With the advent of the latest draft of the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System documents, the public safety sector, including the fire service, is struggling with the definition and execution of unified command. I have been fortunate to observe four major terrorism exercises in the past several weeks, and during none of them did the fire service perform UC in the manner in which it was designed or is now mandated.

Many agencies will tell you that they have been using ICS since the 1980s, but in reality all they're doing is calling the fire boss “Command” instead of “Chief 2” on the radio. Fully implementing ICS with planning and logistics section chiefs and a liaison officer, as well as developing and executing an incident action plan, is something most fire officers have never seen and would be hard-pressed to replicate on a real emergency.

The UC concept isn't new. Traditional wildland firefighting agencies, many Department of Defense responders, local fire departments and private fire brigades have successfully executed UC incidents hundreds of times. The new paradigm for local fire departments is that they won't handle major non-fire emergencies completely within their own department or within their city and county resource pool as often as they used to. There are now dozens of non-traditional resources, unknown to the fire service prior to Sept. 11, 2001, that are part of the response to even suspected terror events.

Much of the unified command issues I've witnessed focus on the following problem areas:

1. All UC representatives are co-located, but very little planning or operational and logistics support is integrated among the various operating agencies. There are multiple incident action plans on the same incident.

2. Command doesn't activate the logistics and planning functions at the scene's command post, instead relying too heavily on dispatch/communications to manage resources and logistical support for the incident.

3. As the incident changes, representatives to the UC perform as if they've completed their mission once they are no longer the lead agency and stop contributing.

In looking at the first problem, the key point is that there should be only one incident action plan per incident, but there may be several supporting documents. Co-located is nice, but seamlessly integrated is better. In developing a true unified command, the result is a single incident action plan.

We often see a strategic discussion among the representatives of all contributing agencies, but then the fire staff starts writing the plan for fire operations; police officers write plans for law enforcement; and EMS and public health are on their own, hoping someone will include them in the process.

With a single incident action plan that accounts for the concerns and experiences of a multi-agency command team, the potential for a better outcome will be realized. The coordination of competing priorities with limited resources will be managed more efficiently and more effectively.

As for the second problem, all around our nation on a daily basis, the dispatch or communications center is the focus for obtaining additional tactical and logistical support. As we expand an incident from the initial response, the incident's complexity requires a team of professionals to focus on planning; forecasting; and providing services, support and facilities.

The communications center may serve you well on a single-alarm event, but during a massive incident, the demand on dispatch will be exponential. The need for information management through a planning section and real-time situation status can't be overstated.

To ensure a continuous supply line and stream of support, a competent logistics manager can't be replicated by an overworked communications technician or fire alarm operator, regardless of experience. Operations may win battles, but logistics wins wars, and these complex, extended operations are, in fact, wars!

In terms of the third problem, unified command becomes frustrating when an organization appears to give up when it's no longer the lead agency.

The idea of first in/first out doesn't work on these big events. A fire agency may arrive at the scene of a bombing, intentional chemical release or transportation incident and perform fire control, search, rescue, medical and hazmat operations. But when the last of the injured and “worried well” are removed, the lead agency in the UC may be reassigned based on new incident priorities.

For example, if the preservation of evidence, documentation of the condition and location of the deceased, and removal of imminent structural hazards become the new priorities, the lead agency may become law enforcement. This usually means that the operations section chief also is reassigned to reflect the lead agency.

As the fire department functions become less of a priority, the senior fire officer remains in the UC, and the fire officer directing operations is reassigned and replaced by a law enforcement operations chief. The senior law enforcement representative now assumes the lead role, and the incident action plan is executed for the next phase of operations. However, the relieved fire officers must continue to contribute their ideas, experience and assistance in managing the myriad activities and issues that must be handled by the UC regardless of whether it is a law, fire or health issue.

There is always one “supported commander” and one or more “supporting commanders” who remain on the job until it's done. This level of support and skill is a significant factor in the overwhelming effectiveness of unified command when applied to multifunctional emergencies. In other words, just because your part of the show is over, you don't get to go home.

It's paramount that you and your immediate staff are well-versed and familiar with the new NRP as well as the unified command concept under the latest NIMS document. It's up to training chiefs to get the new information out to the battalions and company officers. At the next staff meeting, distribute a copy of the new documents and have a frank discussion about how these changes affect your fire department.

There is a new NIMS independent study course offered by the U.S. Fire Administration and National Fire Academy (is-700), and the Office for Domestic Preparedness offers formal classroom and simulation courses on both Unified Command for WMD and the Enhanced Incident Management simulation lab at College Station, Texas. Whatever your level of interest, do something to start the improvement process. And in the spirit of unity, send a copy of the new NIMS to your counterparts at the police department, EMS agency and public health office. It'll pay huge dividends in the long run.

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John Linstrom is a senior manager in the Homeland Security Services division of EG&G Technical Services, assigned to the Southern California office. He's an adjunct faculty member for Texas A&M University and the National Fire Academy. Linstrom currently serves as a battalion chief/paramedic in Apple Valley, Calif. He also serves as commander of the DHS/FEMA DMORT team for Region IX and has been involved in the national US&R program since 1996.