In June, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, along with the International Association of Fire Fighters, called for a safety stand down. The reason for the stand down was the joint concern by both organizations about the number of firefighter fatalities that had occurred in the first few months of 2005. If that rate of deaths continued, the American fire service would experience the worst year of firefighter fatalities in nearly 30 years outside of 2001.

Safety stand downs are a familiar concept, normally revolving around either mechanical failures or trends in human performance errors. Common errors that seem to be contributing to accidents are analyzed, and appropriate corrective training is quickly prepared.

By all indicators, there was widespread participation in the stand down by the American fire service. But the concept was already applied elsewhere in the country before this year. These stand downs have proved to be very beneficial — though they may not have been called a safety stand down.

Near-miss awareness

In the late 1990s, the Fire Department of New York experienced a rash of firefighter fatalities. Led by then — Fire Commissioner Thomas Von Essen, the department quickly put together a back-to-basics safety training program. A booklet was produced describing safety policies, operational procedures and safety training programs. A team was assembled to train all members and officers. The result was a reduction in firefighter fatalities. (Ed.: See “Opportunity Lost,” August, available at www.firechief.com.)

This case illustrates three important principles in improving safety in a fire department. First, support demonstrated by the commissioner sent a clear message: We will be safer. Second, following analysis of the problem, the appropriate training was delivered to all members. Third, the rapid delivery and the special emphasis placed on the problem also carried a message that safety does matter.

Two months after I became fire chief in Seattle, a lieutenant came to see me to describe his near-miss experience at a fire months prior. He explained that he didn't want any other firefighter to go through what he had experienced that night, nor the serous injuries he received.

He described running out of air, becoming separated from his partner and being lost in a burning apartment building. As a last-ditch effort, he detected a window through the smoke and bailed out of the third floor to survive. He suffered substantial smoke inhalation along with serious fractures and internal injuries from the fall.

I made a note to speak to the safety officers and the training chief about the lieutenant's concern, but before the department was able to take any action, I learned of two other recent near-miss events.

During a critique of a multiple-alarm ship fire, a firefighter described getting separated from his partner in the ship's hold and running out of air. By chance, he stumbled into another crew, who escorted him out to safety. The firefighter didn't declare a mayday. He was transported to the hospital suffering from smoke inhalation, treated and later released.

Within days of this statement, a company officer suddenly ran out of air at a residential fire as a result of an SCBA mechanical failure. As he was trying to exit the building on his own, he fell unconscious. Another crew stumbled on him by chance and rescued him. Upon exit, the paramedics found that he had a respiratory rate of only four. He was intubated, revived and transported to the hospital where he was admitted for severe smoke inhalation. He did not declare a mayday, either.

I called for a safety stand down.

Training goals

The first step was to bring all the operations chiefs and safety officers together to conduct a quick analysis of the events. That analysis identified several common errors in each of the three incidents. It further identified several other contributing factors that led to these near-misses.

Once these items were identified, we established a plan for corrective action. We quickly put together an initial education package, and battalion chiefs met with each crew to review the lessons learned. We considered this education effort an interim step while the safety officers and training staff put together a more formalized safety training program for the following year.

We also introduced a rules of engagement procedure for structural firefighting and a new safety policy titled “Best Practices for Risk Analysis and Decision Making,” which described a good safety culture.

A research effort into the capabilities (and limitations) of rapid intervention teams was conducted. As a result of this research, the department's RITs were expanded to include additional resources, specialized equipment and training. The RITs would now be supervised by battalion chiefs. (Ed.: See “Too Little, Too Late,” September, available at www.firechief.com.)

The three personnel who reported the near misses appeared in a training video, telling their stories and lessons learned. The department produced two additional videos describing the results of the RIT research and the resulting new operating procedures, organization and rescue techniques.

We also developed a firefighter safety and survival training program that emphasized SCBA supply awareness, crew integrity, firefighter accountability, use of mayday declarations and the incident commander's response to a mayday. We delivered this program to all crews.

Finally, we implemented an air-management awareness program, which is now being taught at national conferences by Seattle fire officers. The department also purchased larger-capacity air bottles and upgraded their SCBAs with heads-up technology on facepieces that displays the amount of air remaining in the bottle.

Positive results

As result of the safety stand down, there have been no additional near-miss events. The three training videos became a popular item of request from other fire departments. The air-management awareness program continues to be in high demand at national conferences.

There is no question that the fire chief is responsible for firefighter safety. A fire chief can't afford to disregard near-miss events. The message transmitted by the fire chief's decision to call a safety stand down is that the fire chief is serious about safety. To get results, the safety stand down must coincide with an accurate analysis of the problem, along with appropriate and supported follow-through. In both cases described, the results were a far safer work force.

A fire chief doesn't have to wait for the declaration of a national stand down to take action to improve safety. If the problem is serious enough, the fire chief must take action, and do it quickly. A “safety stand down” is one approach to make it happen.

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Gary Morris is the fire chief for the Rural-Metro Fire Department, Maricopa and Pinal County Operations, near Phoenix. He previously was the fire chief for the Seattle Fire Department, and he retired as an assistant chief with the Phoenix Fire Department after a 30-year career. Morris is the immediate past chair of the IAFC Safety Committee. He holds a master's degree in organizational management from the University of Phoenix.