The Halls Fork Prescribed Burn was conducted Oct. 14-16, 2004, at the Uinta National Forest in Utah. Daily after action reviews were conducted at the primary briefing site as resources came off the line.

On Oct. 18, a close-out meeting for this project was conducted by the burn boss, principal overhead and the Spanish Fork District Ranger. At this meeting the ranger facilitated an after-action review for the purpose of consolidating lessons learned from execution of this project and how to apply them on future prescribed burn projects. The outline in the interagency Incident Response Pocket Guide was used for this review.

WHAT WAS PLANNED

During the Oct. 14 and 15 operational periods (no night ops), briefings were conducted at the primary site and at the helibase. Two briefings were necessary because of inaccessibility (ground transportation) between the east and west sides of the burn unit. An incident action plan was provided to assigned personnel. Objectives were clearly communicated and personnel knew what was expected. A grid map was provided that greatly facilitated communications and coordination efforts.

Communications throughout the duration of the project were effective and reflected timely coordination of operations between holding and ignition resources. A high level of safety consciousness and awareness of environmental hazards was evidenced during briefings, operations and in communications between resources on the project. Effective actions were taken to mitigate hazards through application of LCES protocols.

For burnout operations, teams were assigned to the north and east lines. Experienced, organized crews were used for ground ignition and holding operations. This proved to be highly effective. The north line was black-lined by the end of the first period and approximately half to two-thirds of the east line was black-lined as well.

Aerial ignition operations began in the early afternoon of Oct. 14, and about one-third of the 2,400 acre unit was treated by the end of the first period. By the end of Oct. 15, approximately 1,800 acres had been treated. These operations were particularly effective in terms of treating targeted vegetation and keeping fire out of the non-targeted conifer stands.

Discussions between the holding boss, the ignition crew and the burn boss mid-afternoon on the Oct. 15 resulted in dropping out several hundred acres on the south end of the unit. No active lighting occurred here. The basis for this decision by the burn boss included firefighter safety, the amount of non-targeted vegetation in this area, and anticipated resistance to control along the south boundary handline considering fuels, weather and topography. This was a well-informed and reasonable decision.

The position task books for trainees for the two Type-1 ignition specialists noted above as well as one dozer boss, one fire effects monitor, and one task force leader are ready to be reviewed for full certification. Other personnel in key positions, particularly aviation, maintained currency through this assignment.

Weather conditions were very favorable and smoke dispersal was excellent. Smoke was detected for a short period in the vicinity of the Daniels Summit on Oct. 14.

A smoke monitor was set up at the Heber Ranger District office for this project. The availability of an on-site RAWS greatly facilitated informed decision making based on current weather observations and trends. This information was augmented by hourly weather and fuel moisture, including calculated ignition probabilities, manually taken and recorded.

Availability of needed resources and personnel from adjoining districts, forests and agencies was critical to the safe, timely and effective execution of this project.

Overhead personnel and assigned staffing displayed a considerable amount of flexibility and adaptability to changing conditions. For example, burn-out operations required a “go slow-to-go fast” approach because of the amount of line to be treated, variable fuels, and fuel moistures.

Limiting public access to the burn area and access roads was important to successful burn execution, particularly because of the ongoing limited elk season and the popularity of the area to hunters. Not having this closure in place would have resulted in a significant public safety issue and would have compromised the project.

The assignment of a discrete job code to this project greatly facilitated the collection and calculation of project specific unit costs of this resource management activity. The notion of having one job code for multiple burn projects across two national forests and expecting equitable financing of individual projects to “come out in the wash” would be problematic.

Having a map of the burn unit with a grid system overlaid on it greatly facilitated communication and understanding about specific locations across a large and topographically diverse burn unit.

INEFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE

Effective use of the limited window to treat the unit as a whole was hampered by the amount of time it took to burn out control lines. Over five miles of the burn unit boundary required blacklining in advance of fully treating the interior of the unit with aerial ignition. When blacklining occurred early in the operational period, production was slow due to low temperatures and high one-hour fuel moistures. On the 14th and 15th, aerial ignition operations were delayed until mid-afternoon, in part because of the amount of time it took to blackline the north and northeastern boundaries.

