On Jan. 28 at 23:41 hours, the Hinsdale (Ill.) Fire Department responded to the report of a house fire in a building under construction. Police officers had been patrolling the neighborhood on a report of a smell of smoke for approximately 10 minutes prior to the neighbor's 911 call confirming a fire.

Engine 1013 with three personnel, Truck 1019 with three personnel and Ambulance 1015 with one person responded initially, and the responding captain called out a still alarm for an additional engine, two trucks, an ambulance, an incident safety officer, a rapid intervention team officer and a chief officer. This timely still alarm request would prove invaluable later.

Upon arrival, the shift captain reported sectors A and B were clear, but fire was visible in a protrusion of sector D of the home, including some exterior fire in that sector at the roof line. The captain ordered the crews to switch to fireground red and had the engine lead out, dropping both beds, which included a 3-inch supply line to a wye with 1H- and 2H-inch preconnected lines. The other bed was the 5-inch supply line. Truck 1019 took the front of the building and assumed command and accountability.

The first crew took the 1H-inch line to the A/D corner where there was a door that led into a library. From the doorway the crew was able to knockdown almost 90% of the fire. In the meantime the 2H-inch line was connected; the crew switched lines and began to enter the library to continue suppression efforts.

What occurred next is every fire chief's nightmare.

Long drop

A two-person interior crew had entered with the 2H-inch line. They were approximately 25 feet into the library when the lead firefighter fell through a hole in the floor. At the time he went through the floor, both he and his partner were attempting to pull more line into the building. The firefighters were less than feet apart.

One firefighter fell 10 to 12 feet and landed on his hands and knees. His partner didn't know what had happened, but the first thing the downed firefighter did was inform his partner to hold his position exactly where he was and that there was a hole. He then radioed a mayday call. The fallen firefighter communicated that he was capable of assisting in his own rescue and that there was fire at the basement ceiling but not in direct contact with him at that time.

His partner crawled back to the door to verify that the captain had heard the mayday, which had been acknowledged by the shift lieutenant. The shift lieutenant relayed this information to the captain. An exterior hose line was used to protect the downed firefighter. At this time the deputy chief arrived on the scene and had all companies, except the rescue companies, switch to fireground white for operational communications.

As the mutual aid crew from the Tri-State Protection District came up the front walk to take their assignment, they were immediately reassigned to rapid intervention along with the remaining Hinsdale crews. A 20-foot roof ladder was taken into the structure with the plan to get it into the hole as quickly as possible so the downed firefighter could self-rescue. At the same time the shift lieutenant was in search of another exterior entrance to the basement.

The visibility at this point in the library was zero, and the fire was growing to cut off the access hole from below. The downed firefighter's partner used voice contact to direct the rapid intervention team's effort to ladder the hole. The first couple of attempts were unsuccessful due to hitting debris or overshooting the firefighter. He too was struggling with limited visibility, and his low-air alarm was activating.

Eventually the ladder made it through the hole and the firefighter grabbed it. His first attempt to ascend the ladder was met with great heat and fire, and he had to retreat as the area was cooled. A second attempt met with the same frustration. Finally the third attempt was successful, and as the firefighter came though the hole he was grabbed by the Tri-State and Hinsdale crews and pulled from the building, where he was handed off to the mutual aid ambulance company on the scene.

The deputy chief called for a personnel accountability report at that time and confirmed all companies out of the building and accounted for. From the time of the mayday call until the accountability confirmation was about six minutes.

Shortly thereafter there was a collapse of the floor in that A/D sector, followed by heavy fire in the A/B sector in the basement. There continued to be collapse of the first floor in other areas leading to a defensive attack. Suppression crews continued on the white fireground frequency, per my order, due to concern over switching the multiple companies a second time. It was determined that if another mayday was transmitted we would turn fire operations back to red fireground and keep rescue on white fireground.

Fortunate factors

We all unfortunately have read of mayday situations where the outcome was a severe injury or a fatality. This situation was limited to some bumps and bruises. Some definite factors contributed to the fortunate outcome.

First and foremost of these factors was training. I trust that most departments in today's fire service train like we do on rapid intervention teams, self-rescue and emergency scene communications. Our training officer reviews procedures on a regular basis and conducts practical evolutions in training homes.

Additionally, we are fortunate that in our mutual aid division, MABAS Division 10, RIT procedures and self-rescue techniques are constantly reviewed and refined by training and safety officers to better prepare personnel. In fact, just in December, RIT training in a commercial occupancy was conducted for Division 10 as a result of the loss suffered by the Phoenix Fire Department.

