The world order is changing, and many of those changes will have a direct impact on the fire service's role as primary first responder. In that role, firefighters are expected to enter many unknown environments and respond to incidents of civil unrest.

Experts on protective clothing and respiratory equipment, as well as fire departments themselves, have taken many positions regarding how to protect first responders, but the common thread has been that firefighters will be expected to enter hostile environments with conventional structural firefighting clothing, despite those environments being outside what has been considered “normal” for the fire service.

Inadequate preparations

The NFPA 1971 — compliant structural ensemble usually is considered the highest level of non-specialized protective clothing routinely available for the fire service. Many scenarios outside of “normal” could confront firefighters with life-threatening or potentially fatal situations without the appropriate specialized protective clothing or respiratory protection. A major goal confronting the fire service is how to protect first responders in the new world order — with its new definition of “normal” — while not requiring SCBA and a fully encapsulated hazmat suit on every medical aid incident.

Many fire departments have not taken steps to equip or protect firefighters. Most WMD response plans currently in place will result in first responders on the scene of a WMD incident becoming casualties. Such casualties may not result in death, but they most certainly will further dilute critical resources from the incident.

Every fire department or regional response jurisdiction must include a comprehensive plan that includes a WMD dispatch procedure where dispatchers attempt to obtain in-depth information on the scene to warn personnel. In addition, firefighters need to be prepared with easily accessible monitoring equipment and personal protective equipment.

Research indicates that many WMD respiratory protection programs currently in place are inadequate. The current industry standard takes the path of least resistance by using the structural facepiece for WMD incidents, albeit with different filters for different environments. This appears to be a good idea but can be flawed in reality.

The SCBA facepiece is engineered to have positive pressure maintained in the mask. Breathing resistance and carbon dioxide levels are designed based on a constant flow of breathing air into the facepiece. In contrast, a negative-pressure mask is designed to filter toxins upon inhalation and make breathing resistance as easy as possible, generally with low volumes. Breathing resistance has a direct and immediate impact on the performance of the responder, as does the heat stress from hazmat suits.

Facepiece problems

During a Sacramento Regional Fire Academy class, the use of an SCBA facepiece as the primary protective facepiece was tested using the standard WMD-issue cartridge. The cartridge was designed to provide protection from nuclear, biological and chemical contaminants. The experiment was conducted to see if the approved regional system would be effective and desired to see what effect it had on the wearer.

The recruits performed basic tasks under moderate exertion levels, using a modified SCBA agility drill in which some events were altered to simulate a WMD incident. For example, the dummy drag was replaced with a patient on a backboard being loaded onto a gurney, and the gurney was rolled the distance of the hose drag. Each recruit was placed into an agency-appropriate WMD respiratory facepiece with a single NBC cartridge, as per current regional policy. There were an equal number of users of two different NFPA 1981 — approved SCBA facepieces with negative-pressure adaptors.

The results were universal between the two manufacturer's facepieces. The recruits complained of various degrees of headaches and shortness of breath soon after donning the facepiece and beginning the exercise. Breathing difficulty was directly related to effort expended. The harder the recruit worked, the harder the breathing resistance. Recruits were able to slow their operation to complete the task, but this slowing almost doubled the time required to complete the course.

This unscientific experiment indicates that the positive-pressure facepiece may not be suitable for negative-pressure applications, especially if the incident requires the user to be in the facepiece for extended lengths of time. It may be suitable as a cost-effective way to start the WMD respiratory program, but it shouldn't be considered a long-term solution, especially in any jurisdiction that is a potential target.

Such a solution is dependent on departments having time on their side. For example, many departments base their WMD respiratory programs on personnel rotating every 30 minutes or up to an hour or two. This is unrealistic during an emergency. Most fire departments don't have the personnel to rotate during an actual WMD incident that may last for several days or weeks.

Time is also a factor in the use of positive-pressure facepieces. Because negative-pressure units offer dual filters located near the mouth in, they reduce the breathing resistance by a factor of four. That's important if the user has to keep the filter on for the entire approved filter duration of up to eight hours.

