When Hurricane Wilma, the most intense hurricane on record, slammed into the southwest coast of Florida on Oct. 23, it cut a $12 billion swath of destruction across the state and left 35 dead before heading out to sea and dissipating over the Atlantic Ocean. Among the cities in the path of the monster storm was Plantation and its 80,000 residents, directly west of Fort Lauderdale.

Fortunately, Plantation weathered the storm with no loss of life and recovered rapidly, although not without some difficult experiences. Key to the city's positive outcome was its preplanning and ability to function independent of other support mechanisms. The fact that such a level of self-sufficiency was required, however, underscores the benefit that interagency training and cooperation provides — and makes glaringly apparent when it's lacking.

Stormy weather

Hurricanes, of course, are a recognized annual threat to all communities in Florida. The city of Plantation maintains a severe weather operations plan, or SWEOP, and updates it every year prior to the beginning of the hurricane season. The plan calls for emergency reallocation of resources and cooperative efforts by all the city's departments and agencies to achieve effective response and recovery efforts, before, during and after a severe weather event.

Plantation's SWEOP incorporates the National Incident Management System and establishes distinct roles for each essential city department. It also establishes a joint command structure to manage the incident. The SWEOP further identifies the steps that are to be taken during each phase of a severe weather event. The three phases of the plan are pre-storm activation, response and post-storm recovery. Plantation's SWEOP is supplemented by a Continuity of Operations Plan, which establishes an organized process for bringing city government back to normal operation after the emergency response period ends.

Plantation first responders don't wait for hurricane season to start thinking about storms, however. Pre-storm planning begins in early June when all department heads meet to review the plan, make any necessary changes and review their roles, should a storm hit.

“This eliminates the need to meet before each storm,” says Plantation Fire Chief Robert Pudney, who serves as emergency manager during an activation. “Everyone understands their role and what is required of them ahead of time.”

The Plantation Fire Department is a combination department with 250 members organized into five divisions: Suppression, Rescue, Prevention, Mechanics and Administration. The department maintains six fire stations throughout the city and operates 19 pieces of apparatus, including three aerial ladders, a dive-rescue air support unit, a hazmat response truck, a foam unit and several utility vehicles supporting the suppression division. The Rescue Division operates four rescue units, each staffed with two paramedics and an EMT/driver.

Targeted roles

Once it was clear Wilma was going to strike south Florida, Plantation city officials put their SWEOP in motion. In such situations, the Plantation Police Department changes to an “alpha/bravo” shift schedule during which officers work 12-hour rotations and bunk down for the other 12. This ensures that an adequate number of fresh, rested officers will be available throughout the event.

By virtue of the fact the fire department is a combination department, its staffing is handled differently. The rescue division, made up mostly of career personnel, is put on an alpha/bravo shift similar to the police department. Depending on when a storm is scheduled to make impact, the oncoming shift may be called in early, or the ending shift may be held over. As Plantation uses an ABCD shift, there's always at least one shift in reserve should it be needed during the recovery phase. Depending on the projected intensity of the oncoming storm, additional crews may be called in to staff the two spare units as well.

The plan calls for the all-volunteer suppression division to be handled in a different manner. During the pre-storm phase, the six station captains assign a crew to each truck. They also assign crews to replace them once the storm passes.

The SWEOP allocates specific roles for other city departments. For example, the public works and recreation departments combine efforts and create road-clearing crews that stage throughout the city. The purchasing department procures provisions, which are distributed to crews standing by in the city's staging areas. The utilities department prepares generators to be deployed to lift stations and water purification plants to ensure those vital installations continue to operate, and so forth

Braced with its SWEOP, the city of Plantation could only wait. Then, with triple-digit wind speeds and torrential rains, Wilma hit.

The eye of the storm

Two trailer parks sit within Plantation's 22 square miles. Prior to the storm, evacuation orders were issued for both parks. City officials distributed flyers that explained the need for the evacuation and where the closest shelters were located, but as the storm hit, concerns were raised that evacuation orders may not have been heeded. Dramatic shifts in the demographics of the trailer parks had not been factored into the city's planning; many of the residents did not speak English and the flyer had not been produced in any other language.

As the storm continued its northeast progression, a decision was made to send out fire and police units when the hurricane's eye passed over Plantation. As the winds died down and clear skies appeared, units were dispatched to the trailer parks to survey the damage and effect any necessary rescues.

“We estimated about a 20-minute window of opportunity,” says Pudney. There was no time to deploy USAR teams. Crews were instructed to stop at damaged trailers only, radio their location, and search the wreckage for trapped or injured residents. Then Wilma's path shifted abruptly, and the window of opportunity began closing just as rapidly. An order was given for all units to withdraw from the parks immediately and return to their stations.

