As I reviewed the first reports and photos from the furniture store fire in Charleston, S.C., that killed nine firefighters, I was stunned by the similarity in fire conditions to a fire in Phoenix that also killed a firefighter.

For instance, the Charleston fire started on an exterior loading dock, penetrated the building and extended through concealed spaces. Apparently a flashover occurred, trapping firefighters in the building. The fire in Phoenix occurred on March 14, 2001, and involved a 20,132-square-foot supermarket. This fire, too, started on the exterior loading dock and penetrated interior concealed spaces.

It will be many months before the Charleston investigation is complete and details made available. But there are important survival observations from the Phoenix fire that can be discussed in relation to Charleston.

At the Phoenix supermarket fire, the first engine company attacked the loading dock fire from the exterior. The incident commander also assigned an engine and a rescue company to the interior to check for extension and to ensure all occupants had evacuated. When crews initially entered, there was clear visibility to all points of the store. While advancing with a 1^I-inch attack line, firefighters found smoke easing into the supermarket from a rear-corner storage area. As they attacked the fire, they requested a backup attack line. The incident commander ordered another engine crew to take a 1^I-inch attack line and advanced it through the store.

Simultaneously, another engine crew also was entering the storage area from the loading dock to attack the fire. A total of 11 firefighters were in the building, and a second alarm assignment was en route.

As crews continued their interior attack, visibility in the main store remained relatively good, but smoke was beginning to spread into the store area. Suddenly, conditions rapidly worsened. Dense smoke quickly filled the store down to floor level, and the heat immediately increased.

Crews recognized the need to retreat and started doing so as the interior sector officer provided the incident commander a progress report of the deteriorating conditions and their decision to evacuate. The incident commander immediately announced “emergency traffic.” Moments later, following emergency tones, he ordered the evacuation of the building.

Conditions continued to worsen rapidly. During the evacuation, the first mayday was broadcast by Firefighter Brett Tarver, who declared he was off line, out of air and lost. The incident commander immediately ordered the front rapid-intervention team, which consists of an engine and ladder, into the building. An additional engine from staging also was ordered into the front of the building to support the rescue effort, and another was sent in through the loading-dock area. During this period, additional maydays were declared.

A total of four rescued firefighters were sent to the hospital. One fire captain was removed unconscious in near respiratory arrest. He spent several days in the hospital. Sadly Tarver died before he could be rescued.

The Phoenix Fire Department and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health both conducted lengthy investigations of the incident. The investigations examined:

• The Incident Command System;
• Standard operating procedures, training and checklists;
• Rapid-intervention teams;
• Progress reports;
• Air consumption;
• Accountability systems;
• Concealed spaces; and
• Deep-penetration fire operations.

ICS saved lives. A good command organization consisting of an incident commander and several sector officers was in place at the time of flashover. When the crisis occurred, the command team was able to react quickly in and effectively. There were multiple firefighters in trouble, and the department could have suffered additional fatalities had it not been for a good command team.

The Phoenix Fire Department had existing standard operation procedures and checklists related to incident commanders' response to a mayday. The department also had conducted command simulation training for lost firefighter situations previously. This training allowed the command team to react correctly, quickly, and maintain control of an incident involving a highly emotional event for fire crews. These SOPs, training and simulations allowed a smooth and natural escalation to manage the crisis.

When a mayday occurs, the incident commander must change the plan to a priority rescue plan while simultaneously fighting the structural fire. This was an item on the may-day checklist, and the incident commander executed a smooth and effective transition. The new fire attack plan was to aggressively protect the search area using exterior defensive positions to separate the main body of fire from the search area. The rescue plan was to protect the search area with an interior attack while crews conducted searches. This plan continued effectively until firefighter Tarver was removed from the building.

RITs saved lives. They found, escorted or rescued several firefighters who were in the building and either out of air or running out of air. Three crews of four firefighters each were assigned to RIT duties at two entry points. Two RITs entered the front of the store backed up by an additional engine crew from staging. A third team entered from the loading dock area. As crews from additional alarms arrived on the scene, many were assigned to the newly implemented rescue branch to continue search-and-rescue efforts.

Progress reports from all operating locations are critical to the incident commanders' decision-making. At the Phoenix event, the incident commander's view of the roof was obscured partially by the height of the walls at the front of the store. He did not have a good line-of-sight view of smoke issuing from the roof that was carried horizontally across the roof by a breeze. Complicating the situation, the incident commander was able to see white smoke from the fire attack on the loading dock materials, which was drifting across the roof. He was not able to see the increasing dark smoke issuing off the roof behind the white smoke.

A post-incident review of video taken by the media shows rapidly worsening fire conditions. These conditions were not adequately communicated to the incident commander.

