To view the full report go to www.wildfirelessons.net/ICTs.htm. Some of the lessons learned regarding strategy and tactics as described by the interviewees included:

ADAPTING STRATEGIC THINKING

Almost all respondents reported that adapting their thinking presented their biggest challenge. The situation required people to quickly grasp the enormity of events, improvise solutions, and adapt tried-and-true tactics or standard operating procedures for a new and evolving situation.

Most leaders stated they did not think far enough ahead at the start, and they felt as if they were “behind the power curve.” The situation was so dire that respondents at all levels reported feeling “provoked” into wanting to take immediate action without keeping the big picture in mind. Several senior leaders reported that under these circumstances, they were prone to tunnel vision and consequently did not think about contingencies and alternatives. Many senior leaders stated that going out of their way to seek the ideas of peers and subordinates helped maintain discipline and keep the focus on the big picture.

Respondents said that the most significant lesson was that one must have a well-thought-out plan with ingress, egress, trigger points and contingencies as critical factors to both survival and success. They also felt that:

• Leaders at all levels said that collaborating with and seeking input from others to maintain a focus on the big picture helped combat tunnel vision and the tendency to narrow focus in high-stress situations.
• Remaining emotionally detached and trusting doctrine, training and experience to guide decisions was a key theme leaders related. Conducting proper size-up and planning before engaging were even more important during the chaotic and extreme circumstances.
• Leaders said it helped their focus to think about the opportunities the situation presented, and to affect what they could with what resources were available.

STRUCTURE TRIAGE

When the fires surged well into the urban environment, firefighters said they had to shift their thinking from triaging individual houses to evaluating entire city blocks.

Firefighters created anchor points by taking advantage of neighborhoods with relatively few exposed structures. Municipal and county firefighters said that pre-incident planning provided valuable information that enabled them to make quick decisions about which structures or neighborhoods were defensible and where they might make safe, effective stands in their local areas.

During these fires, thinking on structure triage shifted from individual structures to entire neighborhoods and communities. Pre-incident planning saved time in determining defensibility and viable locations to establish anchor points.

• In general, 10 to 20% involvement was the trigger point for firefighters to abandon an individual structure and concentrate on protecting neighboring structures.
• Firefighters had to concentrate on areas with defensible space; little effort was justified in areas without these preparations.

BUMP & RUN VERSUS ANCHOR & HOLD

Most respondents indicated they initially defaulted to their preferred tactics: Structural firefighters headed for the fire's origin, while wildland firefighters tried to find an anchor and start perimeter control.

When fires entered urban neighborhoods, many firefighters said the bump-and-run tactic proved ineffective. In more densely populated neighborhoods, firefighters reported that intense radiant heat emanating from involved structures was more of a threat to surrounding structures than flame impingement or ember attack.

Some municipal and county departments reported that they adapted by implementing a tactic they called anchor and hold or temporary anchoring. These firefighters switched to using hydrants with 2H- inch hose and lower-flow nozzles to pump enough water to cool involved structures in enough time to stop radiant heating or flame impingement on neighboring houses.

To avoid over-commitment to any single area and mitigate the risk, they made additional effort to maintain LCES, and they remained highly mobile by laying out minimal hose and abandoning it or dragging it from location to location. This effort enabled firefighters to remain mobile enough to react to new spot fires. Respondents who used this tactic said it was extremely effective, and they felt it combined the best of wildland doctrine with the additional capabilities of structural engines. They cautioned that a reliable water supply and pressure is required to make the mobile anchoring tactic effective.

• Bump and run worked well in the interface but became ineffective in the urban neighborhoods where multiple structural spot fires and intense radiant heat was more of a threat than flame impingement or ember attack.
• Traditional hydrant use was ineffective because crews tended to overcommit to one area for too long. A mobile system of temporary anchoring was more effective in dense, urban areas.
• Temporary anchoring required increased attention to LCES. The potential for overcommitment was mitigated by limiting the amount of hose used based on available crew members.
• To be an effective tactic, temporary anchoring requires a reliable water source and adequate water pressure.
• Explore the idea of encouraging homeowners to purchase and store barrier products on their property for fire department use.

STRUCTURE PROTECTION BRANCHES

Respondents reported effective results from organizing into structure protection groups and branches rather than divisions in interface areas.

On several incidents, leaders established a structure branch contingency plan that they were ready to implement when the fire reached certain trigger points. Having this contingency plan, with resources preassigned, saved valuable time when conditions demanded a shift in strategy.

• Structure protection resources in the interface were more effective when organized into functional groups committed to a zone defense, and crews were delegated the responsibility to act within these areas.
• Contingency plans for establishing structure protection groups and branches were most effective when made early. Most trigger points to initiate implementation did not allow enough time from recognition to when the group needed to be functioning.

FYI

The Learning Curve is a collection of after-incident reports and Scratchline quarterly newsletter articles by the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center, an interagency program supported by the Federal Fire and Aviation Leadership Council. Visit the center or subscribe to Scratchline at www.wildfirelessons.net.

FOR STRIKE-TEAM ORGANIZATION, LESS MAY BE MORE

Five-engine strike teams were very effective when making a stand or holding the fire at the perimeter of a neighborhood. However, respondents indicated that two-engine teams were more effective inside urban areas.

Strike-team leaders found that single engines with three-person crews were stretched thin when the flame front moved into urban areas and engine crews had to deal with several homes at once; safety margins and crew effectiveness also were reduced. In some cases, agencies had people available but lacked engines, so they supplemented engine crews, staffing engines with up to eight people. Respondents reported excellent results using this technique. It allowed teams to effectively run four hose lines and use a master stream device without compromising LCES.

Some firefighters reported that using a task force of four engines paired with a dozer and a water tender worked better for structure and community protection than four engines or a dozer alone. Firefighters also reported that, at times, Type 1 engines were assigned to strike teams operating in interface areas with narrow roads and minimal turnarounds. They felt this was not effective, and that Type 1 engines were better suited for assignments in urban areas where firefighters could take advantage of their ability to deliver water from hydrants at high volume.

The standard strike team configuration was effective in wildland areas when holding line or making a stand. In urban areas, two-engine teams worked well. Augmenting engines with off-duty structural firefighters increased the effectiveness of engine crews. Type 1 engines were less effective in interface areas with narrow access and turnarounds.

Strike teams ran into span-of-control problems when the captain tried to function as part of an engine crew and as the strike team leader. If a team leader isn't available to lead and supervise an engine strike team, the strike team should be disbanded and the engines reassigned as single resources.

RESIDUAL FIRE

Firefighters reported that after the flame fronts passed in areas of the California wildfires, some units were ordered to bump and run, reposition, or fall back to attack again further downstream. Houses were watered and foamed per standard operating procedure, but several later burned.

Respondents indicated that the losses would have been reduced or prevented if they had been able to leave some units behind to patrol. Firefighter effectiveness was increased when a small task force of engines and crews focused on residual fire and command vehicles or observers patrolled and identified potential problem areas.

Many structures were lost when appropriate resources were not assigned to patrol for residual fires while using bump-and-run tactics in the interface. Assigning observers to the field to patrol and report problems, using a smaller task force to deal with residual fires, was effective.

Leader-set trigger points for patrolling resources to rejoin the main effort after an appropriate amount of time were important.