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September is National Preparedness Month. Glenn Gaines, the U.S. Fire Administration's deputy assistant director, shares core lessons learned about recent disasters to hit U.S. soil. Gaines was joined by Chuck Burkell, the IAFC's President Award recipient and the training specialist for the USFA's executive development program.
Did you ever expect to witness disasters like 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina?
Gaines: Let's being with Hurricane Katrina. History has told us that it could certainly hit the Gulf Coast, and it's a prevalent event. In fact, in 1969, Hurricane Camille struck the Gulf Coast, causing 256 deaths and $1.4 billion in damages. Again, Hurricane Andrew in 1992 struck the Florida peninsula and later up the east coast.
In terms of terrorism, if we look at the [World Trade Center], it was struck prior to the major event in 2001. I think the challenge for the fire service in terms of terrorism is to realize a number of issues, and we'll talk about those later. But I think to the extent that the event at WTC was so catastrophic and such a challenge — even to probably one of the finest and most-prepared fire departments in the world — had such a catastrophic effect I think it was an eye-opener for everyone. I don't know that anyone could have imagined that kind of event with that catastrophic of an impact.
How did such events change the first responders' approach to disasters?
Gaines: I think in a number of ways. Let's talk about hurricanes first. We know that the greatest challenge to local fire departments is that hurricanes are, in fact, a regional event in that they can no longer depend on mutual aid or their friends coming in to assist them. So even though we plan for these events through mutual-aid on the local, state and federal level, we must realize that we pretty much are on our own as local responders. So we must have redundancy and remember that in fact we could become victims, rather than responders. In fact, if memory serves me correctly, New Orleans firefighters — 80% of them lost their homes. So for the most part, the New Orleans Fire Department was damaged in such a way that it made it difficult for them to continue their critical mission.
In terms of terrorism, I had an opportunity to respond to incidents in and around the great Washington metropolitan area when I served as a command officer and later as fire chief. First thing that that firefighters and chief command officers must realize is that this is a crime scene, and that law enforcement for the most part plays the lead role and has a very important role to determine the cause and the nature and the perpetrators involved in these types of events. And second, it also must be on the minds of responders that secondary devices may be in play, and that there are major issues in terms of coordination, structural damage … that put firefighters in peril — especially during the early initial operation. …
The concern I have right now about terrorism is that no one is talking about it because we haven't been struck lately. So I would raise the issue to all fire chiefs to keep terrorism on your mind, be wary of the potential of terrorism and learn from the past.
What are the core lessons learned of preparing operational strategies for a large-scale incident?
Burkell: In New York and the Gulf Coast, actually responders became victims of the incident. We know today 342 FDNY plus additional law enforcement or EMS personnel lost their lives as a result of the attack in New York, so there was all that sorrow and emotional climate. [After Katrina] many of the New Orleans firefighters throughout the Gulf Coast were separated from families and belongings. Operationally, that has to be considered and planned for. The use of National Incident Management System and EOCs are key components for the operational system. And finally, I'd like to site the operational core lesson [for U.S. disasters] was the clarification of roles. And, of course, that largely comes from the incident command system. We need to practice that on a daily basis so that when we are confronted with a complex incident, we are comfortable and practiced with those roles as they become more complex in nature.
What about the reliability of communication systems in a disaster, including power?
Burkell: At the WTC, I arrived a few days after the event in lower Manhattan. By then, communications were fairly well established. However, there continued to be challenges in lower Manhattan. The noise was tremendous. There was this visual distraction when you looked around and saw the remains of lower Manhattan lying in front of you as dust — it was emotionally and visually distracting … it was a period of great anxiety. Katrina, in terms of communications, [disaster] was spread throughout the Gulf region. Wires were down, even after Rita. So phone communications could not be depended on. Cell phones were impacted. There were some utilities using satellite phones but even early on the effectiveness of those were mixed. So this is where our regional, state and federal roles can be of utility because typically those government entities have resources that can enhance communications when there is a venue that's so catastrophic.
What about in terms of equipment or new innovations in the fire service?
Burkell: I think there has been progress made in some areas, meaning equipment and issues related to interoperability. But what comes to my mind is logistics and the functions of staging. That is, we have a lot of let's say bottled water and PPE for personnel, but we may have difficulty getting it to the right location. That's where logistics, finance and various incident-management functions step in, to take that equipment and put it in places where it is needed the most and can be put in the most effective areas at the time.
What social lessons were learned, such as community relations during a disaster?
Burkell: In both incidents — and it's probably not something I would say we are necessarily that proud of but is certainly a reality because of our human nature — I observed incidents where there is a certain climate — not necessarily shared by all but by some — that anything goes. What I mean by that is that we find ourselves in a period of stress, and it lessens our ability to be self-disciplining. So we tend not to follow our own pre-existing plans, and when we do that we can get hurt or see personnel die. So there needs to be preparation that builds in that discipline, as well a counseling and stress management in order to take care of people when they are under stress so they can operate safely. So it has to be a strong lesson. The public had great fear and anxiety and we have to address that. And the responders were suffering alongside the people the need to service.
What improvements have been made?
Gaines: I think the advent of NIMS and the fact that most, if not all, fire departments in this country to some degree have adopted incident command systems and NIMS as daily operational guidelines. I think also the fact that most fire chiefs now in high-risk cities realize there needs to be synergy in terms of the response. The fire service and EMS partners are good. But we don't have all the answers. We need the assistance of public health, public works and law enforcement to gain control of the scene and investigate. So I think that has changed in terms of understanding that not only do we as fire and EMS have responsibility but this must be a coordinated approach to scene management.
Burkell: I concur. The emphasis on NIMS and ICS is the biggest change from a national perspective — not to say it didn't exist in the past but we have made steady progress. I would have to believe that as a nation we are better prepared — not fully — but better to handle these kinds of incidents.
What is your advice to other fire chiefs when it comes to preparing for the next disaster?
Burkell: I think there are four simple steps that are hard to achieve. First of all, every community must perform some level of a vulnerability risk assessment. We have to know what our major elements of risk are in the event that a natural disaster or a terrorism event confronts our organization. In that process, we need to identify who else beyond our own organization is going to mitigate such threats. Next, we have to practice ICS daily. … Finally, it's that notion that we have to exercise, exercise, we have to do it continuously. And then we have to take that after-action, to go back and improve upon the system.
Gaines: We are the first line of defense being first responders, and I'd like to include myself as part of our first-response capability because the federal system — FEMA specifically — as our role as part of the team. We want to ensure that as first responders we have redundancy, that we have plans in place that if the worst happens and that our material and human resources capabilities are wiped out, what plans are in place so we can provide the service that we are charged to provide to our citizens.




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