Several years ago, a journalist in Mexico asked the FDSOA for an article on nightclub fires and how the progressive and able leaders in America manage the prevention and response to fire occurring in nightclubs and other contemporary entertainment venues. I sat down and wrote a short general statement about such assembly areas. It seemed ironic that the journalist was looking to the U.S. fire service as the guiding light on such occupancies. Little did he know such problems would be repeated time and time again in the United States.

In February that tragic irony struck hard when inadequate emergency lighting and blocked exits contributed to the deaths of 21 people and 40 more injuries at a Chicago nightclub. When ill-trained security guards used pepper spray to break up a fight at E2, approximately 1,500 people stampeded down a narrow flight of stairs and piled up at the club's main entrance. The alcohol-impaired crowd broke into utter pandemonium in the dim lighting and smoke haze. Piles of club-goers had to be extracted using sledgehammers and crowbars. The greater irony was that fire authorities had succeeded in getting a court order to close down the club months earlier, yet the club continued to operate.

Conversely, less than a day later more than 100 people calmly walked out of the Fine Line Music Café in Minneapolis when a rock band's pyrotechnics set the ceiling ablaze. What was different here? The club's staff had discussed the Chicago affair prior to the show and led the attendees in a controlled walk to the exits. It's also important to note that this club was sprinklered.

That was not the case in the West Warwick, R.I., nightclub The Station. A few days later after the Minneapolis incident — to the horror of the world — fireworks initiated a rapidly evolving fire, resulting in the nation's fourth-deadliest fire leaving 99 dead, 13 in critical condition and approximately 190 injured.

These high-profile incidents have resulted in a lot of second-guessing, overreacting, finger-pointing and acute reactionary law-making as building code standards are being questioned. Why wasn't the anachoic foam soundproofing noticed and reported? Why weren't there fire sprinklers? Why were the exits inadequate or blocked? Who let them use fireworks in a highly combustible environment?

But while these recent tragedies may shock and appall you, the truth is venue fires happen worldwide with brutal regularity, and they will happen again.

Fighting human nature

It takes memory to prevent these tragedies. Media attention dies down after a few weeks. The public forgets after a few months. Even local residents forget after some time — we forget too soon.

Even the fire service will abandon the cause eventually. Did New York City disband the Social Club Task Force because they developed a more modern, efficient way of dealing with the issue, or did the Happy Land Social Club fire and the 87 who died in the arson inferno fade from their minds?

It also takes a priority on fire prevention. So many firefighters think fire prevention will put them out of work. The popularity seems to be with operations rather than prevention. The priority must be established and maintained by the chief. Fire prevention work takes energy, ever-increasing knowledge, superior judgment, commitment and dedication. Do we really care?

Lastly, it takes the discipline and perseverance to overcome politics and economics. It won't be easy to petition the needed resources when budgets are so competitive. Nothing that a fire marshal or chief tries to do to improve the nightclub safety will be easy or popular.

Solving a tough equation

To prevent future nightclub fires, we need to understand what causes the disaster so we can prevent it. There are some factors present at most of these tragedies:

• A building built out of combustible materials with no interior fire-resistant barriers.
• A room set above or below other occupancy hazards.
• A room with one or very few narrow, small exits that do not go directly outside.
• Chained-off or blocked exits to prevent unauthorized exit or entry. Only one exit is kept active so that the bouncer can control activity.
• Lack of automatic fire sprinklers, standpipe hose racks or sufficient fire extinguishers.
• Combustible decorations scattered around the room so as to expose people and structural members.
• Sources of fire and heat, such as hot lights, cooking equipment in a non-separated area, candles, smoking, and flaming dishes being served.
• Fireworks or sparklers or proximity to a boiler room without separation barriers.
• Mood-altering substances such as alcohol or drugs.

With a combination of these factors present, it's scientifically probable that the fire will occur.

Who then is responsible to watch for these things? Is it the club owner, who needs to act responsible while seeking profit? Is it the fire marshal, who permits the business and inspects it? Is it the band that plays frequently at the clubs? Is it the cook who prepares and profits from the food being served? Is it the bartenders who serve the alcohol? Is it the patrons who enter the environment and participate in the activities? The answer is all of above.

Code comments

The International Association of Fire Chiefs released a statement saying that the recent tragedies are “a clear indication of the need for the code development process to change the way it looks at fire and life safety in the United States.” [Ed.: See “IAFC issues challenge to national code organizations,” page 12.] The IAFC outlined a number of issues that it believes the ICC and NFPA should immediately address, including the requirements that new commercial buildings, particularly places of assembly, be equipped with fire sprinklers and monitored alarm systems; the elimination of the “grandfathering” concept from the codes entirely; and the prohibition of fireworks and pyrotechnics from indoor use entirely.