A couple of other factors that delayed blacklining included treating pockets of highly flammable fir and cutting through or going around isolated dead and down 1,000-hour fuels.

Holding the pre-briefing for key overhead the afternoon before planned ignition was somewhat of a rushed exercise that had the potential for less than a full understanding of strategy, tactics, and expectations.

Development of the burn plan, including the requisite silvicultural prescription did not commence in earnest until the end of February 2004. In the aftermath of a recent escape on the Forest and the requirement to prepare a burn plan per new direction and in conformance with a new template, the planning effort called for a considerable amount of focused staff time. In other words, the stakes were high.

The objective was to have an approved burn plan in place in time for a fall 2004 burn. Although this objective was achieved at a high performance level, involved individuals felt that the time frame was too short. Ideally, the burn plan should be completed several months to a year in advance of implementation. In the case of Halls Fork, this was difficult due to the workload and schedule the silviculturalist was faced with in preparing the silvicultural prescription.

Logistical needs — both personnel and equipment — were acquired on short notice for this project. Some crews and personnel did not report to the project until the second operational period. Swapping out of resources to accommodate other projects in the Zone had the potential for affecting safe and effective execution of the project.

Less than full use of Northern Utah Interagency Fire Center for dispatching was made. This was due in part because of fiscal barriers such as the inability to use equipment through Emergency Equipment Rental Agreements and non-agency personnel as “AD”s on a non-emergency project. Additionally, the lack of reimbursable agreements with sister federal agencies that apply to these types of projects is a barrier. The forest is able to reimburse county and state resources under a cooperative agreement, but not able to do likewise for other federal partners. Because of these barriers, the logistical workload did not lend itself well to normal dispatching procedures.

Planning for and acquisition of logistical support needs was rushed as well as complicated by the barriers noted above. As a result, getting a set of resources “dedicated” to this project was problematic.

In part, because of the barriers noted above, much of the planning for and acquisition of logistical needs fell to, or was assumed by one individual. This undertaking was a somewhat behind the power curve and on more of a just-in-time basis. In spite of these barriers, the resources called for in the burn plan were acquired and assigned to the project.

Not prioritizing burn projects between the two forests coupled with a desire to keep unit costs down resulted in over-committing available resources to too many projects at one time. For example, one crew that had been oriented to the Halls Fork project and had worked on it the first operational period was assigned to another project the following day on the Wasatch-Cache National Forest. Another crew was brought in from off-Forest to replace this crew. This necessitated taking additional time to brief and orient a new resource when limited time was available.

Additionally, personnel assigned to critical overhead positions were reassigned halfway through this project to another prescribed burn. At least one of these positions was left vacant even though it was on the IAP.

Along with the foregoing, discussions were entertained by overhead and other agency personnel to reassign and swap other critical resources to another project such as helicopter and pilot. The decision was made not to pursue this course of action. Swapping resources mid-way through a short-term yet, highly complex project elevates the risk and potential for something to go wrong. More to the point, to do so requires additional precious time and effort to brief incoming personnel that did not have the benefit of the pre-burn orientation.

The IAP for this project had an incorrect map attached to it that was at odds with the approved burn plan. This was mitigated by providing another map to assigned resources. However, having two different maps increased the potential for confusion and misunderstanding.

There continues to be some confusion as to the applicability of the so-called 48-hour rule to management ignited prescribed burns and to wildland fire use fires. One interpretation is that this rule is only applicable to the latter. This needs to be cleared up with respect to management ignited burns as it has a bearing on when and if such fire exceeds its planned perimeter it would be declared an escaped fire.

On the Halls Fork project there were two “slopovers” on the north boundary. Although they were outside the burn unit boundary, they were inside the project area analyzed under NEPA. These spots were picked up and suppressed in a timely manner by resources assigned to the project and, therefore, clearly did not constitute an escape.

WHAT CAN BE DONE NEXT TIME?