Firefighters need to be constantly aware of their SCBA air supply. In this incident, crews were sucker-punched by the initial clear conditions inside the store. When conditions suddenly changed, many were caught with inadequate air supply to safely exit the building. Every firefighter must repeatedly check his or her air supply and not get caught past the point of no return with inadequate air to retreat. Waiting for the low-air warning on the SCBA places the firefighter at great risk of not getting out in time.

For about a decade, Phoenix had been using a detailed accountability system. The system consisted of passports, which listed the individual names of crew members being assigned to the hazard zone. The passports are turned in at an accountability location near each point of entry. Because of this, the department quickly knew who was missing and what general area they were in. This permitted a fast, concentrated rescue effort. It also eliminated wasted efforts based on guessed firefighter locations.

Concealed spaces in large-square-footage buildings can hide a lot of fire and smoke that simply may not be visible by interior crews. This active fire can spread over a large area above the ceiling space before it erupts in visible fire. If firefighters are deep in a large building, they can be overtaken by the flashover before they can exit.

A rapid, 360° reconnaissance of conditions must take place. Progress reports need to be obtained from the roof and all sides of the building to allow for accurate risk assessment. Any dark smoke growing in volume observed from the exterior should signal a concern that there is a significant fire in concealed spaces. This information needs to be communicated to the incident commander and to interior crews.

If smoke conditions are deteriorating, the incident commander must seriously reconsider continuing interior operations versus withdrawing crews.

Deep penetration operations are low-frequency events that create very high risk to firefighters. The experience from the Phoenix fire indicated that firefighters often gauge risk and SCBA air consumption from their experience with the more routine house fires. However, in large buildings, there are no nearby exits or windows available when advancing hose lines deep into the building. If a firefighter gets drawn into waiting for the SCBA low-air warning to activate, he or she may not have a chance to get out in time.

All deep-penetration operations must be viewed as very high risk. The incident commander must understand that it will take longer to evacuate firefighters under deteriorating conditions than it took crews to get deep into the building. The incident commander must take a very cautious approach to these types of operations and closely monitor the conditions and control crews. Evacuation must occur early.

While it was shown that RITs save lives, the Phoenix fire also demonstrated the difficulties in rescuing unconscious firefighters. Finding a lost firefighter is one thing. Extracting him or her from the building is extremely challenging and requires several rescuers to get it done. It takes time.

Following the fire, Phoenix and the Seattle Fire Departments, conducted research in rescuing firefighters from large-square-footage buildings. Phoenix determined 12 firefighters are needed and the average time to search and extract was 21 minutes. Seattle determined 11 firefighters were needed and it took an average of 19 minutes for removal. That is a long time for a firefighter to be out of air — and will likely be lethal.

Firefighters must do all they can to not in trouble in the first place. They must closely, and constantly, monitor their air supply. They must be aware of their surroundings and changing conditions and not push the envelope of risk. They must evacuate before conditions prevent their exit.

When interior crews in Phoenix experienced rapid deterioration of conditions, they immediately chose to retreat rather than continuing to attack a growing fire. They recognized there simply was more fire than they could control with hand lines. They did not need, nor did they seek, permission to evacuate. The interior sector did, however, provide the incident commander a progress report of deteriorating conditions and their decision to self-evacuate. Trying to take a stand on this type of fire would have killed firefighters.

While meeting with chief officer staff in the first days following fire, then-Chief Alan Brunacini stated NIOSH would produce an 80-page report of what went wrong. The Phoenix Fire Department's objective must be to produce an 80-page plan on how to prevent this tragedy from ever occurring again. And Phoenix did just that.

Phoenix provided NIOSH access to more than 100 members to be interviewed — reportedly the largest number of interviews NIOSH had conducted for any pervious fatality investigation. Phoenix also put together a joint labor-management team to conduct an open internal investigation. They took the results of that investigation and the NIOSH findings and created a recovery plan that described changes needed in training, procedures, equipment and more. The investigation report and recovery plan were made available to the fire service and the public. Phoenix since has plotted through the plan and implemented multiple changes, improved training and purchased new or appropriate equipment.

Charleston also has created an investigation team to advise the city on needed changes. This external team is made up of nationally recognized fire offices who have the credentials to conduct a thorough investigation. This team has the talent to make the appropriate recommendations necessary, which if adopted, will prevent this tragedy from occurring again.

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Gary Morris is the fire chief for the Rural-Metro Fire Department, Maricopa and Pinal County Operations, near Phoenix. He previously was the fire chief for the Seattle Fire Department, and he retired as an assistant chief with the Phoenix Fire Department after a 30-year career. He holds a master's degree in organizational management from the University of Phoenix.