While flying into Missoula, we witnessed numerous fires around the area, including several large headers, which provided a very rough ride into Missoula.

During the briefing by Montana Department of National Resources and Conservation, IMT III was informed that the Black Mountain #2 Fire threatened a large number of homes. We were assigned to that incident, and I was assigned to be the structure protection specialist.

On Aug. 11, I met with Capt. Paul Muir and Firefighter Tim DeVos, both with the Missoula Rural Fire District, to formulate a structure protection plan for the Black Mountain #2 fire. Under Muir's direction MRFD had begun the identification and familiarization process for the threatened structures in O'Brien Creek, Lyon Creek, Cedar Creek, Upland Ridge, Saddleback Ridge, Matin, Little Martin and Sherman Gulches.

The process used was to simply tape or nail paper plates to trees, mail boxes or other stationary item in front of each structure throughout the threat area. The paper plate identified each structure. For example, OB 50 meant that structure was the 50th structure in or on O'Brien Creek. This process is much easier than relying on addresses in dark and heavy-smoke conditions and proved to be very useful.

The next step was to GPS all of the identified structures and place them on a topography map. Included on the map were special water sources and special needs.

The maps that we produced turned out to be the most-highly sought-after items of the incident. They were distributed to the daily resources assigned to the structure protection group: the Missoula County Sheriff's Department and the MRFD liaison, operations chief and planning section. We also kept a set of maps for any units that would be called into assist in structure protection. For example, the Lolo Valley Task Force was prearranged to assist, if needed.

Day and night shifts staffed the structure protection group. These units were assigned to patrol, assist homeowners by providing in advice on preparations, and be visible.

By Aug. 16, the fire weather forecast called for Red Flag Warning, which included 12-20mph winds with gusts up to 25mph and 18% to 25% relative humidity. The day shift began with resources assigned to the structure protection group by setting up drafting sites in O'Brien Creek.

Three tactical water tenders equipped with compressed-air foam systems were assigned to pre-treat the north side of O'Brien Creek. about two miles west of OB 50. This was to assist in preventing a slop-over from getting into the bottom of O'Brien Creek. By doing this we were keeping the fire away from the structures. Div. Chief Sean Stafford loaned me two dozers to assist in this endeavor by cutting in a “break” below the fire but above O'Brien Creek.

At approximately 1500 hours a west wind developed. An hour later, MRFD E366 reported a spot fire just west of the drafting site used by the tenders. I ordered E366 to investigate and report back to me. In the meantime I informed Operations Chief Mike Wakoski of the spot fire, who supplied me with aircraft for my division.

Less than two minutes later, E366 reported back that there was a a two-acre fire on the south side of O'Brien Creek that was on the hillside and running uphill very quickly. I reported this to operations, which replied that I had a Type 1 helicopter on its way for my direction and use. One minute later, E366 reported that the fire was now 20 acres in size and that the wind had increased to approximately 30mph.

I contacted the incoming aircraft and directed it to the spot fire. Once overhead the helo reported that “there was nothing [the pilot] could do about that.” He also reported that the fire was now approximately 200 acres in size and moving very quickly. I ordered all scientific and technical planning group resources to report to OB 50.

I met with the operations chief at OB 50 and advised him of the situation. I then ordered units to Cedar Ridge, Lyon Creek and O'Brien Creek to begin pretreating structures. I ordered DeVos to keep track of all resources being deployed into these areas. I didn't want to lose anyone.

At this time Stafford arrived at my location and offered me his resources and his assistance. I directed him and his units to Cedar Ridge for structure preparation and to assist the engine crews with structure protection. His crews cut line and fired out around many structures.

I then began ordering the warning stage of emergency to the incident commander and his deputy. This second stage of the prearranged public protection plan with the Missoula County Sheriff's Department deployed deputies using our maps to the areas that I requested. The warning stage advises the affected public that a safety threat exists or is imminent.

The public protection plan included both evacuation alert phases, and trigger points, which in this case was I-miles west of all structures. It also included traffic routes for residents to use for a safe departure, evacuation boundaries, traffic-control points and public re-entry criteria.

Personnel on Cedar Ridge informed me of the fire's travel speed and condition. Wind speed at this time was approximately 45-50mph. The fire was now traveling across the ridges at approximately 20mph. That didn't leave much time to get equipment into place and begin pretreating structures, as this area is mountainous with winding, narrow dirt roads and poor access to many of the structures. I ordered the area to be evacuated.

Two Type 6 units from MRFD were assigned to the scientific and technical planning group along with a task force from the North Tree Fire, which consisted of two tactical 3,900-gallon water tenders equipped with CAFS and three Type 6s equipped with CAFS. The STPG also had a third tactical water tender with CAFS from the Bureau of Land Management, and E355 and a Type 1 engine from Missoula City Fire Department. The division chief had provided me with three hand crews. All of these crews and rigs went into Cedar Ridge and Lyon Creek. Through prior arrangement, MRFD had arranged a task force to be available for mutual aid. This was requested.

During previous days, I had discussed putting Muir into service as a strike-team leader for the initial units responding into these areas with Muir and DeVos. DeVos was to handle the incoming mutual aid units because there were no common communications.

All units were directed to pretreat and keep moving. The fire was burning toward the structure at OB 50, so I directed a unit to pretreat it and move down canyon.

The fire hit Cedar Ridge and Lyon Creek very quickly after the initial report of the spot fire. Getting equipment into place for a fast and safe egress was difficult. The tenders were large, but very effective.

When the fire hit Cedar Ridge, Muir and Bttn. Chief Jess Mickelson began ordering units out. All units came out accounted for with no injuries. In the meantime the mutual aid task force had been sent to Horseback Ridge. They were busy familiarizing and placing themselves at structures. I asked their task-force leader to be prepared to move into Cedar Ridge and Lyon Creek after the fire went through.

No home or tree is worth a firefighter's life, which is why I ordered my resources to pretreat and leave, but it is very important to re-enter the area after the fire has gone through. This is when many structures are saved, so I ordered Muir to get the resources back into the areas as soon as it was safe to do so. Units reported afterward that they caught fire literally on the edge of structures, which if left unchecked would have burned.

At approximately 2430 hours I ordered all day-shift units off the incident. The Lolo Task Force handled the remaining mop-up and firing operations. Logistics had food waiting for us out of the fire area.

The next day we went into the area and were able to see the damage to the lost structures and to the forest, but we also saw the structures that were saved. We lost only two single-family dwellings, a bus used as a residence, and several vehicles and out-buildings.

One of the structures lost was never pretreated because the fire hit it so fast that the crews could not get to it. The second lost structure was pretreated with CAFS, but lost to crews not being able to get to it afterwards, partially due to its propane tank venting.

The firefighters assigned to this portion of the Black Mountain #2 fire worked in the worst of conditions, heat and smoke. Single-lane dirt roads limited access to many of the structures. A good plan, dedicated firefighters and the ability of CAFS to effectively pretreat structures saved many houses during the course of this fire.

I want to thank all of the firefighters assigned to me during this incident for their bravery and dedication. I also want to thank the members of SoCal IMT III for their direction and support, without which none of this could have happened as successfully and without injuries as it did.

Capt. Paul Muir and Firefighter Tim DeVos contributed to this article.

Capt. Darryl Dutton is a 23-year veteran of the Los Angeles County Fire Department, where he also serves as the Class A foam coordinator. Dutton also is a member of Southern California Incident Management Team III as a foam specialist for structure protection and as a division group supervisor. He has conducted foam training classes in Australia, Germany, China, Canada and the United States. Dutton was a member of the NFPA 1145 committee, Class A Foam for Structural Firefighting.