These SCBA and filter issues can be a factor outside of WMD environments, as well. Consider the case of fire service personnel assisting law enforcement after the release of riot gas. Most fire departments currently provide no protection other than SCBA for such an environment. Unfortunately, SCBA use will severely limit performance ability, as a first responder will be expected to perform Advanced Life Support procedures while carrying 45 pounds of cumbersome gear on the back. The firefighter also will have only 20 to 30 minutes of air before having to change the SCBA cylinder. How practical is changing out cylinders in that environment, and how close would the air compressor unit be able to park?

Clothing issues

Facepieces aren't the only problem. There are also concerns with the garments issued to first responders for use during WMD incidents, from very bulky hazmat garments to standard structural firefighting clothing.

Although departments don't come right out and state that first responders are expendable, many of their SOPS demonstrate a lack of understanding of the levels of protection offered by protective clothing. Most of these procedures are based on the 3/30 Rule, a notion from the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, or SBCCOM, that structural firefighting protective clothing provides an acceptable level of short-term protection from nerve agent vapor.

However, the main protective component of the structural ensemble is the moisture barrier, which protects the wearer from outside liquids while allowing water vapor and heat to escape. Gas vapor is smaller than water vapor and can enter the garment more easily. In other words, the moisture barrier is not a vapor barrier.

Primarily designed to keep the firefighter's thermal layer dry during firefighting, the moisture barrier is also intended to prevent liquid penetration of NFPA 1971 — specified common chemicals, including battery acid, rescue tool hydraulic fluid, AFFF, swimming pool chlorine and gasoline. The moisture barrier is not designed for overall chemical protection, and I know of no moisture barrier manufacturers advocating the use of structural garments as protective garments for WMD incidents.

In fact, structural firefighting ensembles are not designed with WMD use in mind. Although there is much talk about using duct tape at the interface areas such as the wrist, this effort seems futile when you consider that the knit hoods worn by many firefighters provide no moisture or vapor protection. The hood is designed to allow heat to escape, and there are no provisions for liquid or vapor protection.

Equipment best practices

A system can be put into place that will minimize exposure and that provides firefighter safety without relying on structural protective clothing. The key element to success is designing a response model that promotes awareness and easy access to appropriate equipment. Such a plan would place appropriate levels of respiratory and WMD clothing within easy reach of the responder and may someday place some type of nerve, blister and radiological detectors with first responder personnel. Personnel must be trained, and they must be trained to be alert.

Respiratory protection. First responders should be provided with individually issued gas masks that have been approved by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. Gas masks run between $200 and $225.

Departments should select a non-silicone NIOSH-approved facepiece that offers a wide field of vision and provides up to eight hours of breathe-through protection for the 13 serious chemical agents, as well as protection from airborne particle contaminates such as anthrax. A P100-rated filter is suitable for this application, as it won't degrade in an oil-based aerosol environment and is 99.97% efficient in filtering particles with a median size of 0.3 microns. All personnel would be appropriately quantitatively fit-tested.

Purchasing consideration should be directed to the new NIOSH standard that aims to protect users in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear environments. Manufacturers are currently submitting models for certification, and several respiratory products have been certified successfully. The CBRN standard may be confusing to some users, as there will be models for respiratory equipment that appear to be the same — only the respirator with the CBRN label will be approved for CBRN environments. An identical pack may look the same, but only be certified for traditional firefighting uses.

Protective clothing. Departments should provide a compact NFPA 1994-compliant Level B first responder suit. Prices range from $250 to $500. There are various models of hazmat clothing currently available, and selections can be confusing. There are several quality fabrics on the market, and there are some very exciting changes coming that will benefit the first responder.

NFPA 1994, Protective Ensembles for Chemical/Biological Terrorism Incidents, was adopted in 2001 and identifies three different levels of protection against chemical and biological terrorism based on perceived risk. The levels of protection are divided into three classes, with a Class 1 ensemble being the most protective and Class 3 the least. All three classes provide protection of fire personnel, and selection should be made after a risk analysis and action plan are developed.

