After a 10-month damaging dispute and more than a year of tensions, the U.K. fire service now faces the most radical reforms in more than half a century, when firefighting functions were transferred from the National Fire Service to fire brigades maintained by counties and boroughs.

In protest to perceived low salaries, firefighters called for a review of the pay formula and for the average salary to rise from £21,500 to £30,000, or approximately $34,800 to $48,600. When the government rejected the 40% pay increase and instead offered firefighters an 11% raise over two years, firefighters conducted a series of 24- and 48-hour strikes.

How did the dispute get this far? A look at the history of firefighters' pay and working conditions shows that it was a long time coming.

Earnings analysis

The government devolved all negotiations on pay and conditions of service to the National Joint Council, made up of employers and trade unions. However, the only trade union recognized up until now has been the Fire Brigades Union, which represents the largest proportion of uniformed staff in the U.K. fire service.

Following the first national firefighter strike in 1977, the NJC established a complex formula intended to make sure firefighters' earnings are comparable with other manual workers. Every April the government produces the New Earnings Survey, which shows how much employees in other occupations are being paid. A point is set three quarters of the way up the scale of adult male manual workers and this is called the “upper quartile” figure. This figure is then updated in November using the Department of Employment's Earnings Index, and it's this figure that a firefighter's salary, after overtime and any supplementary earnings, is intended to match. The percentage increase in firefighters' pay is then applied to all ranks up to senior divisional officer. The award is a national one, and unlike most pay awards in the public sector, there is no negotiation.

This formula allowed reasonable industrial relations in the service and eliminated the need for annual pay struggles. In fact, it had widespread support until recent years of low inflation and a decline in manufacturing industry adversely affected pay increases.

The current dispute began around the latter part of 2001 when the FBU gave notice that it felt the pay formula was no longer keeping pace when compared to technical grades. According to the FBU statement, Is this really all you are worth, the union was seeing “a growing feeling among members that the increasingly skilled nature of both firefighters and emergency fire control operators' jobs coupled with an increasing workload and decreasing levels of staff should be reflected in their pay packets.”

The union gave verbal notice of its intention to achieve a mandate at its annual conference in May 2002 for the following:

• A pay award between 40% and 51% for firefighters and control room staff.
• Parity with full-time staff for retained and volunteer staff in pay and conditions of service.
• A new pay formula to be linked to the above.

The FBU urged employers to agree to the claim and to partner with the government for the necessary funding. In addition, the FBU wanted no strings of further modernization attached to the pay award, as the union felt the fire service merely would be playing catch up. Since the pay formula was created, the fire service has shifted its focus from purely response to prevention and protection without the required funding for equipment and increased staff. They were prepared, however, to consider possible further modernization linked to a new pay formula.

Under review

The employers were unable to support or afford the FBU pay claim, and by July 2002 talks were beginning to reach deadlock. Faced with the potential for a national dispute, the employers offered a 4% pay raise, with a pledge to backdate any increase above 4% should an independent review make recommendations. They asked the FBU to join them in seeking government approval for such a review in September 2002. The FBU did not accept, as their terms were much higher.

The position of the Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers Association, both prior to the dispute and throughout this period, was to support appropriate pay levels for all staff in the service. Our informal definition of what is “appropriate” and what the return might be is simply that a firefighter should have the same earnings' opportunity as a police officer for the same flexibility of conditions of service. The question was how much and from where funding would be coming.

Employers formally requested an independent review of the fire service. CACFOA also called for an independent review of the fire service to determine not only what the appropriate pay and conditions should be, but also to address the stagnation in many areas of the service and the need for a root-and-branch review. CACFOA's Submissions of Evidence to the review can be found on www.fire-uk.org.

The government responded by establishing a review team under the leadership of Sir George Bain. All fire service stakeholders except the FBU agreed to cooperate with the review. The FBU also never accepted CACFOA's views as support for their claim, stating that CACFOA had no part in this issue.

