The fireground role of the chiefs aide has been frequently questioned and often maligned, even within the fire service, but rarely has it been looked at objectively. In fact, much of what has been written about chiefs aides has been little more than position papers written by two groups: management advocates trying to justify eliminating aides to save money and labor advocates trying to protect jobs.

To the extent that someone who has the inherent biases of a line battalion chief in a Northeastern city can objectively look at the need for aides, I decided to do so as part of the Executive Fire Officer Program at the National Fire Academy. The chiefs aide research came on the heels of research I'd done into the linkage of fireground radio communications and firefighter safety. It was the combination of these topics that shaped my overall outlook.

A number of issues arose during both research projects that are well worth considering. Probably the most important issue was that appreciating the fire service's history helps us understand where we are today in regards to chiefs aides, incident command and related topics. In doing my research, I was surprised to find a remarkable lack of appreciation for this historical perspective in most fire service literature.

When I lecture, I frequently start with the question "How did we fight fires 100 years ago, even 50 years ago, and what are the changes that have fundamentally altered the way we do business?" The answers often mention motorized apparatus, better protective clothing, scba and more reliable hose.

All these are of course correct, but one invention that really revolutionized how we do business rarely gets mentioned. The following represents my analysis of how operations in the fire service have changed over the past 100 years, and in turn how that has affected the roles of chief/incident commander and chiefs aide. My research included numerous personal interviews with fire service historians and elders, together with reading books, magazines and newspaper articles, some of which date back to the 19th century.

While this research originally focused on the evolution of fireground operations in paid urban fire departments in the Northeast, it has some application to much of the rest of the country as well. It's with this assumption that we start our historical journey.

The fireground a century ago Let's go back a hundred years. It's 1900 and we're watching a progressive, paid fire department battle a fire in a three-story tenement. The fire has hold of several rooms on the second floor and is threatening to extend vertically. The first-arriving horse-drawn steam pumper is in operation, and handlines have been advanced into the building. Crews have already set about aggressively battling the fire when the chief arrives.

Where will this chief likely take up his "command position"? In 1900, an experienced chief officer would most likely place himself immediately behind the crew of the most aggressive engine/hose company operating inside the fire building.

From this position, the chief could directly supervise the extinguishment of the fire and verbally communicate with companies working in immediately adjacent areas of the building. Since orders had to be given face to face, it was generally believed that the chief belonged in a position where he could communicate (usually by yelling) with those who were spearheading the attack.

Communication with the dispatch center was accomplished through the telegraph box system, which, although ingenious, had several drawbacks. First of all, someone had to leave the fire scene, go to the nearest fire alarm box and transmit the appropriate coded message. This "someone" was usually the chiefs aide, who was referred to as the "chiefs chauffeur" at the time, because his primary duty was considered to be the care and operation of the chief's horse and buggy.

Second, communications over the telegraph system were (for all practical purposes) one-way: The aide transmitted a coded message to fire alarm, but fire alarm couldn't answer back, aside from being able to acknowledge receipt of the message or request that it be sent again. Third, once additional units were requested, there was no way to communicate with them until they arrived at the scene.

When additional resources were needed at a fire, the chief (usually inside the building) would tell his aide what message to transmit to fire alarm. The aide would exit the building and either run or drive the buggy to the nearest alarm box, where he would then transmit the appropriate message.

On returning to the scene, the aide would carefully observe fire conditions and progress from the exterior, and update the chief in the interior. The aide may also have been asked to relay messages to companies operating beyond shouting range of the chief, or to relay instructions personally to incoming units.

Firefighting in 1900 wasn't often pretty, nor were operations very well coordinated. Due to the chief's location during offensive operations, and the lack of radios at large defensive operations, incoming companies frequently had to rely on their own judgment as to where and how to deploy themselves.

The freelancing that's the bane of today's incident commander was thus born out of necessity. In fact, it's safe to say that good company officers were considered to be those who were adept at freelancing, or in other words, performing an independent size-up, figuring out what tasks had already been accomplished, and committing their crews to accomplish the next most important task.

In 1900, the chief's main focus was squarely on extinguishing the fire. He had no responsibility to manage his span of control, track crews, maintain accountability documentation or periodically rotate crews through rehab. Firefighters were expected to fight the fire from the interior until it was under control or they were driven from the building. A tally of firefighters overcome by smoke was an obligatory footnote to every news story about a fire.

Decades of change The first tremor of a fundamental change came in the 1940s and 1950s, with the advent of radios in apparatus, which immediately increased overall fire department efficiency. Companies no longer had to be in quarters to be in service, as had been the case with the telegraph box system. Recall that in the absence of radios in apparatus, any unit out of quarters was out of touch with the communications center, hence the practice of returning to quarters after an alarm using bells or lights and sirens.

Radios in apparatus also made it possible to better coordinate large defensive operations, as remote units could now receive instructions from the chief and provide him with valuable size-up information, provided he was near a radio-equipped vehicle.

