Most incident commanders are people who have attained their positions because they have shown themselves to be intelligent, strong and determined people. Many have been around for some time and tend to make pretty good decisions. Good incident commanders know the basic rules and the pitfalls. They're good judges of how far they can push the envelope to reach a favorable conclusion. Incident commanders can do these things because of their past experiences.

In 1995 the rules changed when sarin gas was released in the Tokyo subway system. That incident started one of the most significant changes any of us have ever seen in the fire service. Tokyo may have seemed thousands of miles away, but the problem was really at our doorstep. We quickly found out that we didn't know very much. Most of us assumed that our SCBA would protect us from inhalation hazards. Most of us believed that these chemical warfare agents were not so different or any more dangerous than all the other chemicals we were used to dealing with.

Immediately after the Tokyo incident, people started to ask questions about these chemical warfare agents, questions like “What are these chemicals and how do they work?” and “Will our personal protective equipment protect us?” The answers weren't readily available, as most of the chemical experts whom we were used to working with had little or no experience with these chemicals.

We quickly found out that there had been a mutual decision made by NIOSH and the Department of Defense to consider chemical warfare agents a military issue that wasn't found in the civilian arena. Therefore, no testing was done to determine the effectiveness of civilian SCBA to protect against these agents. When the fire service looked at the testing protocols, we found that the military's criteria were designed for a youthful person in perfect physical condition and allowed for “acceptable losses.” These criteria were unacceptable to the fire service.

This situation has been corrected by the NIOSH CBRN testing certification. The major manufacturers are presently developing retrofit kits that will provide the necessary improvements so that many of the existing SCBA now in service can provide adequate protection against these agents. We also can provide a mask that will adequately protect our personnel from inhalation hazards.

Another significant area of concern was the adequacy of protective clothing when responding to these types of incidents. Various government agencies cooperated in the testing of commonly used turnout gear. The initial findings revealed that the typical bunker gear did provide some limited protection. The testing further found that if duct tape were used to seal the bunker gear, the level of protection was increased.

Some incident commanders took these findings to mean that the existing gear was perfectly safe. Others were aghast at the results of this testing and particular unhappy with the idea that duct tape could do any good at all. After a great outcry from the PPE purists, the criteria were tightened and additional testing was performed. When all was said and done, the testing results commonly referred to as the “3/30 Rule” still stand.

Every incident commander must read the report, Guidelines for Incident Commander's Use of Firefighter Protective Ensemble with Self Contained Breathing Apparatus For Rescue Operations During A Terrorist Chemical Agent Incident, understand all the fine points and then make appropriate decisions. The two primary findings are very simple:

• Self-taped turnout gear with SCBA provides sufficient protection in an unknown nerve agent environment for a three-minute reconnaissance to search for living victims.
• Standard turnout gear with SCBA provides sufficient protection from nerve agent vapor hazards inside interior or downwind areas of the hot zone to allow 30 minutes of rescue time for known live victims.

In addition, the NFPA has developed a set of standards that will guide incident commanders in making the appropriate decisions concerning the selection of protective clothing.

Another of the confusing topics that incident commanders must deal with is the great array of instrumentation now available. It wasn't too many years ago that many fire departments felt very advanced if they could identify a potentially explosively atmosphere due to the presence of a flammable product. Why, if you understood the use of the different filters, you could even distinguish between light and heavy hydrocarbons!

Then along came other meters that could determine other single or multiple gas readings. Lower explosive limits, oxygen percentage, carbon monoxide and carbon disulfide became the standard for years. Each of these meters used a relatively simple method whereby personnel could actually apply a test gas, calibrate the meter and obtain an accurate reading that the incident commander could rely on. There were set standards by which the incident commander could make intelligent decisions such as “go or no go” and “safe or unsafe.”

With the advent of chemical and biological warfare agents, instrument readings are harder to get and more difficult to rely on, which makes it much harder for the incident commander to make the right decision. There's no way to field-test an instrument designed to detect an agent such as anthrax. Incident commanders also must remember that there are no established standards to determine how well an instrument works or even how much is too much. The Inter-Agency Board, which is a conglomeration of knowledgeable government specialists, scientists and emergency responders, is working hard to establish who should determine these standards.

The bottom line is that incident commanders can make better decisions. Whenever possible, err on the side of safety. Use all the existing standards. Demand better information. Fight hard to protect your people.

John Eversole was chief of special operations for the Chicago Fire Department before his retirement. He is the chairman of the IAFC Hazardous Materials Committee and the committee for NFPA 472, Professional Competence of Emergency Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents. He received the Congressional Fire Services Institute's Mason Lankford Leadership Award in 2001.

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For more information on the 3/30 Rule, see “Temporary Seal” from November 2001.