The review team indicated they would complete and publish their report by mid-December and would issue an interim paper at the request of government, which was hoped might allow for further negotiations at the NJC without the threat of strike action. However, when the FBU balloted its members regarding a strike in pursuit of the pay claim, they strongly favored such action.

The interim paper issued in November did nothing to quell emotions of staff or their threat of a strike, nor did the final report. CACFOA broadly supported the review recommendations as it would place firefighters' earnings potential very close to police officers', and the recommendations on modernization were similar to those that we had been seeking for many years. We felt that the recommendations would result in improved safety for the community and improved career development for all staff. The review's terms of reference and conclusions/recommendations can be found at www.irfs.org.uk.

The FBU dismissed the review and attempted to discredit the author. Meanwhile the government had advised the NJC that any pay award above inflation would have to be funded from within the service. By now, the employers also were insisting that any pay award be linked to modernization, determined by independently measured progress.

Contingency plans

In all, the FBU called 44 days of strikes but only executed 15 days as negotiations continued. During the conflict, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister asked the Ministry of Defense to arrange for emergency fire cover to be available in the event of a strike. CACFOA and other key agencies worked closely with the government to ensure some form of public safety net in the event of strikes.

A total of 40 Green Goddess military fire engines, staffed by Royal Air Force members, were prepared to take the place of more than 200 specialist fire service machines. The engines were last seen on the streets during the first firefighter strike more than 25 years ago. During the strikes, citizens were urged to take extra care as the aging Green Goddess lacked the speed, specialty equipment and water capacity of modern apparatus, with only top speeds of 35mph, 35-foot ladders and 300-gallon tanks. The rigs lack transport space, rescue equipment and even radios.

The emergency fire cover and the joint operational control centers involving military, police and senior fire officers worked well. Fire deaths didn't increase and fire calls — particularly malicious calls — absolutely tumbled during the strike periods.

In March 2003 the employers offered a deal to the FBU called “Heads of Agreement” modernization, a package agreement, which integrated changes to modernize the fire service with associated pay raises. The package would result in a cumulative 16% raise, resulting in an annual wage of £25,000 for a qualified firefighter by July 2004. The deal would also give part-time firefighters the same hourly pay rate as their full-time counterparts, a key element of the union's pay claim.

It became evident, however, that the dispute was no longer about pay but had moved to conditions of service and the historical influential position the FBU held in the service. Several meetings were held at NJC level to fine-tune the agreement to give the FBU some reassurance while ensuring that management retained its right to manage. This movement was a result of the independent review, which had concluded that authority had managed for too long by consensus.

Progress was made at the NJC meetings, and eventually the FBU Executive Council agreed to recommend the employers' offer to their members. However, the membership overturned the council, threatening more strike dates and seeking further talks with employers regarding the Heads of Agreement.

Down and dirty

Throughout the dispute emotions ran particularly high. Many firefighters felt that the strong intervention of the government, coupled with a less-than-supportive media campaign, jeopardized their pay claim. Relationships between staff, employers and employees reached an all0time low. Sadly, the dark side of the service raised its ugly head in intimidation and intolerance to diversity and others' views, using and abusing official and unofficial Web sites and media coverage in smear campaigns.

The collateral damage to the fire service throughout this period was considerable. Public support and respect for the fire service suffered greatly, and overall the media had lost patience and interest about the issue.

It came as a huge relief on June 12 when a recalled delegates' conference of the FBU voted 3-1 to accept the Executive Council's recommendation, formally ending the dispute at a national level. The concern that many managers in the service hold is that progress toward further modernization at a regional and local level will now become the focus of the FBU.

Nevertheless, we all are determined to look to future collaboration wherever possible. Here are a few simple lessons learned from the dispute:

• The public and the media will not support unrealistic claims underpinned by strikes.
• Always have an exit strategy no matter which side of the debate you support.
• Intimidation at any level does not work.
• What modern media, particularly Web sites and 24-hour television, can expose can seriously damage your objective regardless of which side of the dispute you represent.

This dispute has taken the lid off Pandora's box, and it will never, and more importantly should never, go back on.

