Miami-Dade Fire Rescue is the sponsoring agency for a FEMA urban search-and-rescue response team known as Florida Task Force 1. There are 28 such teams nationwide. They consist typically of 70-80 personnel of various disciplines — rescue, technical, planning and medical specialists; doctors; and structural engineers — who are commanded by a task-force leader. Each task-force leader typically is a senior member of a sponsoring organization, usually a higher-ranking chief fire officer. In this case, I was designated as task-force co-leader along with another senior member of the department, Chief Alan Perry, who is the current program manager for MDFR's urban search-and-rescue bureau.

On the day of the 7.0-magnitude earthquake that devastated Haiti, we spent hours on the phone with federal authorities. There clearly was a need for search-and-rescue operations in Haiti, and we knew that we were less than a two-hour flight away from the Caribbean island nation. In Washington, D.C., the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was working closely with FEMA, and the decision was made jointly to send six U.S urban search-and-rescue task forces to Haiti.

Because our team has many years of deployment experience — both domestic and foreign — we have developed a good process for keeping our personnel and equipment ready to go at a moment's notice. Additionally, our planning process includes being flexible in every aspect of a mission; for example, we have load plans that allow us to change at a moment's notice between military and commercial aircraft. It was a good thing that we did, because that is exactly what happened to us. Logistical issues are a given in disaster deployments, so if you or your team ever prepares to provide aid outside of your normal jurisdiction, it is imperative that you overcome them to the best of your abilities.

Our team departed Miami International Airport and was in Haiti within 36 hours of the earthquake. Once on the ground, we needed to get in contact with State Department officials as soon as possible. The airport in Haiti was right out of a movie scene. The control tower was empty, hundreds of people were milling around the taxiways and there were thousands just outside the front gates. Because of the change in air assets, our personnel and equipment were loaded onto three planes. All of our task force personnel made it with some personal gear and light equipment. Unfortunately, the majority of our heavy tools and gear would not make it into Haiti for another 36 hours. At the airport, we made contact with a USAID representative, who secured transportation for the task force to the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince.

Once at the embassy, the first priority was to find a piece of real estate within the compound in order to set up our base of operations. A small open space next to a loading dock and supply warehouse was chosen. Tents were being erected and the base was starting to take shape within a matter of hours. But make no mistake — the logistical component of the task force is daunting, not only during deployments, but also in the preparation for them. We try to mix all of our disciplines with senior and less-experienced personnel, but especially in logistics. A true mentoring environment exists, and this learning relationship is crucial to not only our current operations, but also for the successful future of the task force. Lessons are learned, not just in a classroom or through a PowerPoint presentation, but also via real-life scenarios. Watching our most-senior members navigate a foreign language or custom while having to procure 100 gallons of fuel on the seventh day of a disaster deployment can be a daunting experience, but it is an unforgettable learning opportunity as well.

On our first day in-country we also began search-and-rescue operations. We assembled our rescue-squad leaders and team managers, and developed our initial plans. A USAID disaster-assistance response team (DART) had established a command post in the embassy, and they were, in essence, our incident commander. In our chain-of-command structure, we only allowed command staff to have access to the embassy and to the DART. This decreased the chance of misinformation being disseminated and thus controlled the information flow. Incident commanders very often are overwhelmed by the enormity of a disaster of this magnitude. The difficulties in managing this disaster was compounded by the fact that in addition to the six U.S. teams, there were more than 30 other international teams operating search-and-rescue missions at the same time.

As we began operations on the third day, a base rhythm had taken form. Operational briefings were being held the night before the mission day. This allowed for reconnaissance squads comprised of eight to 12 task-force members to fan out and begin their missions early the next morning. Some resources were left at our base of operations to manage not only the base itself, but also the command post, medical and decontamination areas. Managing and directing personnel in such a chaotic and constantly changing environment can be a challenge. As in most emergency operations, communication is crucial to the success of such missions. Amazingly, cell-phone service was up and running in the capital city. The problem was accessing the service of our North American providers. The solution was to secure a blanket international-access agreement for our cell phones through the respective providers. This took about 24 hours to accomplish, but it ultimately opened more lines of communication.

Meanwhile, our handheld radios were operational. However we lacked secure, elevated locations for our repeater antennas, which were necessary for extended-range communications. Unfortunately, the handheld radios continued to be ineffective for extended-range communications, but functioned effectively within a range of three miles.

