Studies show that most fire officers react to the situation at hand by recognizing elements of the situation that appear similar to past experiences and quickly choosing actions similar to those that worked for them in the past. This recognition-primed or cue-based decision-making process works extremely well for experienced chief officers and incident commanders who have developed a large mental database of situations through a combination of training and working actual incidents. (See “Time-Tested,” August 2008, available at www.firechief.com.)

The question remains how the fire service can help newer or less experienced chief officers and future chief officers — who may have extensive knowledge, skills and abilities at the tactical/task level — develop the ability to make these intuitive decisions at the strategic/tactical level.

Chief Lloyd Layman proposed an answer to this dilemma as early as the 1940s. Locate a copy of his Firefighting Tactics, published in 1953, and read the introduction. While it may seem that no information so dated could possibly apply to today's firefighting, consider this: Layman's concepts of firefighting tactics created much of the basic foundation on which today's “modern” theories and practices have been built.

Layman wrote that his primary purpose was to “outline a system of training designed to enable officers and future officers of the fire service to familiarize themselves with the art of directing operations on the fireground.” He wanted to present a way of teaching tactics that was “intended to bridge the gap between theory and experience.” Layman argued that to be successful on the fireground, a chief officer must “train the mind in the habit of surveying and analyzing a complicated situation in a systematic manner.” He believed this was necessary to develop and weigh options, decide what action to take, formulate a plan and implement the plan.

While Layman's teachings were presented long before Gary Klein published his findings on recognition-primed decision-making, they still are very applicable today. As chief officers repeatedly use a systematic approach to choose and employ strategies and tactics during simulated training and actual fire responses, this system will facilitate the recognition of various cues, which will, in turn, foster cue-based decisions much more naturally.

Many seem to agree that while the fire service is spending much time and effort sending chiefs through NIMS 700, 100, 200, 300, 400 and more, these chiefs must still get some Strategies and Tactics: 101. By comparing information from older tactics textbooks to the latest ones published; old class notes with new curriculum; the thoughts of retired chiefs to the ideas of today's chiefs; past theories and practices to current theories and practices; the fire service can identify the best practices for chief officers responsible for commanding firegrounds in their communities.

Layman's efforts resulted in his original list of Basic Divisions of Firefighting Tactics as found in his book (Strategy 1). Notice that size-up is listed vertically on the left. That's because size-up is an ongoing process that lasts throughout the duration of the fire. The tactical considerations of rescue, exposures, confinement, extinguishment and overhaul are numbered one through five and listed in the normal sequence of priority. The tactical considerations of ventilation and salvage are lettered and listed to the side, indicating that they can be inserted at any point as the need arises.

Strategy 2 shows a variation of Layman's basic divisions. This is how I first learned about tactical priorities, as this is how my father, Chief William Ennis Sr., always taught what he referred to as the Seven Fundamentals of Firefighting. He simply listed size-up as the first thing a chief officer must do. However, he added two important considerations: call for help and water supply. His logic was the chief officer's size-up should indicate whether he would need additional resources. Dealing mostly with volunteer departments, he argued that if a chief thought he might need additional help, he had better call for it early, as it would take time to arrive.

Adding call for help to the list reminded officers of this crucial early step. Water supply also was added, as the available water supply might affect the ability to, and therefore the decisions relating to, protecting exposures and confining and extinguishing the fire. He included water supply with ventilation and salvage as separate considerations listed vertically to illustrate that they could be considered at any point.

Strategy 3 shows retired Chief Alan Brunacini's list of tactical priorities introduced through his Fireground Command System. In typical Brunacini fashion, his list was short, sweet and to the point. The National Fire Academy adopted these priorities when it developed the curriculum for its Incident Command System courses, changing the terminology to fit its all-incident approach (Strategy 4). While the shortened lists work great for a seasoned chief officer, the three categories as listed may be vague for a new chief initially trying to learn more specific tactics.

Strategy 5 shows the Seven Basic Strategies, again found in the National Fire Academy's ICS curriculum and Chief James Smith text, Strategic and Tactical Considerations for the Fireground. This is identical to Layman's list, summarized in the modern-day acronym RECEO-VS. The fact that Layman's concept has survived in one form or another for six decades is testament to its merit and appeal.

Fireground Strategic Priorities (Strategy 6) is basically the list my father taught for many years. It is based on Layman's original time-tested list, originally created for the purpose of teaching fireground tactics. And I understand and agree with my father's logic for considering the need for help early and the critical element of water supply. I also prefer the term life-safety to rescue. Rescue conjures thoughts of pulling people from burning buildings or carrying them down ladders. Life safety covers not only these rescues, but safety for firefighters, those who already made it out, spectators and police officers. In addition, consider the possibility of a rapid knockdown early.

If this can be achieved, most of the other problems on the fireground are normally minimized.

Regardless of which priority list a chief officer chooses to use, whether it's one here or their own hybrid list, consistently using that list during training, exercises and actual incidents can achieve Layman's objective of “training their mind” to work their way through a chaotic fireground until they develop the ability to react to the cues before them.

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Rick Ennis is the fire chief for the city of Cape Girardeau, Mo. He is a third-generation fire chief with more than 27 years of experience, including nearly 12 years as a fire chief. He earned an associate's degree in fire administration and a bachelor's degree in urban affairs and public administration, and is a graduate of the National Fire Academy's Executive Fire Officer program.