In the 2001 Thirtymile Fire, near Winthrop, Wash., a crew of Forest Service firefighters arrived at what appeared to be a small mop up of a fire started by an unattended campfire. Throughout the course of their suppression activities, they had difficulty keeping their two pumps running, possibly due to improper use of pressure relief valves and lack of experience with pumps and hoses. When the pumps were running, several hose lines burst. There was difficulty in communicating with superiors and some confusion about the chain of command. No current weather reports were provided and no lookouts were posted when needed.

When the fire increased in intensity, a water-dipping helicopter was requested. Although the helicopter was staged only 20 minutes away, its response was significantly delayed while discussion occurred about whether the helicopter could dip water from the Chewuch River, where some threatened species of fish lived. As the fire grew, 14 firefighters and two hikers became trapped. Ultimately, four of the firefighters died.

More than five years later, the on-scene supervisor was charged with four counts of involuntary manslaughter and seven counts of making false statements to investigators. Ellreese Daniels faced the possibility of 24 years in prison if convicted of just the four involuntary manslaughter charges, but ultimately entered into a plea agreement under which he pled guilty to two counts of making false statements to investigators and all other charges were dropped. Finally, nearly seven years after the fire, Daniels was sentenced to three months on a work-release program.

On July 22, 2003, two federal firefighters were killed while fighting the Cramer Fire in the Salmon-Challis National Forest in Idaho. The investigation report revealed that the two firefighters had rappelled into the forest from a helicopter around 9:45 a.m. with the assignment of cutting a helicopter landing area. By mid-afternoon, the fire had increased in intensity and the two firefighters radioed to the rest of the crew, asking them to send in a helicopter "in a hurry." The men repeated the request a few minutes later. Later radio transmissions from them indicated that the fire was advancing rapidly and that they desperately needed to be extricated. A helicopter was en route shortly thereafter, but it could not land because of heavy smoke.

The investigation report indicated that the deaths were partly caused by poor oversight and significant safety lapses. Specifically, the report found that crew members were not warned of the area's potential for extreme fire danger, that they were confused about the availability of helicopters and other firefighting resources, and that the leadership was inadequate. Furthermore, the report concluded that the firefighters used suppression tactics that were considered to be dangerous for the area in which they were working.

The report went on to state that while proper attention was paid to safety in the early stages of the fire, significant lapses occurred later in the incident. The report specifically noted that the men were building the landing area on a ridge just above the fire, where their visibility of the slopes and the fire advancing toward them was obscured by the topography and vegetation.

Furthermore, no one else on the crew was watching the fire for the two men, no one was assigned to keep them informed about changes in the fire, and weather information provided to them was inaccurate.

The U.S. Attorney's office charged the fire's incident commander with two counts of involuntary manslaughter. The charges were resolved when he agreed to serve 18 months of federal probation to avoid further criminal prosecution. It is important to note a significant difference between this case and the Thirtymile Fire case. Specifically, the incident commander in the Cramer Fire was not actually present on the fireground as the Thirtymile Fire supervisor was, yet he still was criminally charged with the deaths of the two firefighters.