We learned that the sharing of information is crucial not only for the success of the mission, but also for the morale of the mission responders. Team and squad briefings were provided as often as possible. Section chiefs and squad leaders were given face-to-face briefings, and were directed to share the information with their team members. In addition, a dedicated base camp satellite phone was provided, along with a schedule for individuals to contact family members during down time.

Back in Miami-Dade, a home support team had been established and staffed around the clock to provide updates and answer questions from task-force friends and family. A designated task-force-command staff member in Haiti had a direct line of communication with the home support-team leader. This not only quelled many rumors and provided important updates, but also aided resupply and, eventually, demobilization efforts.

It is important to recognize the mental and physical health of the task force during disaster deployments. We know that emergency-response personnel already are prone to various external stressors due to their daily duties in the fire service. Now picture that same person, who has been placed in a catastrophic environment, in a foreign country, for up to 14 days — the effects to both body and mind can be overwhelming. To help counter these types of stressors, designated crisis and peer counselors are brought into the home support team to allow them to acclimate themselves to the current needs and circumstances of the disaster response.

During the demobilization process, significant resources are assigned to mental health as well. This same crisis/peer team is reassembled back at home and is present at the task-force homecoming. Without any outside interference, the crisis/peer team speaks with all returning task-force members, provides informational handouts, offers help-line phone numbers, and conducts a cursory stress debriefing. A no-work rest period is then ordered for the returning task-force members. After several days off, all task-force members must also attend a muster for a hot-wash and documentation-preparation meeting. During this secondary muster, both mental and physical health education is then provided in more detail.

In Haiti, tactical considerations were developed by the United Nations Coordinating Group. These included wide-area reconnaissance, search and rescue. The priorities established included: hospitals, schools and universities, multi-story housing, and other large buildings. FL-TF1 made the decision to establish the robust recon teams that would request larger rescue teams when they encountered a live victim.

In February, the House Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management conducted a hearing to examine the lessons learned from the Haiti response, and to hear suggestions regarding possible enhancements to our nation's domestic disaster-response capability. One of the most crucial lessons concerns the importance of a nationwide response protocol that includes a standardized approach to nomenclature, resources and training for all responding agencies. For the most part, this is done in the U.S.; however, this system is still being refined in the international search-and-rescue community.

For example, international search-and-rescue teams arrived in Haiti with an incredible variety of supplies, capabilities and needs. Management of such a diverse resource pool can be vexing. Fortunately, a unified command structure under the United Nations was established to manage all of these resources. As a result, the Haitian urban search-and-rescue response was quite successful, as more than 100 survivors were pulled from the rubble by these teams.

Another lesson we learned long ago is that external affairs or public relations must be ingrained into the task force's every component. Each task-force member is briefed on appropriate customs and rules to follow. The utmost respect is given to addressing empathy and sympathy for the people of the disaster area. As much as possible, we assign dual roles for task-force members to function as liaison and information officers under the command staff.

In Haiti, we also were fortunate to have three task-force members who had roots in the country and spoke fluent French Creole; they proved to be consummate ambassadors for not only our team, but for our country. Miami-Dade Asst. Fire Chief Karls Paul Noel, Chief Fire Officer Yves Mardice and Dr. Rudoph Moise each played a vital role in ensuring our mission was a success through their translation and insights. The task force's planning-section staff also doubled as information officers by conducting press briefings, updating the task force's social-media sites, cataloging images, and communicating with senior embassy officials in Haiti and in the United States.

Dave Downey, MPA, BPA, EMT-P, is a 28-year veteran of the fire service and currently serves as assistant fire chief for technical services for Miami-Dade Fire Rescue. Downey is a founding member of Florida Task Force 1 and is the East Coast Task Force Leaders representative for the DHS/FEMA National Response System.

To the Rescue

The National Urban Search and Rescue Response System was established to provide a structured network to assist local assets mitigate primarily structural collapses in urban environments. The system currently consists of 28 teams nationwide under the auspices of DHS/FEMA. Each participating agency commits to providing a centralized training and deployment center for their respective task forces. For international deployments, the USAID, under the auspices of the State Department, coordinates both rescue and recovery efforts and utilizes two primary urban search-and-rescue task forces as their first-in response teams. Meanwhile, MDFR has played a significant role in assisting both domestic and international response systems since 1985.

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