The backside of the storm was, by far, stronger than the leading edge. From the vantage point on the second floor of the operations center city staffers watched as “Tree City, USA” was rapidly reduced to “Twig City, USA.”

Then, only a few hours later, Wilma was gone.

Assessing the damage

After Wilma's passage, firefighters and EMS personnel ventured out to begin damage assessments. As engine companies and rescue crews traveled through the city streets, they provided a quick assessment of the level of damage based on the hurricane rating scale, and those assessments were marked on a grid map of the city. Downed trees, power lines and street signs are comparable to damage caused by a Category 1 hurricane. Structural damage to building, depending on extent, may be caused by a Category 2, 3 or 4. The objective of the assessment is to rapidly identify areas that suffered critical damage and allow for resources to be deployed quickly to the most needed locations.

Historically, a grid map of Plantation created by crews assessing damage after a storm would be sprinkled with zeroes and occasional ones. Larger numbers were unheard of. This time, however, the grid was covered with ones, twos and the occasional three. For the first time in recent memory, Broward County had suffered profound damage. Huge trees blocked major roads, power lines and traffic lights lay in the streets, and building materials littered the landscape like discarded trash.

Chaos takes charge

Almost immediately Plantation work crews were dispatched to the worst-hit areas in an attempt to clear roads for emergency vehicles. Reports of damaged homes, injuries and missing pets poured into the emergency center.

Because phone lines were down and cell phone service was out, many people took to the streets in an attempt to seek out loved ones. In other cases, the simply curious ventured out with cameras in hand, recording the aftermath. Within only a few hours streets became clogged with cars, trucks and wandering people, the vehicular flow compounded by missing traffic lights, stop signs and street markers.

The rules of preparedness in areas where hurricanes may strike are quite specific. Each individual is supposed to be self-sufficient for the first 72 hours following a storm. That preparation is supposed to include enough water and food for each member of the household, dry clothes, flashlights with batteries, and a portable radio. Unfortunately, many Broward County residents had never experienced devastation on the scale delivered by Wilma, and very few people were adequately prepared. With no electricity, no phones and no Internet, people found out too late just how quickly resource stockpiles can disappear.

As with any major event, there was a need for strong and immediate leadership by state, county and local officials. And in the first few days after Wilma, it appeared as though that was not to be. As requests were put into the Broward County EOC for ice, water, food and health-care resources, the only response that came back was “We're waiting.”

Prior to Wilma's landfall the news media had given considerable coverage to FEMA's assurances of its preparedness for the storm. News reports showed hundreds of tractor-trailers full of ice and water, staged in Homestead and Palm Beach County, that were ready to be deployed. Following the storm's passage, however, not a truck, bag of ice nor bottle of water could be found. As Plantation would later learn, FEMA deployment orders were lost and misdirected, and needed supplies were sent to the wrong places or never deployed at all. Still later, truck drivers would relate their experiences of sitting in staging areas, then being sent to Louisiana, finally being turned back to south Florida, then sent to Jacksonville to stage, then ordered to south Florida again, all as their loads of ice melted.

On Oct. 25, less than 24 hours after Wilma had blown through, the Broward County EOC announced a 2 p.m. opening of points of distribution. Residents were informed that ice, water and food would be available. Unfortunately, the announcement was premature, and supplies had yet to be delivered.

Broward County officials also contacted each city where a distribution point had been designated and asked those cities to supply personnel and coordination. Although this had not been part of any prior planning in which it had been involved, the Plantation Fire Department accepted the challenge, placing Lt. Tony Martins in charge of coordinating operations at Plantation Heritage Park.

When Martins arrived at the park he found nothing. No ice, no water, no trucks or equipment to unload the trucks, nor any personnel to assist with supply distribution if supplies had even been available. All he found was a deserted county park that had been ravaged by the storm. “We couldn't even get in the gate,” he says. Downed trees blocked all entrances.

Despite the few open roads and serious lack of functioning communications equipment, word had quickly spread among local residents of the distribution point's projected opening. Lines of cars began to form hours before it was due to open.

Road-clearing crews were immediately summoned. Assisted by firefighters, the crews cleared the paths and roadways into the park. As day became evening and the lines outside the park lengthened, Martins, coordinating with Plantation Police, worked out a system that would allow for two distribution lines to operate at the same time.

“It was a great plan,” Martins says. “All it required was people and supplies.” But none were forthcoming, and as darkness fell and with reports being broadcast by radio describing how the distribution centers in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties were running at full capacity, impatient crowds at the Broward County site began to direct their anger toward anyone who appeared to in authority.

Common sense takes hold

By nightfall, it became clear that no relief supplies were en route. Pudney made the decision to close the distribution point and keep it closed until supplies could be brought in. Police were brought in to turn away the angry crowds but with no information as to when help might be coming.

City officials then decided to proceed without county support; take complete control of the Heritage Park site; find their own source of supplies; and provide their own personnel, record-keeping and resource management.