However, many contemporary codes were written or changed to reflect similar concerns. The Uniform Building Code and the Uniform Fire Code have numerous requirements for occupancies of this type and controls to prevent this type of disaster. Of course, the codes your local government has implemented as law and the process for enforcement must be defined.

The UBC and UFC are applicable in certain areas when promulgated by local ordinance. It's only two of many codes that are available and they may differ appreciably. If someone were to apply the UBC when constructing a new dance hall or substantially modifying an existing building to include a dance hall, the building permit system should require that the local fire authority review the plans for inclusion of the applicable code requirements and that they continue to maintain an inspection program using the UFC as a guide.

The codes generally would require the dance hall portion of the building to be classified as an assembly occupancy and would then implement the corresponding requirements of the code. For example, the code would stipulate:

• Size and height. The code would establish the maximum allowable size of the rooms and of the building based on the type of construction, spacing to other buildings and their rated occupancy.
• Construction. This would be based on the expected number of occupants. It may include a one- or two-hour fire-resistant wall, floor and ceiling assembly to serve as a barrier and control fire spread. Construction materials would include structural members, fire-resistive layers and wall finishes. Flame spread ratings and the smoke-generating qualities of the materials are considered.
• Automatic fire protection systems. The code would specify and provide the requirements for the need to install fire protection systems in the room or building, such as automatic fire sprinklers throughout, special engineered systems for the kitchen appliances and standpipes.
• Exits. The code would define the number of unobstructed exits required, their widths dependent on the occupancy loading, and their access to a direct outside path not interrupted by turnstiles, half doors, obstructions or other occupancies.
• Door locks and hardware. The code would establish permissible types of locks or the use of quick-opening “panic” hardware dependent on the numbers of people occupying the room.
• Illumination. The code would define minimum illumination required in the room and at the exits, as well as the need for emergency lights in the event of power outages.
• Combustible decorations and sets, including the presence of a stage or platform.
• Kitchen or cooking area. The code would define the necessary fire-resistant separation required for areas of this type, necessary fire protection systems for the appliances, and limits of flammable and combustible materials.
• Room location and limits. The code would establish the limits of putting assembly areas in basements, on upper floors and the necessary construction features dependent on the number of occupants.
• Open flame. The code would establish the limits of having open flame, pyrotechnics and flambé in the room.
• Occupants. The codes will define the “occupancy loading” factors for the room so that you can divide the total square feet by the factor to establish the maximum number of people allowed to occupy the room (the UBC uses 7 square feet per person in an assembly occupancy).
• Fire appliances. Number of fire appliances would mean the fire extinguishers and standpipe hose reels or cabinets required in the room.
• Fire detection and fire alarms. The code would define the type of smoke or fire detectors, alarms and remote surveillance required for the room and building, including emergency backup for electrical power if required.
• Exit corridors. There may be a need for a rated corridor (protected tunnel) when the travel distance to the exits exceeds the code limitations. The corridor would provide a “safe haven” exitway that is separated from the rest of the room or building, enabling people to escape without hindrance.
• Signage. The code would specify what signs need to be present and in what language to warn people of hazards and direct them to an exit. The signs could include fire extinguishers, emergency action plans, exit doors and aisles, and any special considerations.
• Handicapped provisions. There are a special set of code requirements designed to provide adequate controls and safety considerations for disabled and impaired people. These include wheel-chair bound or hearing- or sight-impaired people, as well those with other special considerations.
• Location and separation of equipment rooms, boilers and other energy-producing equipment.

Building and fire codes differ in many respects and are used in the decisions of local governments. The codes themselves are laws only when implemented by local, state or federal regulations. It's probable that local adoption of a code will be accompanied by variations from the model code for certain exceptions based on local needs.

We want people to have a good time and share in the nightclub cultural experience, but we want them to be safe and survive. At this point we are not there. It's a dangerous arena for the public as well as firefighters. We shall see if the fire community can keep the memories and take the commitment to improved nightclub safety to heart. We can't rely on developers, promoters and the public to take the responsibility as they have a short memory.

Generally, if buildings are constructed to resist fire; kept free of accumulations of combustible materials; have sufficient, well-designed and illuminated unobstructed exits; aren't overcrowded; cleared of sources of fire, and provided with automatic sprinkler protection, it's possible to have a safe and survivable dance hall experience and live to tell about it.

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Robert J. McGill is a mechanical engineer and a California-certified hazmat specialist and instructor. He works for Aerojet, a Sacramento-based technology company. In addition, he is a Fire Protection Engineer. He's past chairman of the Fire Department Safety Officers Association, a member of the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Fire Protection Association.