The court noted that the freedom to criticize public officials and expose their wrongdoing is at the very core of First Amendment values, even when the conduct is motivated by personal pique or resentment. The First Amendment still protects the plaintiffs' right to voice their concerns and criticize the defendants and their policies. The court then concluded that the plaintiffs' efforts to expose what they perceived to be the inadequacies of the fire department fell within the scope of content deemed to be matters of public concern.

The court next considered whether the plaintiffs' “interest in making their statements outweighed the interest of the township, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Because the plaintiffs' speech “substantially involved matters of public concern,” the defendants were required to make an even stronger than normal showing that their interests in regulating the plaintiffs' speech outweighed the plaintiffs' interest in speaking. The defendants contended that they acted reasonably to maintain a positive work environment in light of the negativity that the plaintiffs projected onto the department. The court disagreed, saying that the defendants had failed to produce sufficient evidence of insubordination or disruption that would tip the balance in their favor as a matter of law.

Although a fire department ordinarily should be afforded great leeway in disciplining insubordinate firefighters, it's not a self-evident proposition that firefighters who defy a chief's order by speaking out about the fire department or even criticizing it commit an act of insubordination that threatens its efficiency. The court said that the defendants failed to produce evidence that the threat of insubordination in this case was so great as to outweigh the public's interest in an informed discussion about the inadequacies of the fire department.

Indeed, the First Amendment retaliation cause of action was designed to prevent attempts by officials to silence public employees. Quoting from earlier case law, the court said that public employees often are the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions regarding the operations of their public employers, operations that are of substantial concern to the public. Were they unable to speak on these matters, the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues. Therefore, the interest at stake is as much the public's interest in receiving informed opinions as it is the employee's own right to disseminate it.

The defendants next challenged whether either Smith or Herczeg had suffered an adverse action. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to show that they did. Herczeg was terminated from his position as a probationary firefighter without a stated reason. Although as a probationary employee he could be terminated for any reason, the law still prohibits his termination for exercise of his First Amendment rights.