I also credit the Tri-State truck company, as well as my crew, for their quick and decisive tactics. There was no panic, just action, as evidenced by the short time it took to retrieve our downed firefighter. Both crews operated as one with the common goal to save their fellow firefighter. If you were in Tri-State's shoes would you have been able to switch gears as effectively as they did and know what to do in a rescue situation? I will always be grateful they were there when the mayday went down.

Without the composure exhibited by both the downed firefighter and his partner, this incident could have had a very different outcome. For just a moment place yourself in the downed firefighter's situation, on a fire you think you have well under control. With no warning, you plunge into a basement that is involved in fire. Would your first thought be to preserve your partner from falling in behind you? Would you then remember you needed to transmit a mayday? Would you control the very natural urge to panic and, instead of remaining at the hole, stray away in hopes of finding another way out?

How many times have we heard that story of a lost firefighter continuing to move so that companies can't get a good location and ultimately run out of time? What could have happened in this situation if the firefighter had left the hole, given his depleting air supply, the potential fire growth and the time-consuming challenge to find an exterior entrance?

How about his partner? One minute he was in voice contact with a fellow firefighter and the next thing he knows his partner's gone. Would you know that receipt of his mayday message needs to be confirmed? Only you know exactly where he went down and where he is now. You can't afford to do anything but control your emotions.

How about the command staff on the scene? Do you think it was important that they remembered exactly what their procedures were in a mayday situation without referring to a manual? Remember, there's still a fire growing, and your ability to continue suppression efforts may be crucial to the survival of the downed firefighter. Their commands and the tone of those orders either promote confidence or spread despair.

Reinforced training

While our goal is always a perfect fire scene, we all know that isn't usually the case. I would mislead you and not provide some areas to ponder in your own organization if I didn't point out our mistakes.

Lady Luck was on our side. When the switch was made to fireground frequency, in this case fireground red, only one member on the scene failed to hear that command — the downed firefighter. Only the alert monitoring by the shift lieutenant, using his scan mode on his portable, ensured that the downed firefighter was heard immediately. That message was then rebroadcast on red fireground.

Due to size of the home and the estimated depth of the basement, the 20-foot ladder was an appropriate choice. However, this room had a 14-foot boxed beam ceiling that, along with the fact that it was not yet furnished, provided room for the rescue crews to manage the ladder into the hole. In addition, building code regulations as to construction minimums allowed the rescue personnel safe haven around the rescue hole.

That day we learned that homes under construction, specifically those that are almost completed, can be traps for fire personnel. A long pre-burn may lead to void fires that go undetected on initial size-up. What appears to be a room-and-contents fire may be primarily structural members.

Also, it was reinforced that the level of alarm needs to be escalated early. We needed all the people we had at the time of the mayday transmission. Switch to a fireground frequency as soon as possible and confirm all companies have indeed switched and are operating on the same frequency.

Never assume a mayday condition follows a time schedule. Many tragic firefighter losses occur in the early stages of events that do not appear substantial — you can be caught off-guard. Perform regular training on mayday, self-rescue, emergency communications and RIT procedures with line and command staff.

During the investigation, examination of the burn patterns revealed that though almost all the floor joists had been consumed during the course of the fire, what joists that did survive were near the walls. That structural integrity is something to think about whenever possible if evacuating a structure to perform search and rescue or suppression where a long preburn may have occurred.

Once a mayday is transmitted, all hands on the scene will want to be involved in the rescue. Be prepared to institute a calculated rescue attempt, bearing in mind what may have caused the mayday in the first place. Failure to heed this warning can add victims.

Your 360 of the building can provide valuable information. That information goes beyond fire extent, and in the case of a building under construction can advise you if the building has gas or electrical service and access and egress points for both rescue of victims and firefighters alike. Thermal-imaging cameras are a great tool even if you believe the occupancy is empty. They provide information well beyond victim location.

I had more than one company before their release some seven hours later take the time to stop and ask how my firefighter was, as well as to express one common point: They would never take another RIT drill or assignment for granted. You need to take that message back to your organizations. There is no greater assignment than to be responsible for your fellow firefighter's well being.

I would like to personally recognize all the firefighters and command staff on the scene that day who contributed to a successful mayday outcome. I hope you never have to experience a similar situation, but if you do I hope you are prepared.

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Patrick Kenney is chief of the Hinsdale (Ill.) Fire Department.