Every year in the United States, fire departments respond to numerous natural-gas leaks. While many of these emergencies can be controlled quickly and appropriately, the results of some natural-gas leaks are deadly for firefighters and those they protect. In addition to injuries and deaths, the economic and psychological impact on affected communities and families can be devastating.

What's particularly frustrating about the potentially disastrous results of natural-gas leaks is that the majority of these leaks could be controlled quickly or the risk reduced greatly before the fire department and local gas utility service is called to respond. Most of the natural-gas leaks that fire departments are called to could have been prevented by the installation of safety devices called excess-flow valves in the pipelines that bring gas service into U.S. homes and businesses.

Every year, natural-gas line failures force the evacuation of thousands of people in the United States. When the leaking gas is ignited, the resulting explosions and fires kill and maim people, and destroy millions of dollars of property, as in the following cases:

• In September, a gas explosion in a Snow Hill, Md., home left six firefighters in the regional burn center, three of them in critical condition. Seven other firefighters and three civilians were injured, and a gas company worker was killed.
• In July, two sisters, ages 4 and 5, were killed when the Hopkinton, Mass., multiple dwelling that they called home collapsed on top of them after a gas explosion destroyed the structure. Several of the building's 14 other residents were injured. Rescue efforts had to be halted for more than 90 minutes after the initial blast while utility workers searched for a way to cut off gas to the site.
• In 1993, two firefighters in Clayton County, Ga., were severely injured by the explosion of gas leaking from a line that was damaged when a car drove into a house. The explosion occurred 21 minutes after they had responded to the report of an accident.
• In 1989, Capt. M.M. Wallace of the Houston Fire Department, responding to reports of a gas odor, was credited with saving a school full of children. He plugged an open gas line in the school with paper towels and his hands while others located the line's cutoff valve.

“So what?” you might ask. “That's what we firefighters do, risk our lives to save people and property.” That's true, but fire services around the country have worked diligently in recent years to remove unnecessary risk. Better turnout gear and equipment, improved communications, use of incident command systems, two-in and two-out, hazard analysis of target facilities, and common standard operating procedures all help do this dangerous work without unnecessary risk of death or injury. The most serious risks from gas leaks, however, are completely unnecessary.

Excess-flow valves were developed in the 1960s at the urging of the gas industry as a means of quickly stopping leaks from lines ruptured by excavation. The earliest valves were problematic, gaining a reputation for being unreliable. In a few short years, however, the design and the procedures for picking the proper size valves and correctly installing them were improved to make them reliable. An excess-flow valve is designed to permit the normal operation of a gas line, but to automatically close it off when the flow of gas exceeds design limits. Its activation on a ruptured line can prevent the buildup of a dangerous level of gas in a structure, in most instances preventing explosion, fire or incapacitation of the occupants.

More than two million excess-flow valves have been installed voluntarily by gas companies and have worked reliably for 30 years, but there are more than 60 million gas service lines in the United States. The number of these valves installed simply isn't enough.

After accidents involving ruptured gas lines killed 18 people back in the 1970s, investigators for the National Transportation Safety Board called on the Department of Transportation to require the installation of excess-flow valves. Gas industry officials countered that the valves weren't reliable, that they might interfere with the normal operation and maintenance of gas lines, and that they were too costly. More than 20 years of debate ensued, intensifying in the aftermath of each new gas-leak accident and fatality.

In mid-1998, a mother was killed and three of her relatives were injured when a gas-leak explosion destroyed their home in South Riding, Va. A few months later in St. Cloud, Minn., four people were killed, 15 were injured and the lives of firefighters on the scene were threatened when gas from a damaged line exploded. That blast destroyed three buildings and damaged five others so severely that they had to be demolished. Less than a month later, three people were killed when a gas explosion in Bridgeport, Ala., destroyed three buildings. All of these senseless tragedies most likely could have been avoided had an excess-flow valve been installed.

In the early '90s, the International Association of Fire Chiefs came out in strong support of excess-flow valves after a recommendation by its hazmat committee. The IAFC's position supplemented the hard work of Rep. Curt Weldon, who also promoted the use of excess-flow valves. After years of rule-making debate on the issue, the DOT's Office of Pipeline Safety in 1999 finally acted on safety investigators' recommendations by making new rules based on a compromise between proponents of excess-flow valves and the gas industry that gave gas companies two options. They could voluntarily install excess-flow valves on new gas lines and for customers whose gas lines are renewed. If they did not, the gas companies had to notify customers of the benefits and availability of excess-flow valves, and then give customers the option of paying for the installation and maintenance of the valves.

That was a good start. Today more than half of U.S. gas companies are installing hundreds of thousands of additional excess-flow valves, without significant cost to the gas customer. There are problems, however, with the federal requirement. Obviously, not all gas companies are installing the valves. Beyond that, not all residences are getting excess-flow valves on their gas service lines, and many other lines that could benefit from such safeguards are not covered by the federal rule.

