As I reviewed the first reports and photos from the furniture store fire in Charleston, S.C., that killed nine firefighters, I was stunned by the similarity in fire conditions to a fire in Phoenix that also killed a firefighter.

For instance, the Charleston fire started on an exterior loading dock, penetrated the building and extended through concealed spaces. Apparently a flashover occurred, trapping firefighters in the building. The fire in Phoenix occurred on March 14, 2001, and involved a 20,132-square-foot supermarket. This fire, too, started on the exterior loading dock and penetrated interior concealed spaces.

It will be many months before the Charleston investigation is complete and details made available. But there are important survival observations from the Phoenix fire that can be discussed in relation to Charleston.

At the Phoenix supermarket fire, the first engine company attacked the loading dock fire from the exterior. The incident commander also assigned an engine and a rescue company to the interior to check for extension and to ensure all occupants had evacuated. When crews initially entered, there was clear visibility to all points of the store. While advancing with a 1^I-inch attack line, firefighters found smoke easing into the supermarket from a rear-corner storage area. As they attacked the fire, they requested a backup attack line. The incident commander ordered another engine crew to take a 1^I-inch attack line and advanced it through the store.

Simultaneously, another engine crew also was entering the storage area from the loading dock to attack the fire. A total of 11 firefighters were in the building, and a second alarm assignment was en route.

As crews continued their interior attack, visibility in the main store remained relatively good, but smoke was beginning to spread into the store area. Suddenly, conditions rapidly worsened. Dense smoke quickly filled the store down to floor level, and the heat immediately increased.

Crews recognized the need to retreat and started doing so as the interior sector officer provided the incident commander a progress report of the deteriorating conditions and their decision to evacuate. The incident commander immediately announced “emergency traffic.” Moments later, following emergency tones, he ordered the evacuation of the building.

Conditions continued to worsen rapidly. During the evacuation, the first mayday was broadcast by Firefighter Brett Tarver, who declared he was off line, out of air and lost. The incident commander immediately ordered the front rapid-intervention team, which consists of an engine and ladder, into the building. An additional engine from staging also was ordered into the front of the building to support the rescue effort, and another was sent in through the loading-dock area. During this period, additional maydays were declared.

A total of four rescued firefighters were sent to the hospital. One fire captain was removed unconscious in near respiratory arrest. He spent several days in the hospital. Sadly Tarver died before he could be rescued.

The Phoenix Fire Department and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health both conducted lengthy investigations of the incident. The investigations examined:

• The Incident Command System;
• Standard operating procedures, training and checklists;
• Rapid-intervention teams;
• Progress reports;
• Air consumption;
• Accountability systems;
• Concealed spaces; and
• Deep-penetration fire operations.

ICS saved lives. A good command organization consisting of an incident commander and several sector officers was in place at the time of flashover. When the crisis occurred, the command team was able to react quickly in and effectively. There were multiple firefighters in trouble, and the department could have suffered additional fatalities had it not been for a good command team.

The Phoenix Fire Department had existing standard operation procedures and checklists related to incident commanders' response to a mayday. The department also had conducted command simulation training for lost firefighter situations previously. This training allowed the command team to react correctly, quickly, and maintain control of an incident involving a highly emotional event for fire crews. These SOPs, training and simulations allowed a smooth and natural escalation to manage the crisis.

When a mayday occurs, the incident commander must change the plan to a priority rescue plan while simultaneously fighting the structural fire. This was an item on the may-day checklist, and the incident commander executed a smooth and effective transition. The new fire attack plan was to aggressively protect the search area using exterior defensive positions to separate the main body of fire from the search area. The rescue plan was to protect the search area with an interior attack while crews conducted searches. This plan continued effectively until firefighter Tarver was removed from the building.

RITs saved lives. They found, escorted or rescued several firefighters who were in the building and either out of air or running out of air. Three crews of four firefighters each were assigned to RIT duties at two entry points. Two RITs entered the front of the store backed up by an additional engine crew from staging. A third team entered from the loading dock area. As crews from additional alarms arrived on the scene, many were assigned to the newly implemented rescue branch to continue search-and-rescue efforts.