The challenge for the service is immense. The temptation may be to blame the FBU for lifting the lid off Pandora's box or the government for not bowing to demands, but the fact is that the U.K. fire service has been heading for a crisis for several years now.

We must take this opportunity to even better serve our public in an inclusive manner and mature manner. We will succeed in serving the community only by working together. We don't have an abundance of time to succeed, and if we, the internal stakeholders, don't face up to this, then someone else will.

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Jeff Ord, OStJ, QFSM, GIFireE, currently serves as president of the Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers' Association, the foremost official organization for principal fire officers in the United Kingdom. He also is the firemaster of the Strathclyde Fire Brigade in western Scotland.

Timeline

April 18, 2002: Union leaders agree to press for firefighters' salary increase from £21,531 to £30,000 and argue that the service's pay formula, instituted after the 1977-78 strike, is out of date and should be replaced.

May 15, 2002: Firefighters agree to demand 40% increase at annual conference, warning of strike action if demands are not met. Employers say pay claim is unaffordable.

June 6, 2002: As talks start, nearly 12,000 firefighters rally in London.

June 23, 2002: Pay talks break down.

Aug. 28, 2002: Employers propose 4% pay raise.

Sept. 2, 2002: Pay talks break down again; FBU announces recall of national conference to discuss industrial action.

Sept. 5, 2002: Independent review of fire service is launched. Union declines to cooperate.

Oct. 18, 2002: FBU members vote 9-1 in favor of industrial action. A series of 48-hour and eight-day strikes are called.

Oct. 22, 2002: Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott describes threatened strikes as “completely unnecessary and completely unjustified.”

Oct. 25, 2002: Prescott meets union leaders, who claim discussions are “constructive.”

Oct. 26, 2002: First two 48-hour strikes are called off.

Oct. 30, 2002: Fresh talks begin between the FBU and local authority representatives in London.

Nov. 4, 2002: First of a series of eight-day walkouts is postponed; FBU decides on a new 48-hour strike starting at 6 p.m. on Nov. 13 unless there's a settlement.

Nov. 11, 2002: Independent review team's interim report is released, recommending a 4% pay raise and a 7% raise the following year.

Nov. 12, 2002: FBU rejects offer and calls for strike action to go ahead.

Nov. 13, 2002: 48-hour strike begins.

Nov. 14, 2002: After three people die in house fires during the first night of the strike, the government raises the prospect of having the army break picket lines to use red fire engines.

Nov. 15, 2002: The union says firefighters will not prevent troops from using red fire engines. Some striking fire crews break pickets to attend emergencies. First 48-hour action ends.

Nov. 17, 2002: Police will be used to commandeer red fire engines, not troops.

Nov. 18, 2002: The FBU is willing to delay the start of Friday's eight-day strike if progress is made in talks. Meanwhile, it emerges that the government blocked local authorities' moves to offer a 16.1% raise in the summer.

Nov. 20, 2002: Fire authority leaders plan to make a new pay offer in an attempt to avoid the second strike.

Nov. 21, 2002: Prescott makes an emergency statement to the Commons saying the government can't fund a 40% pay rise. The union waits in a London hotel while the employers' negotiators discuss the details of a new offer.

Nov. 22, 2002: At 5:30 a.m., the FBU executive committee votes to accept a package including a 16% pay raise offered by the employers. At 6:10 a.m., Prescott's office telephones FBU General Secretary Andy Gilchrist to say the deputy prime minister wants to see details of the proposed deal. Gilchrist gives him until 7:30 a.m. but Prescott's office says it will not see it until 9 a.m. At 7:28 a.m., the FBU announces that the strike is on, and blames the government for “wrecking” the deal. At 9 a.m., firefighters walk out.

Nov. 25, 2002: Prime Minister Tony Blair attempts to seize control of the agenda, and in a hastily convened press conference and emergency statement to the Commons says he will not risk the economy for the sake of the firefighters. He says that raises above 4% must be paid for by changes in working practices.