In addition to clothing, there are many new fabrics that can be used to create a WMD satchel system that will hold a gas mask and respiratory protection, NFPA 1994-compliant first responder suit, and sealing tape and gloves. The satchel, which would cost about $60, will ensure that each first responder would be appropriately prepared and that the equipment is readily accessible. Personnel would rely on their current issued structural footwear to protect the feet of the protective suits.

Early warning devices provide passive warning for WMD agents and may become a more common part of the first responder's arsenal in the future.

Currently the most common detection of nerve and blister agents is done through wet surface testing, much like a litmus test. There are current products such as M-9 tape, used extensively by the military, that may be developed into an operational plan as long as it's not considered a long-term solution. M-9 tape can be placed on medical bags and boxes as a passive warning device. This is not a fail-safe method, but it may provide some indication of a hazard. The military currently places the tape on vehicles and personnel as a passive warning device that changes color when in contact with wet WMD agents.

Radiological pagers are becoming more common, and the technology has advanced so that marketable products are becoming available. While these pagers detect all three types of radiation, protective clothing will only provide protection from alpha particles, limited protection from beta and no protection from gamma. Reliability and cost of these early warning devices are still to be seen.

While the early warning devices are still in the near future and will be available later this year, the clothing and respiratory devices are currently available and implementation could commence immediately.

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Capt. Michael McKenna is the author of several articles on firefighter safety and is currently assigned to the safety division of the Sacramento (Calif.) Metro Fire District. A member of the fire service since 1977, he sits as a principal member of NFPA 1971 and is also a fire service risk management consultant for Gregory Bragg and Assoc.

Why Gas Masks?

The new “normal” means the introduction of non-traditional equipment to the fire service. For example, the fire service has never had much use for a gas mask.

The traditional gas mask, designed for the military and law enforcement, provides dual-canister mounting with one filter on each side so that the mask can be used with rifles or shotguns. This would allow firefighters to use two filter canisters per person and thereby reduce the breathing resistance by a factor of four. This would increase productivity if circumstances preclude timely relief for personnel. However, it's important to remember that work times will be limited to filter duration based on type of filter and type of hazard.

These masks would be issued individually to all suppression personnel for use during WMD or civil disturbance incidents. If the United States maintains its military presence in the Middle East and if public resistance begins to grow, first responders could find themselves in situations with law enforcement where respiratory protection from tear gas is important.

Currently, most personnel would be required to use SCBA in such a situation. While SCBA is the most effective respiratory protection, its use makes many other activities difficult including something as simple as Advanced Life Support procedures. In addition, personnel will be required to change bottles every 20 minutes.

The gas mask is perfect for first-response WMD and civil-disturbance operations. The caveat is that because of the war and the fears of terrorism, the availability to the masks has tightened, as they are issued to many government agencies and prices are less negotiable. Gas mask manufacturers are at or near full capacity.

Fit Testing

Some fire departments do not fit test their personnel and many fire departments experience difficulties with respiratory fit testing. The initial problem is that the fire service doesn't take respiratory fit testing seriously. Many fire departments still rely on hoods and banana oil and have no annual provisions to make sure that respiratory equipment is properly fitted. Fire departments do not maintain accurate records of fit test values or conduct fit testing on a regular basis.

Large metropolitan fire departments should consider only quantitative fit testing as an appropriate method, as they face a greater hazard to unusual airborne hazards. In addition, fire departments should consider raising the minimum acceptable fit test level to 1,500 or even 2,000 from the OSHA minimum value of 1,000. Generally, a fit test value of 1,000 indicates that the air inside the mask is 1,000 times cleaner than outside the mask, as measured by a particle count.

Proper fit testing takes into account the effect of facepiece or mask selection. Currently, some manufacturers rely on silicone as a sealing fabric for facepieces because silicone provides that soft, sure fit. Unfortunately, there are problems associated with the silicone that include slippage on the face when sweating. Other respiratory equipment manufactured out of silicone will have similar results.

It's also important to note that silicone facepieces don't stop nerve or blister agents. With the possibility of these instances occurring, all silicone facepieces should removed from service. Silicone-based WMD respiratory protection should not be considered acceptable.