The existing federal requirement also falls short because it doesn't specify whom the gas companies must advise. In the case of newly constructed residences, it's not the people who will eventually buy the homes and thus would be in peril from a gas leak, it's the builder. In some instances, those gas companies that are not voluntarily installing the valves may not have provided adequate information as to the benefits of excess-flow valves. Still others may have indirectly dissuaded customers from purchasing the valves.

The federal requirement only applies to residential gas service lines, but residential lines aren't the only problem. Many gas leaks and explosions involve lines to businesses and commercial operations. These gas lines pose the same risks, if not greater ones. They operate well within the design parameters of excess-flow valves, but there is no requirement for gas companies to offer valves to these customers or to make them aware of the valves' safety benefits. That means many of these lines remain unprotected, and the individuals occupying and visiting these businesses, as well the firefighters responding to them, are at risk.

Anytime the fire service lobbies for life-safety changes, we must, as a practical matter, consider the fiscal impact of our suggestions to those who must bear the cost. In the case of excess-flow valves, however, cost is clearly not a legitimate barrier to their installation. Excess-flow valves for residential gas-service lines cost $5 to $15, and the gas companies can include the cost in the price of gas sold. Valves for larger lines servicing high-use business and commercial customers cost more, but these valves are just as effective, reliable and necessary for public safety. The cost of not installing excess-flow valves, in terms of death and destruction from a single gas explosion, makes the relatively modest expense of mandatory installation a no-brainer. The fire service initially used the same argument in the successful campaign to convince homeowners to install and maintain smoke detectors. Subsequently the fire service was able to legislate the smoke detector requirement in many states or local jurisdictions. Why shouldn't we all be protected in the same way from needless gas explosions?

As we all know, the danger to persons and property at the scene of a gas leak isn't the only cost of such incidents. Fire suppression resources are tied up for considerable periods of time on gas-leak calls while the local gas utility attempts to locate shut-off valves. None of us is so rich in staffing, apparatus and budget dollars that we can spare units to cover gas leaks that are entirely preventable in the first place.

Critics of the call for wider use of excess-flow valves argue that they are not necessary because efforts have been made, through the adoption of “One Call” or “Miss Utility” programs in different states, to reduce the risk of utility crews striking gas lines. Not all excavators make the necessary calls. Many leaks occur on gas lines that are hit after their location was identified. Other leaks occur because gas line locations are sometimes incorrectly identified. We simply can't predict how or when a gas line will be breached. In addition to excavation crews hitting them, vehicles run into their gas meters, and earthquakes and other earth movements loosen their joints. In one case in Grand Rapids, Mich., a chunk of ice falling off a house broke a gas line.

Although our local gas utilities do their best, their response time to a leak can be considerable. Federal studies have put their average response time at 20 minutes, but in some cases it is an hour or more. In that time, gas could enter adjacent buildings at higher elevations before the fire responders realize it, causing them to be working in a danger zone that's much larger than previously believed. Responders could be in the midst of these pockets of gas that, when ignited, will send bricks, boards and flames flying.

The fire service and the communities they serve should no longer continue to accept the potential disastrous consequences of natural-gas leaks. These risks can be easily mitigated. We must be pragmatic yet determined in our approach to resolving this issue. We must focus on seeking continuous, prospective improvements from a natural-gas industry that has come a long way to keep their own communities and firefighters safe, but that now should thoroughly institutionalize the necessary changes. The fire service must petition Congress and the DOT to require broader installation of excess-flow valves. We must inform and educate our citizens and state and municipal agencies on this issue and encourage them to act affirmatively on the local level. Ideally our goal should be to enact tougher federal requirements; however, we should simultaneously seek to require the mandatory installation of excess-flow valves through the state and local code making/enforcement processes.

California legislature took the lead on this issue recently with the passage of SB 1992. This performance-oriented bill, recently signed into law, requires prospective installation of excess-flow valves or other acceptable devices to stop the flow of natural gas in the event of a rupture or other similar event that would cause excess flow. The bill's sponsorship by Assemblywoman Dion Aroner and Sen. Don Perata and the support of the California Professional Firefighters and many other organizations were key to making California's initiative a legislative success.

As fire service leaders, we have a responsibility to keep our citizens and firefighters as safe from harm as possible. The solutions to the safety challenges we face in the fire service are not always understood or within our control. As we constantly pick up and look at each piece of the safety jigsaw puzzle, here is one more piece we can now insert into that part of the puzzle that has been completed. Let's not put it back into the unknown pieces pile.

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A 32-year fire service veteran, Steve Halford is the director/chief of the Nashville Fire Department. He holds a bachelor's degree in fire science management from the University of Maryland, is a graduate of the National Fire Academy's Executive Fire Officer Program and is credentialed by the National Board on Fire Service Professional Qualifications as a Fire Officer IV and the International Association of Emergency Mangers as a certified emergency manager.