On Sept. 3, 2005, Arizona Gov. Janet Napolitano declared a state of emergency in support of Hurricane Katrina and established “Operation Good Neighbor.” The state accepted this mission and committed to welcoming evacuees and providing them with food, shelter, transportation, health and medical services, schools for the children, job training, jobs and other assistance with their short- and long-term needs. The first evacuees arrived in Arizona the next day.

On Sept. 12, the president issued an emergency declaration for the state of Arizona, triggering the release of federal funds to help communities respond to Katrina. FEMA authorized Arizona to provide emergency protective measures, including direct federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program at full federal funding.

Shelter operations were conducted at the Arizona State Fairgrounds in Phoenix. John Philbin's Central West Zone Type II Incident Management Team, Southwest Area Geographic Area Coordination Center, participated in the operations from Sept. 3-23. This mission was so different than most, the team felt it was important to document the successes and problems in detailed form, so that others who are cast into this role may build on the lessons learned from this event. Each function submitted a detailed report. The complete report can be found at www.wildfirelessons.net.

What was the most notable success at the incident that others may learn from?

For the incident commander, the most notable success of Operation Good Neighbor was the cooperative effort by more than 83 agencies and organizations to safely shelter almost 600 evacuees and to effectively transition the shelter evacuees and more than 1,000 self-evacuees to long-term personal recovery.

Another important success was the organization of the faith-based groups with able guidance from a special assistant to the governor. They were able to provide assistance that was structured and contributed in many positive ways to the mission.

For the operations section, the success came from organizing the incident into branches: shelter, medical, transportation, donation and transition. The branches were designed to coordinate and facilitate the work with agencies and organizations involved in this operation.

The medical function was taken out of logistics and placed in operations due to the scope of the mission and the significant number of patients and medical personnel staffing the branch.

We learned with the transportation branch that more drivers doesn't mean things will run smoother. That branch also found it difficult adjusting to the differences between a fire assignment and all-risk management.

The transition branch served as a one-stop shop for “social services” that transitioned the evacuees out from the shelter and into the community. This model could be used for day-to-day business.

The IMT played the essential role of getting 83-plus different agencies and organizations to work together, eliminating redundancy and duplication of efforts in accomplishing the mission.

Using NIMS as the managing system, all agencies could see where they fit into the overall organization. NIMS is the only current way to manage large-scale incidents, so it's the only way to go.

Holding structured briefing/coordination meetings twice daily was key to maintaining and enhancing communications between all of the various agencies and groups involved in the shelter operations. Many of the 83 organizations had not worked in an interagency environment, and daily meetings helped foster working relationships and joint problem-solving.

The collaboration is particularly important in ordering supplies. When all agencies involved finally met and resolved how the ordering process was going to take place, things worked smoother than in the beginning with multiple agencies doing their own thing; the ordering process was speeded up at this point.

Capturing costs were extremely difficult due to the lack of understanding of the finance section. Major resistance was presented by many participants due to turf wars over who was in charge.

The information section served more to provide detailed information to the evacuees rather than the typical public information and media role.

In regard to safety, bringing in a USFS occupational safety officer was a great decision that saved time, energy, and provided a margin of cleanliness and safety that could not have been achieved without his expertise.

What were some of the most difficult challenges faced and how were they overcome?

For the incident commander, the greatest challenge was the sheer number of organizations involved. Every agency and organization understands its mission and how to accomplish it. What they don't know is the mission of the other 82 and how they can integrate with each other while preventing duplication and filling gaps in services.

One squirrel we never got in the cage was the issue of badges and control of access to the shelter. Despite the Herculean efforts of many dedicated, hard-working people, we continually struggled to find a system that would let the right folks in and keep out the folks who were not needed.

For the shelter branch, coordination among the agencies and organizations was a considerable challenge. Many organizations simply went their own way without coordination. Multiple points of contact within organizations changed daily without coordination within their organizations and there was no consistency from shift to shift.

Location of evacuees in the shelter was an issue. We recommend giving evacuees a physical location and address within the shelter and developing and post a set of “house rules” for evacuees and workers.

The Department of Administration must be a daily part of the planning process. DOA must understand that decisions they made without communication severely affect and at times undermine shelter operations.

Keeping on top of the communicable disease problem is paramount. Involvement of CDC and state health professionals is vital before evacuees are brought in.

Multiple state agencies and the Red Cross were the primary contacts for the media during the incident. Unfamiliar with NIMS, they would not provide fact sheets or talking points, nor would they permit IMT fire information officers to speak to the media. The state PIOs conveyed distrust and total exclusion of IMT officers. State PIOs didn't understand NIMS and what it could do for them. During the course of 15 days the relationships did improve.

What changes, additions or deletions are recommended to various training curriculums?

In terms of operations, all players must have an understanding of NIMS. Many say they know it, but very few really have a working knowledge of it or even try to apply it. All participants in emergency preparedness need to be well versed in NIMS. Volunteer organizations knew and applied NIMS better than many state agencies. Also, all lead administrators of core agencies should attend ICS I-200 class.

All-risk incidents need to have personnel familiar with donation management. There is a class at the Emergency Management Institute, and this should be a part of the National Response Plan.

What issues were not resolved to your satisfaction and need further review? Based on what was learned, what is your recommendation for resolution?

We were able to observe the myriad programs that were available to people in a bewildering array. Anyone unfamiliar with all of these programs took days to get through them, even when they were co-located. It looks like there are some database issues that could help the whole process if they were resolved. Does anyone know how many times the evacuees had to provide duplicate information while going to all the transition services? Certainly there are database sharing issues that need to be addressed from a legal aspect, but the opportunity for improved services and operational efficiencies should be a big incentive to pursue this project.

The donation branch found problems with the lack of receiving or distribution points near the disaster. Shipping the collection of commodities also was a problem. There was a total disconnect between what was perceived to be needed by government and was actually needed. Several calls to the advocacy center in Louisiana stated no need for commodities. Calls to contacts in the communities stated otherwise. There was no plan to get donated items from donation sites to where they are needed.

There also was confusion between operations and the Red Cross at time of transition out of the shelter. Numbers, locations and names of evacuees within the shelter were inaccurate. A comprehensive check-in and demobilization procedure would resolve many of the issues.

The use of contract showers was difficult for evacuees. They are not familiar with the units and were reluctant to use them. Significant education must be considered when having civilians use shower units.

Finally, the IMT only maintained the status of camp crews and base camp — related equipment. The Red Cross registered incoming evacuees. There needs to be a central clearinghouse of check-in.

The Operation Good Neighbor after-action review roll-up was submitted to the Wildfire Lessons Learned Center. For the full text, visit www.wildfirelessons.net.