In many ways, however, radios in apparatus didn't fundamentally change fireground operations at the vast majority of fires, those being fought from the inside (now called the "offensive mode"). Rather, they merely shortened the distance that the chiefs chauffeur had to run to contact the dispatch center, from the nearest fire alarm box to the nearest radio-equipped vehicle.

Another hint of a change came in some of the magazines and books on firefighting tactics. Some writers, perhaps seizing on the advantages of radios in apparatus at defensive operations, began to advocate that chiefs stay outside buildings and take a "command position" on the exterior.

Despite these writings, however, most experienced chiefs at the time dismissed such thoughts as nonsense, believing the only place they could exercise the type of control they needed at offensive operations was inside the building, within earshot of the men spearheading the attack on the fire.

Up to this point, the importance of a chiefs aide was virtually without question in fire departments whose staffing, response time and water supply facilitated aggressive interior fire attacks. The vital role served by an aide in fire-prone urban areas simply couldn't be efficiently filled in any other way. However, fire departments that, for a variety of reasons, were incapable of mounting and sustaining an aggressive interior attack on fires past the incipient stage predictably viewed aides as being less critical.

The big change, and a change that has quietly revolutionized the way we do business, came in the mid- to late 1970s with the availability of the modern portable radio. Finally, the chief could communicate directly with the dispatch center, as well as with every unit on the scene or responding to the scene, without having to leave the scene or use a go-between. In fact, a chief could even remain outside the building, yet stay in voice contact with every company inside.

The improved efficiency that portable radios brought to the fire service occurred amidst financial chaos in most state and local arenas, as localities struggled with issues like Proposition 13 in California and Proposition 2H in Massachusetts. Fire chiefs were often confronted with a mandate to downsize. Engine and ladder companies were closed, staffing was reduced, and chiefs aides were eliminated in many departments. Among the 161 fire departments I surveyed, of the 68 that had eliminated aides at some point in their history, 95.6% lost them between 1970 and 1996. Financial reasons were cited by 86.8% of these fire departments, with 8.8% reporting they eliminated aides because they were "no longer necessary."

To some fire chiefs, the decision to eliminate chiefs aides was made that much easier by the fact that portable radios allowed the chief in charge of an incident to communicate to an extent never before possible. Many fire chiefs in the 1970s and 1980s probably recalled the days when there were no radios at all, truly believing that the portable radio had made the aide's position a luxury they could no longer afford.

Little did they know what was lurking just around the corner.

The IC starts to get busier The safety movement in the American fire service started to take hold in earnest in the early 1980s. In 1983, the nfpa approved the formation of a committee to develop a comprehensive firefighter safety and health standard, which was ultimately published in 1987 as nfpa 1500, Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program.

New fire service buzzwords were ushered in: "Incident Command System," followed a few years later by "accountability." The world had changed. Firefighter deaths would no longer be accepted as part of the job or unavoidable. Where once there was but a hero's funeral, comprehensive investigations began to look at firefighter deaths and identify common factors.

Suddenly, places like Hackensack became embedded in our firehouse psyche. There on the evening news, we could hear trapped firefighters calling for help on their portable radios, but all too often a system was simply not in place to manage the incident scene or the voluminous communications.

The fire service was coming to grips with its tolerance of, if not outright reliance on, freelancing. It was coming to grips with the need not only to coordinate and control fireground operations, but to coordinate and control fireground communications.

Portable radios had proved to be a two-edged sword. On one hand, they allowed the incident commander to instantly communicate with everyone he or she needed to talk with. On the other hand, the incident commander could now communicate with so many people that he or she could be overwhelmed by the volume of messages coming in.

Overwhelming radio communications weren't the only problem confronting incident commanders in the 1980s and 1990s. Along with this potential for being overwhelmed came new administrative requirements that prior to the 1980s simply hadn't existed. Mask regulations required crews to be rotated out of buildings before exhausting their air supply. Better, but "hotter," protective clothing made crew rotation and rehab an absolute necessity.

Investigations into firefighter fatalities disclosed that incident command alone did not adequately protect firefighter safety and that accountability had to be maintained. A variety of accountability systems were developed to manage this problem, with the common denominator that the incident commander must track the location and function of all members operating on a fire scene, unless he or she assigns that duty to another officer. nfpa 1500 mandates that this tracking be done in writing.

Without a doubt, the role of an incident commander in 2000 is dramatically more complex than the role of "chief in charge" of a fire 100 or even 50 years ago. As this complexity has increased, the role of chiefs aide, in departments where that position has survived, has dramatically changed.

My research disclosed that the role of aides at emergency scenes now includes maintaining ics documentation and status boards, accountability tracking of personnel, assisting with radio communications, use of onboard computers to retrieve vital pre-fire data, scene reconnaissance, and assisting the ic with overall scene management. In recognition of the increased responsibility, some departments have even begun assigning fire officers, not firefighters, to serve as aides.

The new need for aides We're all fond of the expression "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," but if we look closely and critically at our operations, we'll see that there's a problem brewing. It's more than a theoretical problem, as at least one fire department has been cited by its state osha after a firefighter fatality for failing to assign aides to battalion-level chief officers. The investigation disclosed that these chief officers were so overwhelmed with the tasks of monitoring and tracking personnel that they were unable to function effectively as fireground commanders.