Two underlying themes for many of these issues were the short time frame for preparing the burn plan and the narrow window of opportunity when the project area was in prescription (weather and fuel moisture parameters) for executing the burn. Many of these issues and barriers can be mitigated with lengthening the planning period for burn plan preparation, for pre-burn orientation, and for logistical preparation and acquisition of resources. The narrow prescription window is more problematic. However, setting these types of projects up for both fall and spring burns may help.

We also learned that:

1. Guidance and protocols for developing burn plans in the new Interagency Prescribed Fire Handbook are applicable and relevant. Moreover, applying these standards assures a comprehensive and well — thought-out plan. The peer review requirement did raise the confidence level that the burn plan was in compliance with agency policy and direction; that the complexity rating was appropriate; and that the prescription parameters and fire behavior calculations were appropriate and accurately calculated with respect to resource management objectives and predicted fire behavior outputs.

2. A comprehensive communications plan that is implemented early is critical to public support, as demonstrated on this project.

3. Up-front communications and coordination with the National Weather Service and Utah Department of Air Quality facilitate both understanding and support for our prescribed fire program activities.

4. On-site orientation of the burn module well in advance of the ignition date assures a high degree of confidence (internally within the module and externally by agency administrators) in a successful outcome.

5. Advance placement and use of portable RAWS station for these types of burns contributes immeasurably to a higher level of understanding of local weather trends and the influence of terrain on general weather patterns.

6. Use of the incident command system organization and associated command and general staff functions is an efficient and effective way to approach the operational aspects of prescribed burn execution. A more developed use of the planning and logistical elements of ICS would have improved execution of this project.

7. Involvement by local agency administrators in coordination with fire staff and with key resource specialists assures compliance in terms of linking “plan-to-project” continuity. In other words these relationships help assure that the requirements in the project decision notice and supporting vegetative prescriptions are carried forward into the burn plan.

8. Along with the foregoing, it is important to ensure that the incident action plan for the project faithfully reflects what has been approved in the burn plan.

9. Having a qualified safety officer assigned to the project raises the level of awareness and application of LCES by personnel on the project.

10. Large projects should be sectioned out into divisions with appropriate overhead assigned to each.

11. More consideration should be given to pre-burn preparation. In the case of Halls Fork, pre-burn treatments focused on improving a control line on the south boundary. In addition to this, an alternative approach for the north and east boundaries would be to pre-treat and possibly burn out these lines ahead of unit ignition. These could be done so as to not take up valuable time when the bulk of the unit is within its prescription window and more effort could be devoted to taking advantage of that window.

12. Remaining flexible and adaptive to changing weather and fuels conditions is important. Taking a deliberative “go-slow-to-go fast” approach will help assure successful attainment of resource and operational objectives. In other words a high degree of situational awareness on the part of all assigned personnel is critical to success.

13. Provision of a project map with a grid overlay to project personnel facilitated communication and understanding during operations.

14. Use of Type-1 crews is highly desirable for efficient and effective operations, particularly blacklining and holding.

15. Dedicating assigned resources to the project for the duration of its execution assures a greater rate of success. Conversely, swapping out resources has the potential for a lower success rate in executing these types of projects.

16. The availability and commitment of resources from adjacent units, including support personnel is important for assuring appropriate staffing.

17. Advance notification of and restricting public access assures a high degree of firefighter and public safety.

18. Assigning a discrete job code to each burn project will facilitate the collection of project specific unit costs.

19. With respect to planning for prescribed burn, a concerted effort by appropriate personnel over a short period of time can be an effective way to complete a burn plan. However there was some inefficiency with this accelerated approach, which included workload trade-offs, scheduling impacts, and the risk of overlooking critical elements or process steps. Not allowing enough time to plan may result in short-cutting some key steps, thereby leading to less than desirable results.

20. More time ahead of burn execution should be allowed to identify, order, schedule and commit needed resources.

21. An agreement needs to be developed to facilitate interagency reimbursement between federal partners for these non-emergency projects.

22. Along with the foregoing, better use of NUIFC dispatching capabilities should be made in acquiring needed resources.

The Halls Fork after-action review was submitted to the Wildfire Lessons Learned Center. The full text is available at www.wildfirelessons.net.