Nov. 26, 2002: Prescott says that the imminent retirement of 11,000 firefighters will provide an opportunity for a “more efficient utilization of labor” in the fire service without resorting to layoffs or firings. The FBU condemns the statement and says it proves the government's intention all along was to cut jobs.

Nov. 27, 2002: Prominent union leaders threaten to stop reforms in the pubic sector unless the government ends the dispute.

Nov. 29, 2002: Talks between firefighters and employers break down and no new offer is made.

Dec. 2, 2002: The FBU surprisingly calls off the eight-day strike planned to start on Dec. 4 to embrace peace talks at the Acas conciliation service with local authority employers. The government releases a cabinet report praising the way the army has handled emergency cover, which is seen as a way of pushing its modernization agenda.

Dec. 4, 2002: Firefighters' leaders claim government proposals to cut night cover would cost lives, and the two sides appear as far apart as ever at the start of the Acas peace initiative. The FBU threatens fresh strikes as employers warn that peace talks could take weeks to complete.

Dec. 5, 2002: Local authority employers meet officials from Acas for around two hours before leaving, saying that more talks will probably take place next week and that patience was needed.

Dec. 11, 2002: Another planned eight-day strike, set to end Christmas Eve, was called off tonight so that talks aimed at resolving the deadlocked pay dispute can continue.

Dec. 13, 2002: The FBU imposes a six-week deadline on pay negotiations and announces two 48-hour strikes, set for Jan. 28 and Feb. 1.

Dec. 16, 2002: The threat of strikes increases after the final independent review proposed an 11% pay increase, which has already been rejected as by the profession's leaders.

Jan. 21, 2003: A 24-hour strike begins, while soldiers in antiquated green goddesses answer the day's calls.

Jan. 23, 2003: Two-day talks resume at Acas after the employers agreed to drop an earlier demand that the union leadership “commit unreservedly” to accepting widespread reforms in a pay-for-change deal.

Jan. 27, 2003: Firefighters' leaders begin a legal attempt to prevent Prescott from speeding up the closure of fire stations, reducing night cover and redeploying emergency firefighting apparatus.

Jan. 28, 2003: Firefighters go ahead with a 48-hour walkout, the fourth national strike. Prescott announces radical new laws that would enable ministers to seize control of the industry and impose a pay and reform package and enrages unions by refusing to rule out withdrawing the firefighters' right to strike if they refuse to accept an imposed settlement.

Feb. 4, 2003: The FBU decides against calling further strikes following a meeting between employers, the government and union representatives.

Feb. 11, 2003: Talks resume, with both sides proclaiming that they offered the best prospect in months of defusing the crisis.

Feb. 12, 2003: The high court throws out a union challenge to ministerial plans to impose sweeping changes on the fire service.

Feb. 14, 2003: The FBU and Prescott agree to month-long truce.

March 7, 2003: Firefighters reject employers' day-old offer of a three-year deal worth 16% in return for modernization of the fire service.

March 12, 2003: Under pressure from members, the FBU calls a strike for March 20.

March 19, 2003: The executive of the FBU agrees to back the revised “final” offer and suspend a 24-hour strike called for the following day to free up troops for impending Iraqi war. Firefighters reject agreement and threaten new strikes.

March 20, 2003: Prescott states that he will introduce an emergency law allowing him to impose a pay settlement on the fire service and direct its operations.

April 15, 2003: FBU delegates vote to reject the latest pay offer of a 16% rise over three years with changes in working practices.

May 16, 2003: Firefighters' leaders have threaten new wave of strikes for the following week unless there is a breakthrough in the dispute.

May 20, 2003: Firefighters' leaders agree to back a 16% pay raise spread over 30 months. Under the agreement any changes to crew sizes and working arrangements would be negotiated, not imposed; the number of job losses would be significantly lower than the anticipated (5,000-10,000); and a special panel will be convened, chaired by an independent person, to sort out any problems related to staffing.

June 20, 2003: Representatives of the FBU vote by 3-1 to end the dispute.

June 30, 2003: Firefighters' leaders warn of a possible rash of local strikes after Prescott hints that up to 10% of jobs could be cut under government plans to modernize the service.