In recognition of the seriousness of the problem, the 1997 edition of nfpa 1500 specifically stated:

"6-3.7: The incident commander and members who are assigned a supervisory responsibility for a tactical level management unit that involves multiple companies or crews under their command shall have assigned a member(s) to facilitate the on-going tracking and accountability of all assigned companies."

How does a fire chief go back to a financially strapped community that has eliminated aides and argue that they're now needed again? How does a community that never provided aides, perhaps a suburban department or a relative newcomer to the ranks of paid fire departments, get aides in the first place? It won't be easy, but it has to start with all of us in the fire service understanding where we are and how we got here.

We have to look at the additional responsibilities that have been placed on today's incident commander and accept the fact that one person simply can't effectively manage a rapidly growing emergency alone. Twenty aides arriving 20 minutes into the incident might not be able to undo the damage done in the first few minutes as a chief officer struggles to organize an effective attack; address incident priorities; track personnel and maintain accountability documentation; organize a rapid intervention crew; provide relief crews at 10- to 15-minute intervals; and manage radio, cellular and face-to-face communications, all at the same time.

One of the unfortunate realities in the fire service is that by our nature, we take great pride at coping with adversity. We've learned to put out fires with chronically understaffed trucks. We often make up for lack of equipment with our own ingenuity.

In a similar way, most incident commanders can "fake it" and get by without an aide. (See sidebar, page 44.) Chances are these incident commanders will continue to get away with it, time and time again. But when the stars are all in the wrong alignment, and effective incident command is the only thing that will save firefighter or civilian lives, the presence of a trained, experienced aide can make the difference between an unnecessary tragedy and just another incident.

In the next article, I'll focus on the role of chiefs aide in 2000 and possible alternatives for financially strapped departments.

The job of an incident commander is primarily an intellectual one, and as such, it doesn't lend itself to being objectively measured. Having said that, how can we determine if our incident commanders are doing an effective job, or if they're being routinely overwhelmed with the multitude of responsibilities placed on them?

The final outcome of a fire or emergency is not an effective indicator of how well an incident was managed. Many times, well-trained, highly motivated and aggressive firefighters can and do make up for a lack of command and control by freelancing. So long as no one is killed or injured, it may be difficult to accept that there's a problem with how an incident was managed. Also, there are incidents where, regardless of how well they're managed, conditions simply won't allow for a favorable outcome.

Here are some suggestions to help you determine if your incident commanders are really in command or just faking it:

Fireground radio tapes: Analyze copies of fireground radio tapes from actual incidents. The use of archive tapes is preferable, because it will eliminate the risk that ics will change their style because they know they're being evaluated.

* What percentage of the radio messages directed to the incident commander during the course of the incident are missed completely by the ic (unanswered) or partially received (messages that are clear on the radio tape but must be repeated for the ic)?

There's no magic number for this analysis. What's important is to determine whether the ic is regularly missing messages because his or her attention is focused on other matters, be they face-to-face communications, maintaining incident-related documentation, cell phone communications, etc. Missing radio messages on a regular basis is one indication that the ic is overwhelmed with other responsibilities.

Also, does the percentage of missed messages change as the fire progresses? That is, are the missed or partially received messages more likely to occur during the hectic first few minutes at a fire, or do they occur throughout the incident? This may help you determine when additional support in the form of a chiefs aide is most critical.

* Another item that can be determined from these radio tapes is whether the ic gives an assignment or an instruction to a company and gets an acknowledgment from the intended recipient. When overwhelmed, ics may give a unit an assignment and be immediately distracted with another task before they receive an acknowledgment. For example, at Hackensack, just before the roof collapsed, the chief ordered all companies "Back your lines out." This message was never acknowledged, and units didn't withdraw. Five firefighters died.

* Still another problem that can be observed from listening to radio tapes is the ic not knowing where his or her units are deployed. A message such as "Main Street Command to any unit working on the third floor" is a clear indication that the ic doesn't know who's working on the third floor, nor has the incident been properly divided into manageable units.

On-scene freelancing: A sure sign that an incident commander isn't being effective is when arriving units deploy themselves or, in essence, freelance. This can be evaluated by using post-incident critiques to determine where each company deployed, and why. Did the ic or an appropriate sector officer assign them to a specific task, or did they put themselves to work?

ics documentation: Evaluate incident command documentation (ics tactical worksheets, accountability worksheets) to determine if the ic was properly sectorizing the scene and tracking personnel as the incident progressed. Is the documentation complete? Was the documentation prepared as the incident occurred, or did the ic go back afterwards and fill in the forms? At any given time, did the ic know which companies were operating in what areas?

Each or all of these tools can be used to help you determine whether your ics are being overwhelmed. Obviously, there will be differences between individuals based on personal abilities and skills. These suggestions are not intended to be used to rate incident commanders, but rather to objectively study the environment in which they have to function to determine if they need additional administrative support, such as aides.

You be the judge.