complying with NFPA 1403, Live Fire Training Evolutions. The scope of this situation was driven home last year while I was a guest instructor for a state-sponsored fire officer's school in the Midwest.

Prior to conducting an eight-hour class on new firefighting technologies for approximately 200 students, I distributed a training needs survey to better understand local “burning issues.” The survey had brief directions and a listing of 12 training topics of interest, including weapons of mass destruction, thermal imaging, pump operations, command competence, hazardous materials and others. Students were instructed to circle the top four issues that were “most important to your fire department in its goals to improve firefighter training and education, implement new improved fireground technologies, and increase firefighter safety.” The most important topic chosen by the students was “Live Fire Training in Acquired Structures.” After identifying the top four issues, students were asked to “briefly list as many problems as you can think of regarding hurdles and difficulties your department faces in its quest for continuous improvement in each specific subject area.” Here is a sample list of feedback of problems encountered in this area:

• This type of training is rapidly becoming extinct.
• Can't find the right structure to train in.
• Difficult to get structures.
• Environmental Protection Agency regulations.
• Regulations make it almost impossible to live burn.
• NFPA 1403 compliance and keeping up with the standard.
• Lack of commitment to this area.
• Too cumbersome regulations to make it impractical.
• Not enough money for live burns.
• Liability issues.
• New firefighters have never been in a burning building.
• State forms. OSHA. Red tape.
• Not allowed to have live burns by orders of the chief.
• Finding a structure the codes department will allow us to burn.
• Not enough structures for adequate live-fire training. No training center with burn building available.

During a mid-morning class break, I thumbed through the student responses and then briefly discussed the survey results with the class, including the above comments. As we broke for lunch later that morning, an officer hurried over to see me. He said, “I don't know what these people are talking about; my department conducts live-fire training using acquired structures quite frequently, and all of us here live in the same state.” So I asked why his department has no problems performing live-fire training when it seemed that everyone else did. He replied, “They just don't know how to do it!” It's important to mention that this state-sponsored school was conducting more than a dozen classes over that weekend, one of which was a session on NFPA 1403 compliance.

The war among us

There appears to be lurking what I would call a war on live-fire training. This war, like most wars, results in the haves and the have nots — firefighters with or without adequate access to live-fire training. This war also has many “fronts.” For example, one front line has firefighters divided in two distinct groups, either for or against using acquired structures for fire training. Unlike most wars, this one probably isn't as well publicized as it should or could be because there's no single person or group on whom to place the blame. This could make the war on live-fire training destined to be a long, drawn-out affair instead of a quick win.

Who are the casualties of the war on live-fire training? It's the new recruit who has just been “certified” after evolutions in a wood pallet — fueled, reusable concrete burn building and is now riding the engine and arriving at his or her first real-world fire. Or it's the veteran firefighter who hasn't had adequate refresher training in fire behavior, which is needed partly due to waning active experience from the declining number of working fires over the last decade.

The top issue of this war is not over using appropriate acquired structures versus reusable burn buildings, or vice versa. It's a question of how to provide and deliver adequate quantities of high-quality training, using the right tools at the right time, to develop the skills and competence of firefighter trainees and increase their fireground safety during real-world fire responses.

The reusable burn building has played, and will continue to play, a crucial role in firefighter training well into the future. The modern reusable burn building has more features and benefits than ever before. It's shortsighted, however, to think that a reusable burn building is all that is required to train firefighters to handle real-world fire responses effectively and safely.

Additionally, based on similar training needs surveys such as the one above, there continues to be many passed-over training opportunities that could provide valuable live-fire training experience using appropriate acquired structures because of real and/or perceived problems. These problems include, but are not limited to, required permits and the work needed to make the acquired structure safe for training. The fire instructors I have spoken to, no matter which side of the fence they are on regarding the use of acquired structures, agree that the fire service should be very concerned when valuable firefighter training opportunities are passed over.

Five red flags

To understand why we need to be so concerned about the quality and quantity of live-fire training, we must look at the issues. Here are some key facts and data on firefighter fatality trends and new challenges caused by a changing structure fire operation environment. I call these issues “The Five Red Flags.”