Plantation happens to be home to the worldwide delivery company DHL. Plantation Mayor Rae Carole Armstrong worked with DHL's CEO to arrange to have ice and water brought in from other parts of the country. By the next morning, Oct. 25, Heritage Park was up and running. It was the only distribution point in Broward County to have supplies. In addition to volunteers from DHL who helped distribute the supplies, a contingent from the local National Guard and nearly 150 Plantation firefighter family members and friends arrived to assist. Additional help came from local high school students and members of civic organizations.

The tale of a generator

One personal anecdote illustrates both the positive and negative aspects inherent in the situation. My wife and our kids were among those who volunteered to help distribute supplies at Heritage Park.

After that first hard day on the lines alongside some of the National Guardsmen, they learned those particular guardsmen had not only just returned from duty in Iraq to be swept up in the aftermath of the storm, but also that they hadn't had a hot meal or shower in days. Despite complete power outages — our home had a gas stove and gas-fed hot water — my wife and I were able to offer those servicemen home-cooked meals and hot showers throughout the storm's aftermath.

Unknown to us at the time, across town another instance of the lack of interagency planning and cooperation was about to become known. Due to the widespread power outages, lift stations designed to move sewage throughout the system and return it to the water treatment plants for processing were beginning to fail. Backups of sewage were being reported throughout the city.

While the Plantation Utilities Department had placed available generators in the most-affected areas and personnel were manually pumping sewage at other sites, the lack of electrical power was critical. City officials made a request through the county EOC for more generators.

Finally, a single FEMA-supplied generator arrived at one of the requested sites, and power was restored long enough for the situation to be brought under control. Utility workers from Plantation indicated to the FEMA representative that the generator was needed at another lift station, only a few blocks away. The FEMA representative indicated that the generator would have to be returned to the staging area in West Palm Beach, over an hour away, and that another requisition would be required for the other lift station. Despite pleadings by the utilities workers, the FEMA representative was adamant.

As the emergency manager, Pudney was informed of the incident. He immediately sent police officers to the scene to attempt to reason with FEMA, but the representative was unyielding. Pudney then ordered the officers to commandeer the generator. The FEMA rep then threatened to have the National Guard fend off the Plantation police. Unknown to the FEMA rep, the guardsmen were at my home, eating dinner, showering and swimming in my pool. Bottom line, we kept the generator.

The next day, tractor-trailer loads of ice, water, MRES and tarps began to appear at the distribution point. A contingent of police officers from Bradenton, Fla., also was deployed to help with security and distribution.

By the fourth day, my wife's kitchen had officially moved from our home to Heritage Park, where she prepared three meals each day for the collective groups. The park was affectionately dubbed “Camp Bradenton.”

The forgotten essential

When it comes to planning, one of the most frequently overlooked functions is the need for providing information to the public. Most disaster plans devote at best a paragraph or two to the subject, simply mentioning the need for public information and delegating of those duties to the emergency manager or designee.

Plantation was no different. Until Wilma, several drafts and rewrites of the SWEOP identified the need for a public information office function but provided little beyond identification of the need.

With a city as large as Plantation, it should have been imperative to ensure its residents received accurate information from its own sources. Plantation had three separate public information teams working throughout the city: those of the police department, the fire department and the city administration. And, while the police and fire PIOS often collaborated on individual incidents, there were no cohesive plans to bring the resources together during a major event.

Only weeks before Hurricane Wilma swept through the western Caribbean, Plantation's PIOS had met to form a Joint Information System should a major event occur. During their initial meeting, the group discussed several issues including the potential collapse of the city's Internet-dependent e-mail system, during a major storm. At the close of the meeting several projects were handed out and the group agreed to work together during an incident. However, no details had been ironed out. Nor would they get the chance — only two weeks later, Wilma hit.

Immediately after the storm passed, the team met again to formulate a plan. In retrospect, as the PIO team members assessed their needs and capabilities, they began to realize that every prediction for failure had come true. Internet, e-mail, phone lines and cell phone communications were all down. There was no power. There also was an urgent need to inform residents of many immediate and emergent issues, including the need to boil water, stay inside after dark and avoid unnecessary travel.

Preplanning for hurricane season involves more than just water, ice and flashlight batteries. Plantation's aggressive approach to preplanning and sense of spirited cooperation between city departments helped ease the pain of a direct hit from a very destructive storm. But undoubtedly, as the city completes its post-event reporting there will be some major rewrites to what had been thought to have been a comprehensive plan.

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Joel Gordon, RN, NREMT-P, has served as a battalion chief and public information officer with the Plantation (Fla.) Fire Department for more than eight years and was one of the original organizers of the department's EMS division. Gordon is serving his third term as chair of the Florida Association of Public Information Officers. He's a team leader with the State of Florida PIO Deployment Team.