For those who may be following these articles, you may have noticed that I cover the issue of command from both a technical and a philosophical perspective. The issue of command is both vast enough to provide opportunities for commentary and specific in terms of effective application to provide the basis for standard use given particular situations. In Command and the ‘White Flag’, I talked a bit about the need for incident commanders to now when to “wave the white flag” and know when to give up when things aren’t working. As important as the “white flag” is given certain situations, is important to have a specific kind of courage to throw the “red flag” when necessary.

In professional football, when a head coach feels that a referee’s is unfair he can throw a red “challenge” flag and ask that the play be reviewed using instant replay. Teams received a specified number of challenges that can be used throughout a game in all except the last two minutes; at that time the call for review must come from the replay official in a booth high above the stadium. If the coach is successful, the ruling on the field is overturned. If there’s no “incontrovertible evidence” supporting the coach’s position, the play stands and the team looses a time out.

At the scene of an incident, it’s not only important that the incident command support the operations section, tactical-level management and single resources when they are going the right direction, but also be ready to challenge their assumptions where appropriate and necessary.

For ranking officers arriving at the scene of an incident, the first opportunity to throw the red flag is on arrival. There’s an assumption that goes along with the dispatch of command officers to incidents. While chief officers aren’t needed to lay hose lines, raise ladders or treat patients, they are necessary to coordinate the activities of those who are performing at the task level and ensure that the environment is safe and supportive of actions that further the incident’s strategic goals.

A subtle method of challenging the incident commander, without actually assuming command of the incident is asking a series of questions intended to confirm the IC’s current strategy. The existence of a strategic plan can be confirmed by asking a few simple questions:

• Strategically, what is your goal?
• Tactically how are you deploying resources to achieve these goals?
• What is you current span of control?
• What tactical (operational) mode are you in?

Occasionally, it’s apparent on arrival at the scene that not only are the actions being taken by resources on the scene not in concert with a strategic goal, there are in some cases no discernable goals at all. Many organizations use a “deputy incident commander” role in the Incident Management System to address these types of concerns. You may recall that deputies in the IMS must have similar qualifications as the position they are assigned to and must be capable of functioning in the role if required to do so. A “thousand yard stare” in response to questioning about the incident’s strategic direction suggests that it is time to not only challenge what is going on, but to assume command of the incident. This action is a direct challenge regarding the current direction of the incident. Though this can be perceived as negative, depending on the pre-incident relationship of the IC and the command officer assuming command, assumption of command when things are not going well is intended to improve the function of command rather than embarrass the current incident commander. There is certainly a level of diplomacy that is necessary in certain citations.

Perhaps the most overt use of the “red flag” is a situation when IC believes that the actions of the operations section, tactical-level manager or single resource are contrary to the strategic plan and creating a potential life-safety issue for the responders. Though this places a command officer in a position to be described as the dreaded “micro-manager,” this is an opportunity to change the perception in favor of the safety of the responders and the effectiveness of the strategic plan. A radio message “chief we have this one under control” when the smoke and fire conditions are deteriorating, or a report from a search group supervisor that “the area isn’t shored, but we think we can get in and out fairly quickly to do the search” are both examples that simply must be challenged.

The fear of rejection is a strong emotion and motivator, especially in fire service members who are not accustomed to it do to their nearly “rock star” status in a community. Challenging the strategy of an IC or the tactical decision of others in the IMS can be perceived rejection of the person who made the decision or took the action whether intended or not. However, when necessary an incident commander cannot fear a misperception when it comes to making important command decisions, especially those that obviously influence the safety of responders. Unfortunately, ICs who don’t use their “red flags” chance loosing something much more important than a time out in a football game.

I. David Daniels is fire chief of the Fulton County (Ga.) Fire Department, a metro department surrounding the city of Atlanta. He holds a master's degree in human resources management. He is a member of the NFPA’s Fire Service Occupational Safety and Health and the Professional Qualifications for Incident Management Functional Positions committees.