1. Diminished fire officer experience

   According to NFPA, there was a 31% decrease in the incidence of structure fires throughout the United States between 1987 and 2001. As a result of the decline in fires, firefighters have less fire experience than their predecessors had a generation ago. As many of the experienced firefighters and officers retire, they're replaced by young officers with comparably less experience. There is great concern that these young officers' inability to recognize flashover and building collapse, and the inability to react quickly enough to avoid being caught by these two potentially fatal conditions, will continue to result in firefighter injuries and fatalities.

2. Steady firefighter fatality rates

   These rates on the fireground are virtually unchanged over time. According to NFPA, from 1977 to 2000 the number of firefighter deaths annually at structure fires dropped 59%. However, over the same period, the annual number of structure fires declined by 54%. Looking at it another way, the firefighter death rate per 100,000 structure fires in the late 1970s was 5.8. In the late 1980s the firefighter death rate per 100,000 structure fires was 5.7 — virtually unchanged.

   It#39;s important to note where the fireground deaths are occurring. According to NFPA, in the late 1970s, the rate of death due to traumatic firefighter injury occurring while operating inside structures was 1.8 deaths per 100,000 structure fires. By the late 1990s it had risen to almost 3 deaths per 100,000 structure fires.

3. Larger home construction

   The new single-family dwelling built today is, on average, larger than ever before. (See “New Single-Family Home Characteristics,” opposite.) The average square feet of new homes in 1970 was 1,500 square feet; by 2003 the average size had risen to 2,330 square feet. In 1970, only 39% had a two-car or more garage; in 2003 this had risen to 82%.

   Also, 38% of the new homes built in 2003 were over 2,400 square feet. Some suburbs have entered the era of the “McMansion,” a large single family home of 3,000 to 6,000 square feet or more. While meeting local building codes, these homes present a serious firefighting challenge and hazard due to their sheer size and potentially undesirable methods of construction.

4. More challenging fuel loads

   The contents inside new homes pose more challenges. Synthetic hydrocarbon materials such as sofas and carpets present a challenging fuel load compared to the inside of homes in the 1970s. In the 1970s, a cotton-padded upholstered chair produced a heat release rate of 290- to 370kw, while a newer polyurethane chair produces a heat release rate of 1,350- to 1,990kw.

   While building codes and construction standards have risen to higher levels in some parts of the country, the installation of residential fire sprinklers for new homes and the retrofit of existing dwellings have been slow movers. Residential sprinkler technology has been proved to reduce the possibility of a flashover and extension of a single room fire beyond the compartment of origin. While not a cure-all for fire protection, residential sprinklers, if widely implemented, could reduce firefighter injury and fatality.

5. Unfamiliar firefighting technology

   Fire departments routinely integrate new technology into fire suppression operations. This includes, but is not limited to, Class A foam, CAF systems, thermal imagers, and firefighter locating devices. These technologies show great promise to increase firefighter safety. However, the benefit of any new technology is directly proportional to the knowledge of the people using it. There's concern that without a good understanding of the capabilities and limitations of these new technologies, firefighters may have a false sense of security and thus commit themselves to fireground positions where they don't belong.

These red flags are cause for concern when forecasting future trends in firefighter injuries and fatalities. Each item alone is significant, but combined they become a perfect storm of sorts, creating a much larger problem because of their synergy. These red flags make high-quality live-fire training a critical requirement today more than ever before.

Calculated risk

As previously discussed, one “front” or problem area in the war on live-fire training is the growing number of departments throughout the United States that have reduced or eliminated the use of acquired structures for live-fire training. There are a number of reasons why, including highly publicized cases of tragic firefighter injury and fatality that have occurred over the past several years involving acquired structure live-fire training evolutions that went awry. The concern about potential firefighter injury and fatality is often the prime-motivating factor regarding decisions to abandon the use of acquired structures.

It's important to put the use of acquired structures into perspective. While a fire department's response to an accidental or incendiary fire is an inherently hazardous activity, a live-fire training session in an acquired structure need not be. With appropriate planning and execution, a live-fire training session that's compliant with NFPA 1403 minimizes the unknown and creates a calculated risk to maximize student safety.

Obtaining high levels of safety during live-fire training sessions through appropriate planning and execution is the result of a good management system. It's this good management system that turns an inherently hazardous activity, firefighting, into a calculated risk. NFPA 1403 provides the basic, minimum information that's the basis for a good live-fire training management system. Adding instructors who are live-fire training experts to the equation will fine-tune and improve that management system.

Prior to the current American invasion of Iraq, CNN reported on the shift in military training from open-ground battlefields like those in Afghanistan to “the warfare sites of the future” in urban environments. The military built a city, with all the necessary props, so soldiers could turn theory into practice to maximize learning and have a realistic environment to evaluate student performance. Realistic urban-combat scenarios following theoretical training sessions not only increase the effectiveness of military personnel but also reduce battlefield casualties.

The fire service maintains similar safeguards in repetitive-use burn buildings, which use propane-fueled fire simulators for a highly controlled fire environment. However, students don't have the opportunity to observe actual growth and behavior of Class A fuels burning within a compartment. Acquired structures are key for this experience.

Fire growth in a compartment depends on numerous variables such as the type and quantity of fuel, fuel geometry, ventilation, and building construction. Live-fire training in acquired structures is a good method to correct student behaviors such as poor decision-making and flawed action plans due to unrealistic perceptions of fire growth and actual time to structural collapse. An NFPA 1403 — compliant live-fire training burn using an acquired structure benefits trainees by allowing them to study and understand firsthand fire growth and structural collapse in a minimized risk environment.

The challenge

The fire instructors whom I have surveyed agree that the acquired structure can have many skill training benefits over and above the use of a fixed burn building. Most say that the acquired structure should be part of a multi-tiered training approach, starting with classroom education using videos, then virtual computer training where available, followed by reusable burn building fire exercises and then fire exercises in appropriate acquired structures. They are very concerned about firefighter safety regarding the use of acquired structures and also see a wide range of related issues.

In one survey fire instructors were asked, “For those fire officers whom you know openly refuse to conduct live-fire training evolutions using acquired structures, what are the reasons they give for doing so?” Their responses included:

• The instructor is not trained to do this type of training.
• Thy do not want the legal responsibility of this type of training.
• Training needed, but not this way.
• They do not know what NFPA 1403 is.
• They consider live-fire training a waste of time.
• Too lazy.
• There is too much paperwork to do a live burn.
• Too extensive preparation.
• Unpredictable safety risks.
• Unrepeatable from one evolution to another.

The group of fire instructors also was asked, “Do you feel there should be a coordinated effort on the national level to advocate the use of acquired structures for live-fire training, and educate fire officers in NFPA 1403 and its application in acquired structures?” Their responses:

• Yes.
• We need to go further in the standard to say what minimum condition the structure needs to be in, or brought up to, before it can be used.
• No, but again, education and strict adherence to NFPA 1403 for all live-fire training, whatever the environment, is a must.

The war on live-fire training rages on. The casualties, those with inadequate access to high-quality, appropriate and safe live-fire training, are mounting. In some areas of North America, fire officers are passing on valuable opportunities to conduct live-fire training in acquired structures for a variety of real and perceived reasons. Yet there remain some bright spots of progress.

The state of Florida passed legislation adopting parts of NFPA 1402 and most of 1403 that also requires a state-certified live-fire trainer to be present and in-charge during live-fire training evolutions in both reusable burn buildings and acquired structures. Having the availability of a certified subject-matter expert will undoubtedly be an excellent resource for fire officers in Florida who desire to safely use appropriate acquired structures for training within their own fire district.

Dominic Colletti is the author of The Compressed Air Foam Systems Handbook and Class A Foam — Best Practice For Structure Firefighters. He is co-author of Foam Firefighting Operations 1 and The Rural Firefighting Handbook. Colletti is a former assistant fire chief and serves on the technical committee of NFPA 1500, Fire Department Occupation Safety and Health. He is the global foam systems product manager for Hale Products and can be reached at dcolletti@idexcorp.com.

The author would like to thank John Peltier and the Massachusetts Firefighting Academy, William Richards and the Florida State Fire College, and Bryant Stiles and the Kentucky Community and Technical College System for their assistance.

NEW SINGLE-FAMILY HOME CHARACTERISTICS

	1950	1970	1990	2003
Average area (sq. ft.)	983	1,500	2,080	2,330
More than 2,400 sq. ft.	—	10%	29%	38%
Two stories or more	14%	17%	49%	53%
Four bedrooms	1%	24%	29%	37%
Two-car garage or larger	—	39%	72%	82%